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Can Vermont Put the Nuclear Genie Back in
the Bottle?: A Test of Congressional
Preemptive Power
Hope Babcock •

Before the nuclear core meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
reactors in Japan restoked public anxiety about nuclear energy, Vermont's
Senate used Vermont Act No. 160 to vote to block continued operation of the
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant after the expiration of its forty-year
operating license. This Article examines whether a state can legislatively
override a permit issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission extending the
license of a power plant. The author places this question within a broader
federalism context-one where states assert their sovereign rights to regulate
the environment in the shadow of federal mandates. She finds the absence of
language mandating the use of nuclear power and of an express preemption
provision in the Atomic Energy Act persuasive of a lack of preemption for a
state's legislative override of this type of permit. Equally convincing is the
Atomic Energy Act's reservation of state authority over the generation, sale,
and transmission of energy produced by nuclear power plants, and the passage
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of environmental laws giving states regulatory authority over some aspects of
nuclear power plant operation. Additionally, the author argues that policy
arguments favoring preemption, such as the need for uniformity and
coordination of shared resources, superior federal resources and technical
knowledge, and prevention of spillover effects do not apply to this situation;
while arguments against preemption, such as preserving states as robust
centers ofgovernance and regulatory experimentation and as checks on federal
government excesses and errors, and avoiding regulatory gaps and regulatory
capture, do apply here. Even collective action problems, which often favor
preemption, are weak. The argument that Vermont's initiative may derail
recent national efforts to "restart" the nuclear power industry as a way to
reduce the nation 's dependence on foreign oil and its global carbon footprint
also fails as applied to Vermont's legislation. Thus, the author concludes that
Vermont Act No. 160 should withstand a preemption challenge.
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INTRODUCTION

The [state] law will be followed in this matter regardless of the NRC's
jurisdiction. 1
We nuclear people have made a Faustian Bargain with society. On the
one hand we offer-in a catalytic nuclear burner-an inexhaustible
source of energy. But the price we demand of society for this miracle
energy source is both a vigilance and longevity of our social
institutions that we are quite unaccustomed to. The society must then
make the choice and this is a choice that we nuclear people cannot
dictate. We can only participate in making it. 2
Nuclear power currently provides approximately 20 percent of the
electrical energy consumed by the United States. 3 Yet, largely because of the
accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 outside Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in 1978,
no new reactors have been constructed since then. Indeed, many reactors on the
drawing boards at that time were cancelled. 4 As a result, the nation's nuclear
fleet is an aging one. Originally licensed for forty years, designers of these
older reactors expected that they would have been replaced before the end of
their operating lifetime by now with newer models. 5 However, none of these
reactors have been replaced, which is why the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) is issuing licenses to extend their operating lifetime for twenty-year
periods. This is what the NRC did in the case of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Plant. 6
1. Elizabeth MiJier, State Commissioner of Public Services, as quoted in Amanda Peterka, NRC
Puts Hold on Vermont Yankee License, GREENWIRE (March 16, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/
Greenwire/print/2011/03/16/7.
2. Eric Charles Woychik, California's Nuclear Disposal Law Confronts the Nuclear Waste
Management Dilemma: State Power to Regulate Reactors, 14 ENVTL. L. 359 (1984) (quoting Alvin
Weinberg, Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy, 177 SCI. 27 (1972)).
3. See Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy
Sources?, 46 IDAHO L. REv. 509, 528 (2010) (listing nuclear energy as 20 percent of U.S. total net
electricity generation).
4. Nathan Hultman, Jonathan G. Koomey & Daniel M. Kammen, Viewpoint, What History Can
Teach Us about the Future Costs of U.S. Nuclear Power, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2088-89 (2007) (In
2005, "[o]ne hundred and four nuclear reactors provided 19.3% of U.S. electricity generation, but no
new reactors have been approved for construction by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
since 1978."); see also Hope M. Babcock, A Risky Business-Generation of Nuclear Power and
Deepwater Drilling for Offshore Oil and Gas, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63 (2012) (discussing cancelling
nuclear power plants after the core meltdown at Three Mile Island).
5. As Reactors Age, Standards Relax-Report, GREENWIRE (June 20, 2011) [hereinafter As
Reactors Age, Standards Relax], http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/06/20/7.
6. The NRC has issued sixty-six licenses granting operating reactors twenty-year extensions of
their original licenses, and sixteen more extensions are pending at the NRC. Jeff Donn, Tritium Leaks
Found at Many Nuke Sites, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 21, 2011), http://www.ap.org/company/
awards/part-ii-aging-nukes; see also Timothy Hurst, Will Fukushima Pull a Vermont Nuclear Plant Off
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The recent concern about climate change and energy independence has
rekindled an interest in rebooting the commercial nuclear industry. 7 The
nuclear industry is developing a new generation of reactors and streamlined
licensing procedures in response to that interest. 8 Yet public concerns remain
about reactor safety, spent nuclear fuel storage, and nuclear proliferation, as
well as the high costs of the nuclear plants. 9 These factors prompt some states
to question the advisability of extending the operating lifetime of their older
plants. 10
This Article examines whether states, like Vermont, li can block the
NRC's extension of the operating lifetime of nuclear reactors. Answering this
question requires an examination of federalism and preemption concerns,
which have become increasingly muddled. Evolving understandings about the
safety risks of these reactors and attendant economic costs to states of their
operation, as well as available energy alternatives, have made the answer less
clear, and the peripatetic boundary between state and federal power over
environmental matters has encouraged states to flex their regulatory muscles

the Rails?, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2011 ), http:www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid~US 156615525820 I 10331
("The NRC gas never turned down a plant relicensing ... granting 61 straight extensions to the nation's
aging fleet.").
7. Hultman et a!., supra note 4, at 2089 ("Rising and volatile petroleum prices, geo-political
conflicts in fossil-fuel-rich regions, increasing energy demand from emerging economies, and climate
change have all contributed to a resurgence of interest in nuclear power because of its potential to
address energy security without emitting C0 2 or regional pollutants."); id. at 2092 ("The case for nuclear
power resurgence rests not on expectations for dramatic growth in electricity demand but rather on
concerns about energy security and climate change.").
8. Babcock, supra note 4, at 143 nn. 404, 405 (discussing the next generation of nuclear power
plants and proposals to streamline the reactor licensing process).
9. Hultman et a!., supra note 4, at 2089 ("[E]ven in a carbon-constrained world, nuclear power
may be more expensive than some decentralized energy-efficient and distributed-generation
technologies.").
I 0. Similar situations have arisen in other areas involving nuclear power plants and radioactive
materials. See, e.g., Brendan T. Guastella, Lights Out for L/LCO: A Look at New Yorks' Takeover Plan,
53 BROOK. L. REv. 723, 744 (1987) ("Unless the NRC changes the regulations [allowing utilities to
carry out emergency response functions], the Supreme Court will be forced to determine whether a state
may effectively prohibit a utility from obtaining an operating license for a nuclear power plant by
withholding services, ordinarily provided by the state, when the services are necessary for fulfillment of
RERP [radiological emergency response plan] requirements."); Karen Goxem, Emergency Offiite
Planning for Nuclear Power Plants: Federal Versus State and Local Control, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 417,
434 (1988); Barbara H. Schuknecht, Thomas D. Overcast & Dwight D. Dively, Federal Preemption of
State and Local Radioactive Materials Transportation Regulations, 4 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 3, 16
(1985) ("[T]he federal government has the legal authority to preempt virtually all state and local laws
regulating transportation of radioactive materials [under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, [and] the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1804
(1982)] .... [State and local] laws already disrupt radioactive materials transportation to some extent,
and carriers and shippers fear that further proliferation of such laws may make such shipments virtually
impossible. On the other hand, states, localities, and facilities can offer substantial reasons for some of
their requirements, usually related to improved safety or information to facilitate planning. From a
policy perspective, these reasons suggest that considerable thought should be given to any effort to
preempt all state and local requirements affecting shipments of radioactive material.").
II. See 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 160.
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over nuclear plants. Since the U.S. Supreme Court carved out an area of state
regulation from the previously exclusive regulatory domain of the federal
government in Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Development Commission 12 twenty-five years ago, states have been pushing
to expand their authority over nuclear power plants.
This Article first examines the state of nuclear power today, the industry's
accident record, and the current condition of its aging commercial generating
plants. Part I also briefly identifies factors that make it more attractive for the
nuclear industry to extend the operating lifetime of its plants instead of bringing
new, arguably safer reactors online. Part II takes a closer look at Vermont
Yankee, its operating history and accident record, and Vermont Act 160. Then,
the author examines preemption doctrine against a backdrop of federalism
theory in Part III, focusing on the judicial presumption against preemption of
state law and the difficulty, as well as importance, of determining congressional
intent. Part IV identifies policy reasons for and against preemption of state laws
in general, returning to some of the federalism concerns raised in Part III.
Pragmatic qualms, such as collective action problems, are also discussed in this
Part. Part V applies principles and teachings from previous discussion of
preemption law and policy to Vermont Act 160. This Part concludes that
neither express nor implied preemption apply to Vermont Act 160 because of
the absence of an express preemption provision or any mandate directing the
development of commercial nuclear power in the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 13
and the reservations of state power in the AEA and in other environmental
statutes. The Article also finds that Vermont's law does not create collective
action problems, removing the only policy rationale that might warrant its
preemption.
Based on this analysis, the author concludes that while states like Vermont
can close down the nuclear industry within their borders because of state
regulatory authority over environmental matters in general and over nuclear
plants in particular, most have little incentive to do so. Not finding Vermont's
law preempted also promotes federalism as it preserves states as a brake on
powerful, yet sometimes captured, federal agencies and assures that there are
more than one set of eyes watching an inherently risky activity. 14

I. THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TODAY
There are several factors that make an investment in nuclear power risky
for the utility industry. Increased operating and regulatory costs have put

12. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983)
(allowing California to block the construction of new nuclear plants because of ongoing concerns about
disposal of their waste).
13. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703,68 Stat. 919 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20112284 (1982)).
14. Babcock, supra note 4, at 82-84 (discussing potential risks of operating nuclear power plants).
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financial strains on utilities which own nuclear power plants and dissuaded
many from constructing new plants. Because of these costs, power companies
have turned to extending the operating lifetime of their existing plants.

A. Nuclear Power Is a Risky Business Investment
Today there are 104 nuclear power plants operating in the United States,
but no new reactors have been ordered since 1978, the date of the accident at
Three Mile Island. 15 The commercial nuclear industry has essentially been
"moribund" since that accident. 16 Three Mile Island created a tidal wave of
opposition to nuclear power, which led to the cancellation of plants that had
been ordered and the shutdown of a plant that had entered the low powertesting phase. 17 The accident also ushered in an era of heightened regulatory
review and new requirements. 18 Plants had to move offline to meet the new
requirements, reducing their overall production rate and increasing cost per
megawatt hour of electricity, which drove new capital away from the
industry. 19 Thus, post-Three Mile Island, selecting the nuclear option became
financially risky-a far cry from the industry's initial promise of cheap
electricity that had prompted a binge of nuclear power plant construction. 20
Investing in nuclear power remains financially uncertain for electric power

15. See id. at 89-90 (discussing what happened to the nuclear industry after Three Mile Island).
16. See Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 221, 225 (2005)
('Thus it is more than fair to say that the nuclear industry in this country has been moribund for 30 years
after what promised to be a nearly inexhaustible and cheap source of energy."); see also Neal H. Lewis,
Interpreting the Oracle: Licensing Modifications, Economics, Safety, Politics, and the Future ofNuclear
Power in the United States, 16 ALB. L.J. 27,28 (2006) ("In the twenty years prior to 1990, one hundred
licenses were issued to operate nuclear reactors. A license for a new nuclear facility in the United States
has not been issued since the Watts Bar I facility was permitted in 1996. Over one hundred permits that
were issued for construction of nuclear facilities were withdrawn during the 70's and 80's.").
17. Goxem discusses the saga of shutting down Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham
nuclear plant, which still awaits decommissioning. See generally Goxem, supra note 10; Petra Shattuck,
Note, Federalism and 0./fsite Emergency Planning for Nuclear Reactors: The Shoreham Impasse, 66
B.U. L. REV. 229,257 (1986).
18. Babcock, supra note 4, at 129-35 (discussing post-Three Mile Island accident regulatory
changes).
19. See David F. Cavers, State Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 50 KY. L.J.
33, 33 (1961) ("Progress toward [economic return on investment] could be set back by regulatory
authorization in either of two ways; by the careless or inexpert scrutiny of reactor designs and operating
procedures, followed by a reactor 'incident' . . . or by the imposition of unnecessary and costly
precautionary requirements rendering economic power an impossibility. The federal government can
properly claim special standing to protect against both of these risks."). Ironically, these new regulations
have increased public apprehension about nuclear power. See Laurence H. Tribe, California Declines
the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679,708 n.l39 (1979) ("The
public's misgivings about nuclear energy grow in proportion to the precautions which must be taken to
guard against any mishaps of a flawed technology.").
20. Tomain, supra note 16, at 227 (quoting Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss
as saying privatized nuclear power would be "too cheap to meter"); see also Guastella, supra note 10, at
765-66 (quoting James Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. II, 1985, at cover, 82 ("The failure of the
U.S. nuclear power program ranks as the largest managerial disaster in business history.")).
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companies for many reasons. 21 Construction of nuclear plants is a lengthy
process and energy demand is volatile. 22 The cost-effectiveness of a plant
depends on its reliable operation for an extended period in order for plant
owners to recoup their investment in the plant, its fuel, and its operation. 23
When a plant is offline for refueling or repairs, including safety upgrades, the
power company must purchase expensive substitute energy. 24 Companies with
nuclear plants in electric markets that have not been deregulated have seen their
rate base increase substantially once a plant becomes operational, 25 and many
of these same companies have seen their bond ratings reduced, further eroding
their financial strength. 26 Concerns about disposal of radioactive wastes,
another incident like Three Mile Island, and terrorist threats have all fueled
public opposition, attenuated the licensing process, and helped make nuclear
energy more costly than electricity from coal or gas fired power plants. As
plants age, worn out components require repair 27 and new standards require
additional safety equipment, resulting in expenses that consumers of electricity
will incur through increased rates-another source of public anger and
opposition. 28
Although the reliability of nuclear power plants has improved
substantially over the past decades, 29 their operating costs have continued to
21. See William S. Jordan III, A Plea for Reason and Responsibility in Nuclear Energy Policy, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 971, 983 (1988) {reviewing JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION
( 1987)) ("[N]uclear power was nurtured in an artificial market ... traditional ratemaking tends to
encourage nuclear power, and ... increased competition has been a major change in the market in recent
years."); see also Thomas Kaplan & Danny Hakim, Indian Pt. May Enlist Giuliani as Defender, N.Y.
TiMES, Aug. 4, 2011, at A20 (saying the company was "startled" by Governor Cuomo's blunt
determination to shut down the Indian Point reactors).
22. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 400 ("Since nuclear plants require long lead times and
continued growth of electricity demand is, at best, uncertain, proposed reactors may be unnecessary by
the time they are completed."); see also id at 402 ("While nuclear plant construction costs have
increased rapidly, the demand for electricity and the need for new nuclear plants has declined.").
23. See id. at 400-{) I. Indeed, when a plant is prematurely shuttered, there are many besides
ratepayers who must bear the costs. Shattuck, supra note 17, at 268 n.216 (Former utility executive John
S. Dyson said "[t]he possible victims include the taxpayers, the ratepayers, the stockholders, the
bondholders, which may include some pension funds, and the banks, which could create some very
serious problems for the banking system in New York.").
24. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 400 n.259.
25. See id. A utility's rate base consists of its capital expenditures. Melissa Powers, The Cost of
Coal: Climate Change and the End of Coal as a Source of "Cheap" Electricity, 12 U. PENN. J. Bus. L.
407, 413-14 {20 I 0). In exchange for an exclusive "franchise" to provide electricity within a defined
geographic area, a utility must agree to subject their "cost-of-service" ratemaking to public utility
commission review. /d. at 412. Utilities are allowed to earn "just and reasonable" revenues for provision
of those services. /d. at 412-13.
26. See id.
27. See David Lochbaum, U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century: The Risk of a Lifetime, UNION
OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 19-20 (2004), http:l/www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/
nuclear04fnl.pdf.
28. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 401; see also Powers, supra note 25, at 413 (discussing how
utilities can recover their operating expenses from ratepayers).
29. There was a precipitous drop in overall nuclear plant capacity after Three Mile Island. See
Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2091 ("After the accident at TMI in 1979, the industry was subjected to
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escalate. 30 The increased cost in part reflects the more rigorous regulatory
environment following the Three Mile Island accident and rising public
opposition to nuclear power. 31 Because the cost of building and operating
nuclear power plants does not vary significantly among reactors, any increase
in capital cost has a direct impact on the delivered cost of the electricity
generated by these plants. 32 Where the electric utility market is deregulated, it
is particularly sensitive to high capital costs. 33 Consequently, utilities are
turning away from nuclear power in favor of less financially risky sources of
electricity, like coal, natural gas, and wind, any one of which can usually be
built more quickly than a nuclear power plant. 34
While the next generation of nuclear reactors and continued public
subsidization of the risk of an accident through the Price-Anderson Act 35 will
reduce the costs of constructing and operating a nuclear power plant, 36 the
continued possibility of financial surprises increases the potential for
unanticipated costs for utilities that select the nuclear option. 37 High unit costs
and the length of time it takes to get NRC approval of a reactor design both
slow down technological learning and impede information transfers in the
nuclear industry. When these factors are added to "the highly contextualized
nature" of site-specific nuclear plants, they present "a nontrivial risk of cost

intense regulatory scrutiny and evaluation. As a result, the overall fleet capacity factor-the net
generation for all reactors in the set divided by the maximum possible generation of all reactors in the
set-dropped precipitously and reached its nadir in 1982 at 52.9%. During the period 2000-2004, the 69
reactors operation by 1982 had improved their overall capacity factor to 87.4%. This increase,
attributable to improvements in utilization rates and decreases in service down time, is equivalent to an
additional 16.3 GW of generation just from those reactors existing in 1982--equivalent to the addition
of -15 new nuclear reactors."). But see Babcock, supra note 4, at 82 n.98 (arguing that the increase in
plant utilization rates was a result of the NRC's maintenance rule that allowed some maintenance
activities to be performed while the plant was still operating, which decreased the time the plant was out
of service for refueling).
30. Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2091.
31. /d.
32. /d.
33. A deregulated market is a competitive market and, hence, market participants are particularly
price sensitive to any increase in costs that might make their electricity less competitive.
34. Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2089.
35. Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (2000)). The Price-Anderson Act limited the liability of utilities and manufacturers of
nuclear reactors in the event of a nuclear accident.
36. See Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2091 ("Factors expected to lead to such cost improvements
include better technology, streamlined regulation, operational incentives, design standardization, the
intensive use of information technology for design, supply chain and construction management, and
concern over climate change."). Jordan discusses the subject of public subsidization of the commercial
nuclear fuel cycle. See Jordan, supra note 21, at 974. Chandler discusses the next generation of
commercial nuclear reactors and the licensing changes made to facilitate their use. See generally
Christopher C. Chandler, Recent Developments in Licensing and Regulation at the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 485 (2006); Lewis, supra note 16 (describing the changes made to the
NRC's licensing regulations to accommodate the next generation of nuclear reactors and make the
licensing process more efficient and less costly and time consuming).
37. Hultman et al., supra note 4, at 2091.
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surprises" for utilities. 38
Additionally, nuclear energy's position as an alternative source of energy
is far from secure as its significant environmental benefits are balanced by
significant environmental costs. 39 On one hand, nuclear power offers the
potential to reduce the country's reliance on fossil fuels and its carbon
footprint; on the other, the waste disposal problem and "the hefty financial
burdens associated with nuclear power plants" remain the biggest barriers to its
reinvigoration. 40 The benefits of reducing the country's reliance on fossil fuels
and decreasing its carbon footprint may not be obvious enough to overcome the
costs of constructing and operating a nuclear power plant and disposing of its
waste fuel, and to warrant states taking on the financial risks of underwriting
nuclear power.
Not only are there financial risks for power companies who select nuclear
power, but also there are other factors contributing to the industry's lack of
growth and causing it to extend the operating lifetime of existing plants rather
than construct new ones. Thus, although there are twenty-two applications for
licenses to build thirty-three new reactors pending before the NRC, "regulatory
constraints, a potentially rate-limiting supply chain for reactor parts, and the
need to train new nuclear operators" make it unlikely that any new reactors will
be finished until 2020. 41 With no new nuclear capacity on the immediate
horizon, the only way to avoid disrupting the service that existing nuclear
plants provide is to extend their forty-year operating licenses for a sufficient
amount of time to allow a new generation of reactors to come online. 42 The

38. See id. at 2091-92 ("Yet high unit costs and long lead times lead to a slower learning rate and
require more expenditures than would technologies of smaller scale, and the contextualized nature of
site-built nuclear reactors presents a nontrivial risk of cost surprises.").
39. See Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 528; see also Jordan, supra note 21, at 972 ("[A]ccording to
Professor Tomain, the potential financial consequences of an accident, changes in the energy market,
and the financial condition of the nuclear industry have determined nuclear power developments since
the [Three Mile Island] accident and will be major, if not conclusive, determinants of the future of
nuclear power.").
40. Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 529; see also Woychik, supra note 2, at 402; Tomain, supra note
I6, at 237. Despite these concerns and the recent catastrophic nuclear accident in Japan, some states
continue to be interested in reviving the industry; however, others have increased their opposition as a
result of the accident. Christa Marshall, Nuclear Revival Plans Continue in Some States, CLIMATEWIR.E
(Mar. 2I, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2011/03/2114 (citing Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Iowa, Utah, and Missouri, as states that are still considering the nuclear option; other states, like New
York and New Jersey, are less supportive).
41. Amanda Leiter, The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and
the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 56 (2008); see also Tomain, supra note 16, at 240
(explaining that while there is "evidence that nuclear plants are becoming better managed . . .
universities are turning out fewer trained nuclear engineers to become those managers").
42. See Tomain, supra note 16, at 228 ("Nuclear plants were the largest electric utilities operating
until that time and continue to be so through the present. From 1963 to 1969, for example, the Atomic
Energy Commission issued twenty-eight construction permits for plants ranging from 800 to 1100
megawatts which constitute the upper range of electric plants."). The effect of taking a nuclear plant
offline was vividly illustrated by the recent shutdown of San Onofre, which affected 5 million
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consequences of permanently taking nuclear power plants offline are
considerable, 43 not the least of which would be the need to continue to rely on
coal-fired power plants. 44 However, there are some drawbacks to relying on
older nuclear plants; there is no question that safety risks 45 and maintenance
costs 46 increase as plants become older. The financial uncertainty of the
nuclear market, which could lead to plant cancellations and disruptions in the
supply of electrical power, public opposition to nuclear power, and safety risks
make building new nuclear power an unattractive alternative to states. 47
Evidently, adding nuclear power to the electric grid is no longer "a panacea"
for the industry, if it ever was. 48

B. The Nuclear Industry's Accident Record and the Particular Problems
with Older Plants
Although the accident record of the commercial nuclear industry in the
United States is good compared to other high-risk industries, like the chemical
or deepwater drilling industry, 49 it still presents concerns. Post-Three Mile
Island, there have been forty-seven accidents serious enough to require the
afflicted plants to shut down for longer than a year. 50 The average cost of these

customers. See Power Outage Hits up to 5M in U.S. Southwest, Mexico, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 9,
20 II), http://news.yahoo.com/power-outage-hits-5m-us-southwest-mexico-034451499.html.
43. See Kathleen C. Reilly, Global Benefits Versus Local Concerns: The Need for a Bird's Eye
View of Nuclear Energy, 70 IND. L. J. 679, 697 (1995) ("In cases where a nuclear plant shuts down
because its safety costs are too great, one must consider opportunity costs . . . . Naturally, the
opportunity costs of forgoing nuclear power include the elimination of energy the nuclear plant would
have provided. However, this cost will vary under different circumstances."); see also Tribe, supra note
19, at 706 ("Each one of those big reactors represents about a half-billion dollars investment ....
Further, for each idle reactor the utility must find and fuel alternate generating capacity. Replacement
fuel alone, if generating capacity is available, amounts to about 10 million barrels for each idle
reactor.").
44. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 698; see also Arthur W. Murphy & D. Bruce La Pierre, Nuclear
Moratorium Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 392, 455 (1976) (referring to "the confusion and delay" that "might result in the choice
of fossil fuel plants by some companies who did not wish to take even the small risk that the acts would
be upheld"); Luis Li, Comment, State Sovereignty and Nuclear Free Zones, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1169,
1204 (1991) (finding preemption unlikely because it was improbable that every locality would enact
nuclear free zones and because the NRC could continue weapons production in its own facilities).
45. See Tomain, supra note 16, at 245.
46. See Paul Voosen, As Nuclear Reactor Fleet Ages, Engineers Ask, 'Is 80 the New 40?', N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/ll/20/20greenwire-as-nuclear-reactorfleet-ages-engineers-ask-is-94897.html?pagewanted=all.
47. See Tomain, supra note 16, at 246 ("Nuclear does not appear to pass a market test, has
increasing safety concerns, and does not have great promise for replacing fossil fuels."); see also
Voosen, supra note 46.
48. Tomain, supra note 16, at 234 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND
RESPONSE 51 {2004)).
49. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 70-75, 82-84 (discussing the accident record of the deepwater
drilling industry and the nuclear industry).
50. See Bob Herbert, Op.-Ed., We're Not Ready, N.Y. TiMES, July 20, 2010, at A23, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/20 I 0/07/20/opinion/20herbert.html
(describing
"[a]nother
frightening
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outages has been between $1.5 billion and $2 billion, principally because of the
need to find replacement power. 5 1 In recent years, many of these problems can
be attributed to aging systems at older plants, 52 raising the probability that
extending the operating lifetime of these plants will result in more problems,
more outages, and more costs.
The higher accident rates at older plants as compared to newer plants are
not surprising, since the components of these older plants, like their piping
systems, are wearing out. A report by the Government Accountability Office
found that "all 65 sites where nuclear plants are located in the United States
have experienced leakage or spillage of radioactive material into groundwater,
some of which is attributable to aging underground pipes." 53 Radioactive
tritium has leaked from corroded, buried pipes at three-quarters of U.S.
commercial reactors. 54 Moreover, based on a yearlong review ofNRC records,
the Associated Press found that "the number and severity of these leaks has
been escalating." 55 In 2011, there was a tritium leak from underground pipes of
2.5 million picocuries per liter at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant,
which is 125 times higher than the drinking water standard promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 56 The year before that, a week after
accident" in 2002 at the Davis-Besse plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, where a "hidden leak led to corrosion
that caused a near-catastrophe. By the time the problem was discovered, only a thin layer of stainless
steel was left to hold back the disaster."). More recently, radioactive tritium leaked from underground
pipes at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in Vernon, Vermont. Peter Behr, Experts Weigh
Extending the Lives of Nuclear Power Plants for 80 Years, CLIMATEWIRE (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2010/09/20/1. In 2007, part of the plant's cooling tower collapsed.
!d. For a comparison between the accident records of the nuclear industry and offshore deepwater
drilling industry, see Babcock, supra note 4.
51. See Herbert, supra note 50.
52. See LOCHBAUM, supra note 27, at I 9-20.
53. Hannah Northey, Pipes Under Nuclear Plants are Leaking, ENVIRONMENT & ENERGY DAILY
(June 22, 20Il), http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/20II/06/22/IO (reporting on the release of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report by Congressmen Edward Markey (D.-MA) and Peter
Welch (D.-VT), and citing, as an example, that a 1.5 inch hole in a buried cooling water pipe at a New
York nuclear power plant was found); see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I l-563,
OVERSIGHT OF UNDERGROUND PIPING SYSTEMS COMMENSURATE WITH RISK, BUT PROACTIVE
MEASURES COULD HELP ADDRESS FUTURE LEAKS 5 (201 !), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/dl 1563.pdf.
54. Donn, supra note 6 (reporting that Excelon paid $1.2 million to settle state and county
complaints over tritium leaks from two of its facilities in Illinois, one of which was awarded relicenses
for an additional twenty years before the leaks in the emergency core cooling system were discovered;
the company bought at least nine properties near the other facility for a total of $6.1 million).
55. See id (reporting that "[n]early two-thirds of the leaks" were reported to the NRC in the last
five years).
56. !d. Interestingly, two Entergy employees had testified earlier at two state hearings that there
were no underground pipes. See Matthew L. Wald, Plant Owner Sues Vermont Over License for
Reactor, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2011, at A16 (describing plant's operational problems as including the
collapse of a wooden cooling tower in August 2007 and a tritium leak from an underground pipe, after
plant officials denied that there were any underground pipes containing tritium in testimony before two
state panels); see also Behr, supra note 50. Entergy later removed the employees. See Letter from David
C. Lewis, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC to Michael Columb, Entergy Nuclear Operations
Site Vice President (June I 7, 2010) (reporting on an NRC Inspection and Review of Areas Identified in
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the forty-one year old Oyster Creek plant was relicensed for an additional
twenty years, a plant worker discovered tritium "by chance" in 3000 gallons of
water that had leaked into a concrete vault containing electrical cables. 57 Since
that time, additional tritium leaks at Oyster Creek have been discovered at
concentrations 540 times higher than the EPA's drinking water limits. 58
Tritium leaks have caused particular anxiety because tritium exposure is linked
to cancer. 59
According to nuclear safety engineers, the number of leaks "suggests"
nuclear plant operators are having a hard time maintaining systems that are now
"decades" old. 60 Making matters worse, there is no quick way to detect these
leaks because buried pipes are inaccessible and, therefore, difficult and costly
to inspect. 61 Digging up pipes (the only sure way to tell if they are corroded or
leaking) is expensive. 62 Leaks can go undetected for years and may be
discovered only when work is done on nearby piping or holding tanks. 63 Also,
these underground pipes can carry cooling water, essential to prevent a core
meltdown in case of an emergency shutdown; thus, leaking pipes may imperil
emergency safety systems at these plants. 64 Poor maintenance, relaxed
operating standards, 65 and the high costs of repairs mean that these problems,
Demand for Information). However, the Vermont Attorney General said he "lacked the smoking gun"
that would enable him to bring criminal charges against Entergy officials for lying about leaking
underground pipes, even though the company's employees "clearly ... [and] repeatedly failed to meet a
minimally acceptable standard of credibility and trustworthiness." Hannah Northey, Vermont Won't
Charge Entergy over Radioactive Leaks, E&ENEWSPM (July 6, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/
eenewspm/2011/07/06/04. There were also tritium leaks in 2005. !d.
57. Donn, supra note 6 (recounting the critical comments of anti-nuclear activists about how the
NRC gas "allowed the industry to get away with little concern about public safety").
58. See id. Recently, the Third Circuit directed Excelon, the owner of Oyster Creek, and the NRC
to review the agency's 2009 decision to extend the plant's license for another twenty years and to advise
the court on any possible impact the Japanese accident might have on "the propriety" of granting that
license extension. Court Requires Excelon, NRC to Review Licensing at Oyster Creek, GREENWIRE
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/03/22/archive/19.
59. See Radioactive Water Leaks in U.S. Plants Go Unchecked, GREENWIRE (Apr. II, 2011)
[hereinafter Radioactive Water Leaks], http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/04/ll/IO/ ('The
investigation of NRC documents found that almost all nuclear plants have leaked tritium, a byproduct of
nuclear fission that has been linked to cancer. Most plants have leaked tritium more than once, and large
leaks have been on the rise. There were five leaks or spills reported in 201 0."); id. ("While tritium is not
the most dangerous radioactive material, according to a 2006 National Academy of Sciences panel, it
can increase the risk of cancer in even small doses.").
60. Donn, supra note 6.
61. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 53, at I.
62. See id. at 7 (quoting Excelon's presentation at a 2009 meeting with regulators as saying, "100
percent verification of piping integrity is not practical" and "[ e)xcavations have significant impact on
plant operations"); id. at 9 (saying Excelon has spent $14 million at Oyster Creek to get better access to
2000 feet of tritium-carrying pipes, but has been unable "to stop widespread leaking").
63. Donn, supra note 6 ("The industry tends to inspect piping when it must be dug up for some
other reason.").
64. !d. (reporting on the discovery at Salem Unit I of corrosion in the unit's cooling water system
which had worn the pipe down "to a quarter of its minimum required thickness").
65. See As Reactors Age, Standards Relax, supra note 5 (saying GAO reported that "[f]ederal
nuclear regulators have kept the industry in compliance by repeatedly weakening standards," citing as an
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as well as potential problems caused by failed cables, 66 corroding metal parts,
cracked cement, brittle reactor vessels, leaky valves, and cracked tubing, are
not always attended to as plant owners try to get "more and more out of these
plants." 67
The NRC review instigated in response to the accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi plant in 2010 has unearthed more anomalies in U.S. reactors. 68 For
example, a recent report by the NRC's Office of Inspector General reported
that 30 percent of domestic nuclear power plant operators failed to report
defects in plant equipment. 69 Some of these defects may have created "a
substantial safety hazard" during the time they remained uncorrected. 70
Unfortunately, the NRC has not yet issued any civil penalties or taken other
serious enforcement action against the utilities that failed to report.7 1 The
NRC's apparent laxness has energized anti-nuclear groups, 72 restoking public
fears about radiation. 73 The record shows that these concerns about the safety
of nuclear power plants, especially older plants, are not unfounded.
C. Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants-A House Divided

With its origins in the highly secretive Manhattan Project, the entire field
of atomic energy was "monopolized by the federal government, until passage
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946," which created a civilian regulatory agency
to encourage the commercial development of nuclear power. 74 When the Act

example the case of leaky valves where regulators simply "increased the leakage allowance up to 20
times the original limit").
66. See Donn, supra note 6 (reporting on a 2008 NRC staff memo that said industry data showed
that eighty-three electrical cables failed between twenty-one and thirty years of service, compared to
only forty within the first ten years of service, and making the additional point that "underground
cabling set in concrete can be extraordinarily difficult to replace").
67. As Reactors Age, Standards Relax, supra note 5. The AP report found that older plants have
been allowed to run "less safely just to prolong operations." Donn, supra note 6.
68. See Hannah Northey & Anne C. Mulkern, Earthquake Risks Must be Reanalyzed for U.S.
Reactors, GREENWIRE (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/03/24/4 (announcing
the NRC's initiation of all I 04 reactors to assess their ability to withstand earthquakes).
69. Hannah Northey, U.S. Plant Operators Failing to Report Some Equipment Defects-NRC
Audit, E&ENEwsPM (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspr/ 2011/03/24/1.
70. Jd.
71. See id.
72. See Radioactive Water Leaks, supra note 59.
73. See Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A Civic Republican Moment for Achieving
Broader Changes in Environmental Behavior, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. I, 17 (2009) (discussing the role
of environmental groups as public norm changers).
74. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 394-95 ("The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 transferred
control of the development of atomic energy to a civilian agency, the Atomic Energy Commission;
however, as the federal government retained the ownership of all fissionable materials and related
facilities, and private activity was restricted to contractual operations for the government, the monopoly
persisted."); see also Cavers, supra note 19, at 32-33 ("[J]t would be hard to defend the discontinuance
of federal jurisdiction to license the construction and operation of reactors. The federal government has
both special interests and special qualifications for that task. It has invested billions of dollars in the
development of atomic energy, and, in the long run, its hope for any substantial return on that
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1954, Congress's preoccupation with developing commercial

uses of nuclear materials meant that the legislators gave little thought to the
role of states in regulating nuclear plants beyond the states' customary
regulation of electric power. 75 Thus, the federal government retained nuclear
power plant regulatory control.
The risk of accidents at nuclear plants, the need to isolate and safeguard
radioactive wastes, the latent national security threats posed by plants, and the
possible proliferation of fissionable material provided the basis for continuing
federal regulation.7 6 However, amendments to the AEA in 1954 and 1959
whittled away at the exclusive federal regulatory preserve over nuclear reactors
and decreased ·the promotional bias evident in the earlier legislation. 77 These
amendments created a role for states in the regulation of some nuclear
materials 78 and clarified that states retained regulatory authority over the
generation, sale, and transmission of electric power produced by nuclear
plants. 79 At the same time, new legislation, like the Energy Reorganization Act

investment (military uses excepted) must rest on the achievement of economic methods of utilizing
nuclear fuels for atomic power.").
75. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 395, 397 ("The fact that there was little state
regulation of these sources of radiation and that the Act provided only a very limited role for private
industry meant that there was no reason to provide for or even to contemplate state regulation of atomic
energy."); see also id. at 397 ("In ignoring such matters, Congress simply reflected the reality that there
was little or no interest in state regulation of this new federal preserve."); Cavers, supra note 19, at 33
("The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which first made the private ownership of atomic reactors legally
possible, was singularly silent as to the Act's effect on state authority with respect to the facilities and
materials over which it gave the federal government far-reaching power to be exercised chiefly through
the medium of licensing."); Reilly, supra note 43, at 679 ("Congress determined that federal regulation
of private nuclear development would be necessary for 'optimum progress, efficiency, and economy in
this area of atomic endeavor."'); Angela Durbin, Corrunent, Striking a Delicate Balance: Developing a
New Rationale for Preemption While Protecting the Public's Role on Siting Liquefied Natural Gas
Terminals, 56 EMORY L.J. 507, 528 (2006) ("Congress's interest in and justification for regulating
nuclear energy exclusively was due in part to the special relationship between nuclear energy and the
federal government.").
76. See Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 529 ("[G]iven the danger associated with fission reactions
and the radioactive waste generated by the process as well as the potential national security threat it
poses, nuclear energy is regulated under a strict regime that gives the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
exclusive jurisdiction over the safety of nuclear power plants.").
77. See Christopher F. Baum, Banning the Transportation of Nuclear Waste: A Permissible
Exercise of the State's Police Power?, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 663, 668 (1984) ("The primary purpose of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) is to foster the safe development of nuclear energy as a power
source." (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,20607 (1983)). See also Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 396 n.30 ("The reports of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy noted that the major reason for amending the 1946 Act to provide for the
participation of private enterprise was to encourage the development of atomic power for the production
of electricity. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954), H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1954).").
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (2006) (amending the AEA in 1954 to allow states to enter into
agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission for the regulation of byproduct, source, and special
nuclear materials in quantities too low to form a critical mass).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or
regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of
electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission: Provided, that
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of 1974 (ERA) 80 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1980, 81 weakened the promotional bias of the initial AEA. 82
While the creation of the Department of Energy in 1977 preserved the ERA's
"balanced approach" to nuclear power and alternative sources of energy, 83 the
new laws opened the door for states to select alternative sources of power
without undermining a national goal. Collectively, these laws weakened the
exclusive hold of the federal government over how the nuclear option might be
fulfilled.
The 1959 amendment to the AEA specifically granting state regulatory
authority over the generation, sale, and transmission of electric power produced
by nuclear plants, 84 enables a state public service commission (PSC) to set
rates for the power nuclear plants produce and to certify whether a new nuclear
power plant is needed. 85 Certification is generally based on the ''utility's need
for power, its financial health, its compliance with previous rulemaking
decisions, and the cost and environmental consequences of the proposed power

this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State, or local agency any authority to
regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the Commission."); see also Goxem, supra note 10, at 42122 ("The amendment, therefore, allowed the states to retain authority in specified areas of nuclear power
generation, while increasing their regulatory power over certain nuclear materials. Consequently the
statutory language and legislative history of the 1954 Act and its amendments did not give the federal
government authority over all aspects of nuclear power regulation."); id. at 421 n.28 (Congress limited
the scope of state-federal cooperative agreements because "Congress thought that states would not have
the knowledge or capability to safely and effectively regulate power plants ... [and] Congress was
concerned with the potential impact of any state regulation on the growth of the industry.") (citations
omitted).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5851.
81. Pub. L. No. 96-295, 94 Stat. 780. For a discussion of these and other laws, such as the
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8201-8286b, which promotes
conservation instead of consumption, see Jeannette M. Nishimura-Paige, Pacific Gas & Electric: A
Nuclear Energy Option or a Nuclear Energy Mandate?, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 995, 1030 & n.213
(1984). See also id. at 1030 n.221 ("Congress also passed the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research &
Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5901-5920, which directed [the Energy Research and
Development Administration] to develop 'a comprehensive nonnuclear energy research, development,
and demonstration program.' 42 U.S.C. §§ 5905(b)(l) (1982).").
82. See Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1030 (explaining that the ERA established the Energy
Research and Development Administration, the goal of which was to increase the efficiency and
reliability of all sources of energy, not just nuclear power); see also id. ("The Act's legislative history
indicates concern about a pro-nuclear bias in the regulatory agency and expresses a desire to have the
Federal Government 'place greater relative emphasis on nonnuclear energy.'") (citing S. Rep. No. 980,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. C.C.A.N. 5470, 5480).
83. See Charles B. Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California's Nuclear
Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. I, 82 (1980).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2018.
85. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 432-33 ("Authority over state-chartered utilities, wielded by
state utility regulatory agencies, is exercised generally through (I) setting a utility's rate of return on
investment in power plant and equipment, (2) directing utility services provided to customers through
rulemaking authority, and (3) decisions to grant or reject a power plant certificate of public convenience
and necessity (CPCN) or land use permit."). Since Vermont Yankee sells wholesale power, the Federal
Energy Commission and not the Vermont Public Service Board approves its rates. See Entergy Nuclear
Vt. Yankee, LLC, v. Shumlin, No. 1:11-cv-99-jgrn, 2011 WL 2811317, at *8 (D. Vt. July 18, 2011).
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plant." 86 Thus, a state PSC can determine whether a nuclear or non-nuclear
power plant should be built or "require the development of particular energy
generation technologies, out-of-state power purchases, or implementation of
energy conservation programs." 87 State PSCs can also influence the source of
power a utility chooses by offering rate incentives or disincentives that
encourage energy conservation or utilization of specific energy sources other
than nuclear power. 88 They can also require utilities to provide lower rates for
utility customers who conserve energy and to finance alternative energy
construction. 89 This power amounts to indirect regulation of nuclear power "by
displacing the need and incentive for its use." 90
State PSCs can also determine what is included in a utility's rate base,
specifically affecting whether it will be able to recoup the cost of constructing
or maintaining a nuclear power plant. 91 For example, when a power plant never
operates, as in the case of Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham facility,
or its operation produces a severe economic burden on the ratepayers, a state
PSC could remove the cost of the plant from the utility's rate base. 92 Moreover,
depending on how a state PSC handles these costs, it could dissuade a utility
from keeping an older plant running.
In addition to control over rates, states can affect the location of a nuclear
86. Woychik, supra note 2, at 433.
87. Jd. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190,227 (1983)).
88. See id. at 434 ("States can promulgate rules to direct utility services and can allocate
discouraging rates of return for noncompliance with such rules. States can use rulemaking authority to
require implementation of energy conservation measures and alternative energy supplies that are less
costly than nuclear power.").
89. See id. at 435-36.
90. Jd. at 435.
91. See id. at 436 ("State legislatures and utility regulators also have authority to allow or disallow
the cost of a nuclear reactor to be included in 'rate base."'); id. at 439 ("States historically have
regulated issuance of a CPCN . . . to 'prevent unnecessary or uneconomic construction."'); id. ("It is
well established that 'applicants for certificates of convenience and necessity ... should show that the
costs of construction or facilities which they propose are both adequate and reasonable."'). For example,
the New Jersey and Pennsylvania PSCs did not allow Metropolitan Edison to include the cost of
cleaning up Three Mile Island Unit 2 in its rate base. See Mark P. Widoff, The Accident at Three Mile
Island, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 223, 236 (1982), available at http://digitalcommons.law.
wne.edullawreview/vol4/iss2/2/.
92. See Woychik, supra note 2, at 436 ("The general criterion is whether the facility is considered
'used and useful.' Therefore, if a reactor never begins full operation, or if it performs so poorly that it
produces a severe economic burden on ratepayers, the state's utility regulators can remove the plant's
cost from the owner's rate base."); id. at 433-34 ("The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and
economical management to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for
the proper discharge of its public duties." (quoting Bluefield Waterworks & Improvements Co. v. W.
VA. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 693 (1923) (emphasis added))); see also Guastella, supra note
I 0, at 759 (The "prudent investment test" does not allow "the use of plant costs in determining rates if
the investment was imprudent in light of information that was reasonable available to management at the
time the investment decision was made"; and while commissions rarely "disallow all of the utility's
investment as imprudent," they may allow only partial recovery ''whereby the costs are allocated among
investors, ratepayers, and taxpayers.").
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plant. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty, 93 states have been considered protectors of their citizens' health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. 94 This authority includes regulation ofland
use when "reasonably related to those recognized state interests." 95 Aproposed
site for a nuclear power plant would be a strong interest for the affected
community. 96 Moreover, many ofthe factors that are considered when a site is
chosen for a reactor implicate state knowledge of and experience with the local
environment. 97
Additionally, no environmental law specifically bars states from
regulating the environmental effects of nuclear power plants. 98 Laws like
section 122 of the Clean Air Act, 99 which allows states to regulate radioactive
air emissions from nuclear power plants, 100 and section 116, 101 which
authorizes states to set more stringent air emission limitations than federal
limitations or to establish their own limitations in the absence of federal
ones, 102 enable states to prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant for
93.
94.

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See Eleanor M. Young, Exercising Police Powers to Control Spent Fuel and Other
Radioactive Wastes, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 335,339 (1984).
95. ld. at 339 (citing Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390); see also George B. Adams, Jr.,
Regulation of Health and Safety in Private Atomic Energy Activities: A Problem in Federal-State
Relationships, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 163, 186 (1958) ("[D]espite the obvious national interest and the
extensive AEC program aimed at the most effective locations for nuclear facilities, the concern of local
authorities cannot be easily dismissed."); Wiggins, supra not~ 83, at 85 ("Decisionmaking about nuclear
power, on the other hand, affects a subject of exclusively state control. Public utilities wishing to
construct nuclear power plants seek the use of private or state-owned land and facility, which, unlike
navigable waters, are not at all in the federal domain."); Tribe, supra note 19, at 709-10 (discussing
California's nuclear power plant moratorium and arguing that "[s]ince California seeks to eliminate
land-use which creates a continuing source of public fears and unrest, it is exercising a traditional land
use power for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards").
96. See Adams, supra note 95, at 186 ("The proposed site of an atomic reactor is apt to be of
intense local interest."); see also Patrick J. Murphy, Case Note, Gone Fission: Federal Preemption and
the Resurgence of the Nuclear Industry (The One That Almost Got Away), 82 TEMP. L. REV. 863, 886
(2009) ("[A]ttempting to protect a location from the potentially negative effects of a new power plant is
a legitimate state concern regardless of the type of plant." (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res.
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,222-23 (1983))).
97. See Adams, supra note 95, at 186 ("Reactor location involves a consideration of factors (such
as conditions of the soil, underground waters and access to main piping and electrical systems) with
which the state has had long experience and which is not susceptible to general regulation.").
98. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 886.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7422 (2006).
100. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 698 (Section 122 "transfers from the NRC to the EPA and the
states the authority to set air quality standards and emission levels, as well as requirements respecting
the control of, radioactive air pollutants for purposes of protecting public health.").
101. 42 u.s.c. § 7416.
102. See Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1031 ("The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 give
the states the authority to regulate radioactive air emissions from nuclear plants," and "[s]tates may
impose emission standards more stringent than those defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.")
(citations omitted); see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 698-99 ("Under [section 122], radioactive
pollutants, including source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material are covered by
Section 116 [retention of state authority] of the Clean Air Act. Thus, any State, or political subdivision
thereof, may establish standards more stringent than Federal, or where a Federal standards [sic] has not
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noncompliance with state emission levels. 103 Even though Congress realized
that requiring nuclear utilities to comply with state air emission standards could
be a burden, it nonetheless concluded protecting public health was a necessary
"cost of doing business for the nuclear power industry." 104 The House floor
manager of the bill stated: "[T]he states may protect the ambient air and use
their police powers to protect the health of the citizens in their area. This has
always been true for other pollutants, and I see no reason for any exemption for
radioactive pollutants." 105
Moreover, the Clean Water Act 106 empowers the EPA and states with
permitting authority to issue permits for the discharge of heated water from
power plants and the design of their cooling water intake systems. 107 Recent
rules implementing these provisions, such as regulations forcing nuclear
utilities to install closed cycle cooling or make changes in the design of their
intake structures to avoid harming aquatic organisms, could shut down "scores
of power plants" because of the accompanying costs. 108 Additionally, under
section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 109 a state can refuse to certify a nuclear
power plant's discharge for being in non-compliance with state water quality
standards. 110 Under these statutes, states have a legitimate right to protect their
been established, may establish any standards they deem appropriate. Thus the provision would not
preempt States and localities from setting and enforcing stricter air pollution standards for radiation than
the Federal standards, and would not follow the holding of Northern States Power Co. v. State of
Minnesota in the context of radioactive air pollution." (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-564, at 143 (1977)
(Conf. Rep.))).
103. See Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1030 n.215 {"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
agreed that, under the authority of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, a state could prevent nuclear
plants from being constructed at all."); id. at 1031 n.225 (Sections 116 and 122 "reflect the first explicit
manifestation of congressional intent that states may regulate nuclear energy activity for the purposes of
protecting their citizens from radiation hazards (at least in the context of radioactive air pollution)."); see
also Woychik, supra note 2, at 459-60 (contending that because states can adopt tougher air quality
regulations "[i]t seems safe to conclude that state regulations promulgated under the CAA, and
genuinely based on concerns for clean air, would withstand a preemption challenge").
104. Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1031; see also Woychik, supra note 2, at 460 ("Congress
recognized that the scope of the NRC's authority was 'terribly important' because 'any county [or state]
in the country could close down any nuclear power plant ... simply by establishing standards of
emission that are lower than those that exist [at a reactor]."').
105. Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1031 n.225 (quoting 123 CONG. REc. 8671 (1977)
(statement of Rep. Rogers)); see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 699 ("Section 122 demonstrates that
Congress is not averse to allowing the states to regulate nuclear energy activity for the purpose of
protecting their citizens from radiation hazards - at least in the context of radioactive air pollution.").
106. See 33 U.S.C. §1342 (2006).
107. /d. §!316(a)-(b).
108. Behr, supra note 50 (quoting the President of nuclear industry's chief trade association, NEI,
as saying: "A blanket requirement to force the installation of cooling towers is unnecessary and will put
regional economies and tens of thousands of jobs at risk by potentially forcing scores of power plants to
shut down over the next decade."); see also id. (arguing that owners of some older nuclear plants may
"opt to retire the plants" instead of building cooling towers, citing as an example Oyster Creek plant on
New Jersey's Barnegat Bay, which closed ten years before the expiration of plant's operating license).
109. 33 u.s.c. § 1341.
110. This year, Vermont refused to certify Vermont Yankee's discharges and sued the NRC for
extending the plant's operating license based on noncompliance with section 401. See Olga Peters, NRC,
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citizens and natural resources from the adverse environmental impact of power
plants. 111
The Supreme Court acknowledged these traditional state areas of
regulatory authority over nuclear power plants in Pacific Gas & Electric v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, which
remains good law today. 112 In that case, which involved the preemption of a
California moratorium on the construction of new nuclear plants, the Court said
that while the federal government has exclusive authority over nuclear power
plant construction, operation, and radiological safety, states retain regulatory
authority over non-radiological safety. 113 Thus, only state laws with a "direct
and substantial effect" on nuclear power plant safety would be preempted. 114
Subsequent courts have narrowly defined the term nuclear "safety" to protect
state police power regulations over non-radiological health and safety
matters. 115 The Court also refrained from questioning California's motive
behind its law-its concern about the disposal of nuclear wastes-even though
this motive appeared to fall within the exclusive purview of the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) over safety matters. 116 All the Court required was that a
state, here California, show a "plausible non-safety purpose" for its action. 117

NEC and State Square Off Over VY Clean Water Certificate, COMMONS (Aug. 17, 2011),
http:/lvtdigger.org/2011/08/17/nrc-nec-and-state-square-off-over-vy-clean-water-certificate/; see also
Danny Hakim, Cuomo Stakes Tough Stance on 2 Reactors, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2011, at A2
(describing New York State Department of Environmental Conservation's rejection of Entergy's
application for Indian Point Units 2 and 3). The company appealed the denial to the state hearing board
and the NRC. /d. at AS.
111. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 886. ("As the Supreme Court reemphasized in English,
Congress never intended to block all state regulation in the nuclear field. The direct and substantial
standard allows courts to review the purpose of legislation to ensure that, in practice, the law will not
impermissibly encroach on federal exclusive authority notwithstanding the state legislature's stated
purpose.").
112. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comrn'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). See
e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990) (repeating the standard established by Pacific
Gas and saying "for a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and
substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning
radiological safety levels"). See also cases cited holding states laws were not preempted infra note 123
and accompanying text.
113. See Goxem, supra note 10, at 423.
114. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 874 ("The Court has significantly modified the Northern States
standard of total federal control of nuclear regulation. The current standard used to interpret the meaning
of the 1954 Act and the 1959 Amendment is the one laid down in Pacific Gas. This standard, termed
'direct and substantial' in English provides that a state regulation with a direct and substantial effect on
radiological or safety issues, or in conflict with a named federal power, is preempted by federal law.").
115. See id. at 887 ("[T]he Pacific Gas direct and substantial standard requires a narrow
construction of the definition of 'safety,' so as not to impede on a state's traditional authority to regulate
energy in a manner consistent with congressional intent."); id. at 887 n.269 (citing Pacific Gas for the
proposition that Congress intended "to preserve state authority over safety matters").
116. See Goxem, supra note 10, at 423.
117. See id. at 427 ("The Court in Pacific Gas held that state actions that had the effect of
regulating radiological safety were permissible as long as the state could show a plausible non-safety
purpose for the action. In Silkwood, the Court went further and found that Congress intended state
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The elasticity of this standard both expanded the scope of state power over
nuclear power plants and emboldened states to cross into what might otherwise
be viewed as a federal regulatory preserve.
Pacific Gas is widely interpreted as creating dual regulatory authority over
nuclear power plants 118 and decentralizing nuclear plant regulation by
explicitly recognizing a separate sphere of state regulatory power. 119 A later
decision by the Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 120 affirmed that the
states' role in regulating nuclear power can extend into safety regulation. 121
But, while it is clear that Congress left room for states to regulate nuclear
plants, the question is how much room. 122 Court decisions on whether a state's
exercise of regulatory authority over nuclear reactors has crossed the line into
federal authority have been far from consistent. 123
punitive damage awards to be available to victims of nuclear accidents, even though the purpose as well
as the effect of such awards was to regulate conduct in matters related to radiological safety.").
118. See Goxem, supra note I 0, at 446 ("In fact, the Atomic Energy Act and its amendments
created a dual system of regulation. The federal government maintains exclusive control over the
construction and operation of plants, as well as the regulation of radiological hazards. The states retain
their traditional powers relating to the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating
facilities to be licensed, land use, and ratemaking. The Supreme Court recognized this dual system of
regulation in Pacific Gas and reaffirmed in Silkwood.").
119. See Jordan, supra note 21, at 975 (Pacific Gas '"serves as a benchmark for legal change' by
explicitly recognizing a state role in nuclear decision making, and thereby contributing to, or perhaps
even causing, a decentralization of authority with respect to nuclear power." (quoting TOMAIN, supra
note 21, at 17-18)); Reilly, supra note 43, at 684 ("The court included state economic considerations
among those immune to preemption, interpreting the Act as reserving the right of states to regulate
nuclear power based on the '[n]eed for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and
service."'); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205
(1983) (noting that "states have traditionally governed in these areas"); cf Goxem, supra note I 0, at 441
(The federal district court in Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.
Supp. 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), "held that a state or local government could refrain from participating in
offsite [emergency] planning."); id. at 443 ("The result in Citizens is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in Silkwood. In both cases, the legislative history did not indicate an affirmative intent
to displace traditional state authority, even though it interfered with federal authority to regulate safety ..
. . The analysis of preemption as applied to offsite [emergency] planning leads to the conclusion,
therefore, that state or local governments are free to refrain from developing or implementing an offsite
plan, even if motivated by safety concerns.").
120. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 239, 256 (1984).
121. See Goxem, supra note I 0, at 427.
122. See David E. Izhakoff, Federal Preemption: State Regulation of Federally Owned Nuclear
Production Plants, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 665, 669 n.27 (1989) ("We thought that this act [1959
amendments to AEA] without saying in so many words did make clear that there is preemption here, but
we have tried to avoid defining the precise extent of that preemption feeling it is better to leave these
kind [sic] of detailed questions perhaps up to the courts later to be resolved." (quoting Federal-State
Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field: Hearing Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th
Cong. 308 (1959) (statement ofMr. Lowenstein))).
123. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers & Paul F. Dauer, Taming the New Breed of Nuclear Free Zone
Ordinances: Statutory and Constitutional Infirmities in Local Procurement Ordinances Blacklisting the
Producers of Nuclear Weapons Components, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 87, 102 n.95 (1989) (citing cases
holding that federal law preempted state laws and that federal law did not preempt state laws). Compare
United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding federal law preempted
Washington law that required "total cleanup of contamination" from a site before additional radioactive
materials could be placed there), Skull Valley Band ofGoshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1227
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II. VERMONT AND ITS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant (Vermont Yank:ee) is a 640
megawatt nuclear power plant located in Vernon, Vermont, at the southeastern
tip of the state. 124 The plant provides one-third of Vermont's energy needs. 125
The AEC licensed the plant in 1972. 126 Entergy, a Louisiana-based energy
company, purchased Vermont Yankee in 2001 for $180 million, roughly half
the cost of an equivalent coal-fired plant or wind farm. 127 In 2006, the NRC,
the successor federal agency to the AEC, permitted Entergy to increase the
plant's power output by 20 percent. 128 After five years of review, in March
2010-ironically the day before the Fukushima disaster-the NRC extended
the plant's operating license, 129 due to expire in 2012, l30 to 2032. 131 Thus,

(lOth Cir. 2004) (holding Utah law regulating nuclear fuel storage and transportation preempted), United
States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816, 820-23 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding federal law preempted Kentucky
environmental permit conditions applicable to disposing radioactive wastes in a landfill), Cnty. of
Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co, 728 F.2d 52, 60--61 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding state tort and contract
claims against utility preempted because they related to safety), and Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1112 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding ordinance barring spent fuel
importation and storage preempted by federal law), with Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174
(1988) (declining to preempt incidental safety regulations which allowed award of additional
compensation to workers at federal nuclear production facility), English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72,
90 (1990) (holding state law action for intentional infliction of emotional distress did not "fall within the
pre-empted field of nuclear safety as that field has been defined in prior cases"), Kerr-McGee v. City of
W. Chi., 914 F.2d 820, 826 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding City's application of its erosion and sedimentation
regulations to a waste disposal site not preempted because the City is not "precluded from visiting those
same areas of concern" touched upon by the NRC's comprehensive licensing scheme "so long as the
City does not interfere with the regulation of radiological hazards").
124. See Hannah Northey, Entergy Sues to Keep Vermont Yankee Running, E&ENEWSPM (Apr. 8,
2011 ), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/ 2011/04118/4.
125. Since Vermont Yankee sells wholesale power, its rates are approved by the Federal Energy
Commission and not the Vermont Public Service Board. See Complaint at 21, Entergy Nuclear Vt.
Yankee, LLC. v. Shumlin, No. 1:11-cv-00099-jgm (D. Vt. Apr. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 2811317
[hereinafter Entergy Complaint], available at http://www.entergy.com/content/investor_relations/pdfs/418-ll_complaint.pdf.
126. See Gillian Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale ofJudicial Review and
Nuclear Waste 1, 10 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No.
0592, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= I 0 16&context=columbia_pllt.
127. Christian Parenti, What Nuclear Renaissance?, THE NATION, May 12, 2008, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/what-nuclear-renaissance.
128. Press Release, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Staff Approves Power Uprate for
Vermont Yankee (Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docsfML0606/
ML060610249.pdf.
129. See NRC Renews License for Vermont Yankee, E&ENEWSPM (Mar. 21, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/print/20 11103/21/5; see also Northey, supra note 124 (noting that
NRC renewed Vermont Yankee's operating license on March 21 "after a five-year review").
130. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, ENTERGY, http://www.entergy-nuc1ear.com/
plant_informationlvermont-yankee (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
131. See Hurst, supra note 6 ("[C]oincidentally, only hours before the earthquake and tsunami
rocked northeastern Japan and set off the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, the NRC voted 4-0 to
approve Vermont Yankee for another twenty years, putting the streak at 62 straight extensions."). A
temporary suspension of pending applications to extend the operating lifetime of domestic reactors,
including the decision to approve the Vermont Yankee extension, is no longer in effect. See Shir
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Vermont Yankee will continue to operate for another twenty years unless
something happens to shut it down.
Vermont Yankee has had several serious accidents. In 1996, there was
significant circumferential cracking in the plant's reactor pressure vessel, the
core shroud, and the condenser, as well as in the plant's feedwater and
recirculation pipes. 132 In 2003, the reactor had a leak in the primary piping
connected to the reactor vessel head, which automatically shut the plant
down. 133 In 2004, spent nuclear fuel rods went missing from the plant. 134 In
2007, a wooden cooling tower collapsed for no apparent reason. 135 In 2010,
tritium leaks were discovered in underground piping at the plant; that same
spring both cesium and strontium-90 were found in soils surrounding the plant,
and recently, a fish with high strontium levels was caught near the plant
outfall. 136 Tritium was also found in the Connecticut River close to where
groundwater from the plant enters the river in January 2010, and again recently
in mid-July of2011 137 prompting the Vermont Senate to take action. 138
Vermont Yankee's accident record feeds into the general paranoia about
nuclear power plants, which has been further kindled by the recent accident at
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear generating station in Japan. 139 Vermont
Haberman, NRC Rejects Petition to Suspend Nuke Plant Licensing Activities, SEACOASTONL!NE.COM
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20110916-NEWS-109160360; see also Union
Elec. Co. d/b/a/ Ameren Missouri (Callaway Plant, Unit 2), CLI-11-05, 74 NRC__, 20-21 (Sept. 9,
20 II), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders/20 11/20 ll05cli.pdf.
132. See Keith Harmon Snow, Vermont Yankee: A Second Lease on Half-Life,
ALL THINGSPASS.COM (Mar. 30, 20 II), http://www.allthingspass.cornluploads/html-69VT%20Yankee%
20Nuke%20Final.htm.
133. See id. (noting that there were actually two leaks: one when packing blew out of a valve; the
other where a pump seal failed on restart).
134. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-05-339, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION: NRC NEEDS TO Do MORE TO ENSURE THAT POWER PLANTS ARE EFFECTIVELY
CONTROLLING SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, SUMMARY (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05339.pdf.
135. See Behr, supra note 50.
136. See Dave Gram, Despite Calls to Slow Down, NRC Grants Vermont
Yankee
Renewal,
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Mar. 21, 2011 ), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/viewart/20 1103211
NEWS07/ll 03210 I 0/Despite-calls-slow-down-NRC-grants-Vermont-Yankee-renewal.
Underscoring
the Governor's concern, a fish caught near the plant contained strontium-90, a radioactive isotope
capable of causing leukemia and bone cancer. Although strontium-90 can occur naturally, "( o ]ne finding
of [strontium-90] just above the lower limit of detection in one fish sample is notable because it's the
first time strontium-90 has been detected in the edible portion of any of our fish samples." Radioactive
Fish Found Near Vermont Plant, GREENWIRE (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/
print/2011/08/03/23.
137. See Tritium Found Again in River Near Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, GREENWIRE (Aug.
18, 2011), http://www.eenews.net /Greenwire/2011108/18/21.
138. See infra note !56 (discussing circumstances of Vermont Senate vote directing the state PSB
to deny Vermont Yankee a new certificate of public good).
139. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 140-47 (discussing public fear of nuclear power). The effects of
the Japanese accident are still unfolding as more evidence is gathered about human and environmental
exposure. See Fukushima Containment Chambers Likely Breached, GREENWIRE (May 25, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/05/25/10 ("Last month, Japan's governrnent raised the
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Yankee's reactor design is the same as the Fukushima Daiichi plants. 140 It
contains the Mark 1 suppression system that failed to function in the Japanese
accident 141 and relies on above-ground spent fuel storage tanks like the
Japanese plants. 142
Thus, Vermont Yankee "has long been a bone of contention for many
Vermonters." 143 In 1975, Vermont amended its public services laws to require
the approval by both houses of the Vermont General Assembly before the state
Public Service Board (PSB)-the equivalent of a public service commission or
state utility board-could issue a certificate of public good for the construction
of a nuclear power plant. 144 Vermont Yankee's original owner consented to the
state's regulatory power over its nuclear plant, subjecting the plant to regulation
by the Vermont PSB as well as the state Water Resources Board and Health
Board. 145 In 2002, when Entergy Corporation bought the plant, it signed an
agreement with the PSB that it would reapply to the PSB for a new certificate
of public good when the plant's operating license expired in 2012. 146
severity rating of the Fukushima crisis to the highest, matching Chernobyl in 1986" and "the Fukushima
plant may release more radiation than Chernobyl."); see also Norirnitsu Onishi & Martin Fackler, Japan
Hid Radiation Path Leaving Evacuees in Peril, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2011, at AI. In response to the
accident, both Germany and Switzerland have suspended their nuclear plans. See Germany, Switzerland
Suspend Nuclear Plans, GREENWIRE (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/gw/sample/print/7.
140. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 67 n.13.
141. See Snow, supra note 132 (quoting Harold Denton, NRC Director of Regulation, as saying the
Mark I containment system had "something like a 90% probability of containment failure" in the event
of a core meltdown).
142. See Hurst, supra note 6 (quoting the executive director of an anti-nuclear citizens group as
saying, when referring to the Fukushima Daiichi plant, "[t]hat plant, which uses the same General
Electric boiling water reactors with Mark-1 containment vessels and above-ground spent waste storage
pools as those at Vermont Yankee, contains more spent fuel than all four of the pools at Fukushima
combined").
143. Jd.
144. An Act Relating to the Certificate of Public Good for Extending the Operating License of a
Nuclear Power Plant, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("Before a certificate of
public good is issued for the construction of a nuclear fission plant the public service board shall obtain
the approval of the general assembly and the assembly's determination that the construction of the
proposed facility will promote the general welfare."). In 2005, the General Assembly recodified the
authority of the PSB over the facility's operation, extending that authority beyond its 2010 license
expiration date. The General Assembly's located its authority over the PSB's certification decision in
the Assembly's regulatory authority over future spent fuel storage. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6522(c)
(2011). This is not Vermont's first attempt at controlling initiatives involving radioactive materials. See
generally Lisa Anne St. Amand, Note, Legislative Control Over the Uranium Industry in Vermont:
Flirting with Preemption, 7 VT. L. REV. 315, 323 (1982) (discussing Vermont's earlier attempt to use its
police powers to mandate legislative approval of uranium development proposals).
145. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 420 (saying that the utility also agreed to abide by state
rules regulating radioactive emissions and "to use its best efforts to secure AEC approval of the
installation of any device that would restrict emissions"); id. (speculating that the reason Vermont
Yankee signed the agreement was that "it was trying to secure the approval of the Vermont Public
Service Board for a bond issue").
146. SeeWald, supra note 56, at Al6 ("When [the subsidiaries of Entergy Corporation] bought the
plant from local utilities in 2002, they signed an agreement with Vermont's regulatory agency, the
Public Service Board, agreeing that when the plant's 40-year license expired in March 20212, its
'certificate of public good' would also need to be renewed."); Dave Gram, Nuke Plant VP Says Firm
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In 2006, the General Assembly passed Vermont Act 160-the focus of
this Article-that prevents the operation of Vermont Yankee beyond the
expiration date of its license without the Assembly's authorization. 147 In 2008,
the General Assembly passed Act 189, calling for a "thorough, independent,
and public assessment" of the reliability of the plant's systems, structures, and
components because of the plant's age. 148 Act 189 required the PSB to
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the plant's safety when it initiated its
review of Vermont Yankee's license extension. 149 This audit resulted in a
"Comprehensive Reliability Assessment" of the plant's continued operation
and safety beyond 2012 and, on balance, concluded that the plant could be
operated safely for another twenty years. 150 Although Act 189 allows the PSB
to start proceedings for the issuance of a certificate of public good, 151 Act 160
prohibits the PSB from issuing the certificate without legislative approva1. 152
By subjecting Vermont Yankee to the jurisdiction of both the state's PSB and
General Assembly, Vermont Act 160 makes Vermont Yankee not only the sole

Agreed to Vt. Oversight, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 13, 2011), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Nukeplant-VP-says-firm-apf-1869991089.html; see also Northey, supra note 124 ("Entergy argues that it
bought the Vermont Yankee plant in 2002 under an agreement with the state that stipulated that the
Vermont Public Service Board, not the state's legislature, would grant the plant's certificate.").
Certificates of public good are required for all Vermont power plants. SeeWald, supra note 56, at A16
(saying Vermont "requires such certificates of all big power plants").
147. 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 160. This Act amended title 30, section 248 of the Vermont Code
by specifically prohibiting operation of a nuclear plant beyond the date permitted in its certificate of
public good without the approval of the state general assembly and sets up a process for petitioning the
PSB to gain such approval, including arranging for a study that looks at the need for the plant and its
benefits, risks, costs, and alternatives that might promote the general welfare better than the nuclear
plant. The study must also identify and analyze any long-term accountability and financial responsibility
issues, as well as long-term environmental, economic, and public health issues, including issues related
to dry cask storage of nuclear waste from the plant and decommissioning options. In spring 20 II, two
bills were introduced in both houses of Vermont's legislature amending section 248(e)(2) by removing
the requirement for legislative approval of the continued operation of a nuclear power plant beyond the
date of its current certificate of public good and for the storage of spent fuel at the reactor beyond that
date. SeeS. 84, 2011-2012 S., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2011); H. 331, 2011-2012 H., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2011). As
of the date of this Article, neither bill has passed either legislative body.
148. An Act relating to a Comprehensive Vertical Audit and Reliability Assessment of the Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Facility, 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 189. According to Entergy, the Act specifically
requires an inquiry into (I) whether the "design of the system [is] in keeping with the expected initial
conditions and its design basis"; (2) whether "plant records adequately represent the as-built condition of
the plant'; (3) "[w]hat changes or compensations have been made to accommodate unanticipated
operations outcomes"; (4) the results of periodic testing and inspection of the systems; (5) whether "the
management system for aging components [has] been adequately maintained to assure the components
meet the design basis"; (6) all repairs, modifications, and redesigns to plant systems; and (7) the efficacy
of plant operator training. See Entergy Complaint, supra note 125, at 21.
149. 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 189.
150. Entergy Complaint, supra note 125, at 22. After the discovery of tritium in plant monitoring
wells, Vermont Governor Shumlin ordered the PSB to appoint a "Reliability Oversight Committee" to
provide "additional expertise on oversight of Vermont Yankee issues within the state's jurisdiction." /d.
151. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
152. Entergy Complaint, supra note 125, at 22.
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nuclear reactor in the country facing two layers of state regulatory review, 153
but also the only one where a state legislature can block its continued
operation. 154
In February 2010, after the discovery of tritium in the plant's monitoring
wells, the state PSB opened an investigation of whether Vermont Yankee
should be shut down or take other steps to stop radioactive and non-radioactive
releases into the environment pending the completion of certain repairs,
whether "good cause" existed to revoke or modify Entergy's 2002 Certificate
of Public Good for the plant, and whether penalties should be issued because
these releases violated Vermont law. 155 However, without waiting for the
results of that investigation, at the urging of then-State Senator Peter Shumlin,
the Vermont Senate voted 26-4 to direct the PSB not to issue a certificate of
public good for the plant. 156 Explaining the Senate vote, now-Governor
Shumlin said "the plant was too old to operate reliably." 157 In March 2011,
despite findings by both the NRC and Vermont's nuclear engineer that the plant
was safe, Governor Shumlin said:
Given the serious radioactive tritium leaks and the recent tritium test
results, the source of which has yet to be determined, and other almost
weekly problems occurring at this facility, 1 remain convinced that it is not
in the public good for the plant to remain open beyond its scheduled closing
in 2012. 158
Indicating its determination to press forward with the plant, Entergy announced
153. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 432 n.221 ("The statute clearly provides that nuclear
power plants are subject to the jurisdiction of the General Assembly in addition to the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Board. Therefore, the statute does not merely shift evaluation of nuclear power plants
from one state agency to the legislature but in fact subjects them to an additional layer of government
review."); see also Wald, supra note 56, at A 16.
154. See Hurst, supra note 6 ("[B]ecause the Vermont legislature must also approve the license
extension, the only U.S. state where that is the case, the state decision and the NRC decision will stand
in opposition to each other-and that has never happened in a rclicensing before.").
155. Entergy/Vermont Yankee, Docket 7600 (Vt. Pub Serv. Bd. 2011), available at http:!/
psb.vermont.gov/docketandprojccts/electric/7600.
156. SeeWald, supra note 56, at AI6 ("In February 2010, the State Senate voted 26-4, to refuse to
grant such a certificate to Vcrmont Yankee, partly at the urging of the governor Peter Shumlin, who was
then a state senator. The House did not vote."). Vermont is not the only state threatening the license
extension of one of Entergy's nuclear plants. See Kaplan & Hakim, supra note 21, at A 18 (discussing
Entergy's public relations campaign initiated in response to "intensified political opposition and public
unease"); id. ("An advertising campaign would be the most visible sign yet of Entergy's concern that
Mr. Cuomo and other opponents pose a serious threat to the future of the plant.").
157. SeeWald, supra note 56, at A16; id. ("Underlying the struggle is that the plant has had
embarrassing operational lapses in recent years, and is the same vintage and design as No. I reactor at
the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan, which was damaged in the March II earthquake and tsunami.").
158. Gram, supra note 136; see also Yankee Owner Tries New Strategy To Win Over Vermonters,
VPRNEWS (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.vpr.net/news_detail/90481/ (According to Governor Shumlin,
"1 don't think you can convince most Vermonters today ... that Vermont's best energy choice is to play
Russian Roulette with an aging nuclear power plant."); Alan Wirzbicki, Vermont's Unique Nuclear
BOSTON GLOBE
(Mar.
23,
2011),
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobc/
Power
Veto,
editorial_opinion/ blogs/the _ angle/20 11103/vermonts _ unique.html (Governor Shumlin said "more
states should follow Vermont's lead ... [by] 'tak[ing] control into their own hands about aging plants"').
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in July 2011 its intent to refuel the reactor to avoid having to shut it down. 159
The company has been unsuccessfully trying to sell the plant for a while. 160
The stage was set for a battle between the power company, which indicated no
interest in shutting the plant, and the state, which had every intent that it be shut
down.
Predictably, Entergy filed suit to overturn the state law, 161 alleging that
the AEA preempts Vermont Act 160. 162 Entergy's complaint asserted that the
Senate had intruded into the province of the NRC by making a decision based
on safety, as opposed to economic, concems. 163 Entergy denied that its lawsuit
159. See Entergy Plans to Refuel Vermont Yankee Plant, GREENWIRE (July 26, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/201!/07/26/10 (saying that refueling will cost the company up
to $65 million, but will earn the company $90 million if it can operate until March when its state
certificate expires).
160. SeeWald, supra note 56, at Al6 (Entcrgy has "tried to sell the troubled reactor, but no buyers
stepped forward."); see also Green Mountain Power, Unwilling to get on Vermont Yankee, Looks East,
GREENWIRE (May 25, 2011), http://www.cenews.net/Grcenwire/print/2011/05/25/12 (reporting that
Green Mountain Power Corporation had instead reached a twenty-three year power purchase agreement
to get electricity from Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire because of the "uncertainty
around the future of Vermont Yankee which the state is pushing to close"); Third Vermont, Utility
Declines Deal With Vermont Yankee, GREENWIRE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.ccnews.net/Grccnwire/
print/2011/04/27/14 (reporting that Vermont Electric Cooperative's board voted against entering into a
twenty-year contract with Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant despite substantial savings).
161. Entcrgy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC, v. Shumlin, No. 1:11-cv-99-jgm, 2011 WL 2811317 (D.
Vt. July 18, 2011); see also Wald, supra note 56, at Al6 (saying Entergy sued Vermont officials in
federal district court in Burlington, Vermont "challenging the constitutionality of a state law giving the
Vermont legislature veto power over operation of the reactor when its current license expires next
March"). Prior to Entcrgy's lawsuit, a coalition of environmental groups sued the NRC for failing to
obtain a section 40l(c) water quality certification from the state for the license extension or a waiver by
the state of that requirement. See Lawsuit Alleges Clean Water Act Violations in Vermont Yankee
License Extension, GREENWIRE (May 24, 2011), http://www.ccncws.net/Grccnwirc/print/2011/05/24110
(discussing the lawsuit brought by the Vermont Department of Public Service and New England
Coalition, an anti-nuclear group, claiming the NRC failed to obtain a section 401 water quality
certificate or a state waiver of the requirement and seeking to enjoin "proposed license extension until
Entergy Corp ... provides the water quality certificate to federal nuclear regulators"; Vermont Yankee's
position is that the original Section 401 certificate "still applies today.").
162. Entergy Complaint, supra note 125, at 21-22. Entergy's nuclear subsidiary and Entcrgy
Nuclear Vermont Yankee joined Entcrgy. The Defendants were Governor Shumlin, the state attorney
general, and members of the Vcrmont PSB. See Wald, supra note 56, at A 16 (noting the suit was filed
by Entcrgy subsidiaries Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee and Entergy Nuclear Operations and the
defendants were Governor Shumlin, State Attorney General William Sorrell, and the members of the
PSB). Massachusetts and three environmental organizations filed amicus briefs supporting Vermont; a
local union filed in support of Entcrgy. Massachusetts argued that it had an interest in the future of the
plant since it was located five miles from the border with Massachusetts and several towns in
Massachusetts received electricity from the plant and were within its emergency evacuation zone.
Should an accident happen, "Massachusetts communities could face contamination of soil, water, and
agriculture resources that would force displacement of residents and businesses, conceivably devastating
state or local economics for years into the Commonwealth's future." Brief for Commonwealth of
Massachusetts as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at 4, Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v.
Shumlin, No. I: 11-cv-00099-jgm (D. Vt. Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/
files/Massachusctts%20Amicus%20in%20support%20of%20Vermonts%20opposition%20to%20PI.pdf.
163. SeeWald, supra note 56, at A16 (An Entergy executive "said the legislature had improperly
taken the decision out of the hands of experts at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and given it to
'political decision makers.' Only the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can make decisions about
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breached the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding with the PSB in which it
agreed to submit its relicensing application to the PSB, saying that it was not
"going back on its word," rather the "general assembly changed the rules and
left [it] with no other choices." 164 Although the company initially lost on its
preliminary injunction motion to keep the plant running during the course of
the litigation on the ground that it failed to show irreparable harm from the
plant's closure, 165 it ultimately prevailed in the district court on its preemption
argument. 166
The case quickly gained national recognition, aided by comments like
those from U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, to the effect that the
lawsuit was none of the Justice Department's business. 167 But as Entergy sees
it, what Vermont did is very much a matter of national concern because
Vermont Act 160 conflicts with the AEA and its exclusive jurisdiction over the
safety of nuclear power plants. According to Entergy, the NRC's decision to
extend Vermont Yankee's license is proof positive of this conflict. 168 While
Entergy seems correct in that there is little question that safety concerns played
a role in the General Assembly's enactment of Act 160, the legislative history
also reflects unease about the unpredictability of nuclear power plant costs. 169
safety."); see also Northey, supra note 124 (quoting an Entergy official as saying "[t]hc 2006 law 'took
the decision about Vermont Yankee's future away from the Public Service Board, a quasi-judicial expert
decision-maker, independent of legislative control' and placed it into the 'hands of political
individuals"'). Entergy additionally accused the state of being willing to issue the certificate of public
good if the company gave "utility price breaks" to its Vermont customers, which, according to the
lawsuit, would "violate the federal authority's exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce because it
would result in consumers in New Hampshire and Massachusetts paying higher rates." Wald, supra note
56, at Al6; see also Northey, supra note 124 (saying that Entergy contends that any agreement between
it and Vermont that gave "preferential rates," compared to non-Vermont utilities, to Vermont residents
would "favor in-state residents over out-of-state residents" and therefore violate the Commerce Clause).
164. Wald, supra note 56, at Al6 (According to an Entergy executive: "You will hear that Entergy
is going back on its word and breaking the deal it made in the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding.
This is not true. We believe the general assembly changed the rules and left us with no other choices.").
165. See Judge Rejects Bid to Keep Vermont Yankee open Amid Law Suit, GREENWIRE (July 19,
20 II), http://www.ecnews.net/Greenwire/print/20 11/07/19/14.
166. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Vt. 2012) (holding that the
AEA preempted Vermont Act 160 and that plaintiff Entergy Vermont Yankee was also entitled to
injunctive relief on its Commerce Clause claim).
167. In a related maneuver, Senator Sanders, enraged that the NRC had held a secret vote on
whether to ask the Department of Justice to intervene in the lawsuit in support of Entergy, blocked the
nomination of a member of the NRC to a full term on the Commission. See Hannah Northey, Sanders
Blocks Controversial NRC Pick Over Vermont Lawsuit, GREENWIRE (June 28, 2011),
http://www.cenews.net/ Greenwire/print/2011/06/28/5. Senator Sanders only lifted the hold when the
Department of Justice announced it would not intervene in the case. See Hannah Northey, DOJ Won't
in
Vermont
Yankee
Case-Sanders,
E&ENEWSPM
(June
30,
2010),
Intervene
http://eencws.net/eenewsprn/print/2011/06/30/05; see also Justice Department Confirms it Won't
Intervene in Vermont Yankee Lawsuit, BERNIE SANDERS-U.S. SENATOR FOR VT. (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroorn/news/?id=5dff44 78-cb04-41 Oa-9e5d-90353fl5c !3d.
168. See generally Entergy Complaint, supra note 125.
169. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 432 n.220 (noting rejection of the 1975 floor
amendment that would have limited the General Assembly's approval to "non-radiological aspects of
the construction and operation of the plant" and that legislative findings for the bill indicated "there were
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The question is whether the state could block Vermont Yankee's relicensing to
avoid those costs without being preempted by the AEA by straying into an area
of exclusive federal regulation.
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE

I do not think the United States would come to an end, if we lost our power
to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled
if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states.
For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who
are not trained to national views and how action is taken that embodies
what the Commerce Clause was meant to end. 17 0

This Part briefly sets out the preemption doctrine's general features,
focusing on the presumption against preemption and the intent of the drafters of
both the preempting and preempted law. The doctrine is examined within the
context of general federalism principles and the policies that animate those
principles.
A. The Preemption Doctrine in Broad Strokes

The preemption doctrine is entirely judge-made. It "is rooted in the
juxtaposition of the powers reserved to the states and the supremacy of federal
law over state law under the United States Constitution." 171 The doctrine is
neither dictated by the Constitution nor required by our federal structure of
government. 172 Rather than a characteristic of federal law, 173 preemption is a

substantial questions concerning (I) the safety and effect on public health of nuclear fission plants, (2)
the reliability of emergency core cooling systems, (3) the safe disposal of radioactive wastes, and (4) the
economic costs of fission plants which arc unpredictable and often raise the final cost of electricity to
prohibitive levels" (citing H. 127, 1975 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Scss. (Vt. 1975) (enacted as VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 30, § 248(c))).
170. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96
(1920).
171. Tribe, supra note 19, at 686.
172. SeeS. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv.
685, 754-55 (1991) ("[P]reemption adjudication docs not focus on a constitutional text, structural
principle, or value. Preemption decisions instead interpret legislative, administrative, or common law
schemes that issue from the federal and state governments, and determine whether the schemes can coregulate"). Hoke generally finds that constitutional jurisprudence is no help to a court faced with a
conflict between federal and state law and that any reference to the Supremacy Clause is "superfluous"
as the Clause operates at a "meta-constitutional level bereft of substantive content." !d. at 755; see also
Stephen Gardbaum, Congress's Power to Preempt States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39,41 (2005) ("[A]lthough
both supremacy and preemption displace (or supersede) state law, they operate to displace different
types of state law and do so by the different mechanisms of automatic consequence and discretionary
power respectively.").
173. See Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 40-41 (Unlike preemption, "Supremacy is an attribute of
federal law, specifying its hierarchical status vis-a-vis state law ... an attribute that automatically or
inherently attaches to all federal law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause and, like other attributes-for
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power that Congress possesses and may choose to exercise at its discretion. 174
Hence, congressional intent is central to any preemption analysis performed by
a court.
The preemption doctrine declares invalid state laws that "retard, impede,
burden, or in any matter control[] the operation of federal law." 175 When a
court finds that federal law preempts a state law, the state cannot take action
based on that state law, 176 even if it would otherwise be free to act. 177 While

example, being the law of the land directly upon enactment without need for state implementation-is not
something that Congress can either bestow or change."); id. at 49 (identifying the Necessary and Proper
Clause, "an enumerated power of Congress," as "the proper and best source of Congress's power of
preemption").
174. See id. at 41 ("Preemption ... is a power of Congress rather than an automatic characteristic
of federal law. Like all powers of Congress, it is discretionary and so may or may not be exercised.").
Gardbaum argues that ''what is central to any preemption analysis is not conflict, not the Supremacy
Clause, but the nature, source, and limits of Congress's power of preemption." !d. at 46. For this reason,
he argues that Congress should be held to a higher standard of clarity for preemption determinations,
similar to that imposed under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendment. !d. at 5657 ("Proper understanding of the nature of preemption as a power to abrogate concurrent state authority
renders it sufficiently similar to Eleventh Amendment abrogation to require a similar standard, and the
stated rationale behind the condition on both Eleventh Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause
powers is exactly the same in the preemption context: namely, congressional altering of the
Constitution's default position on federal-state relations.").
175. Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling
Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 579, 585 (2008) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819)). Some
scholars ascribe to the theory that affected individuals should only be required to respond to one master.
See Kenneth L. Hirsh, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 525 (1972)
(San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon/, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and other cases "like it suggest
what may be called a 'one master' theory of preemption. This theory declares that private activities
subject to regulation by a federal agency with broad regulatory powers should be subject to only one
master; state laws imposing requirements which could be imposed by the federal agency are
presumptively invalid."); see also id. ("The important point to note here is that the 'one master' theory is
a judicially elaborated doctrine of preemption which is based on the principle that different types of laws
require different types of preemption rules."); id. at 550 ("[T]he one-master theory is treated as a
presumption rather than as an absolute rule; the Court applies it in cases where Congress has delegated
regulatory powers to a federal agency unless there are substantial countervailing factors," and the theory
"does not extend to cases where the delegated federal authority does not permit comprehensive federal
regulation of what the Court perceives to be the relevant field." (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1962))).
176. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 27-28 ("[When the Court] forecloses state regulatory power by
finding a state enactment preempted, the states cannot avoid the result but must cease to act in a field
that may be of great local or regional concern. If the Court finds against preemption, however, the state
remains capable of regulating the subject. If Congress disagrees, it can legislate away state authority
explicitly. Thus a state-supportive presumption in preemption cases shows deference to primary
congressional responsibility for the federal balance."); see also Hoke, supra note 172, at 687 n.4 ("The
term 'preempted' surfaces in a wide range of legal contexts, often merely as a synonym for 'forbidden'
or 'ousted.' In its strict sense, the term 'federal preemption' expresses the conclusion that state or local
law must be disabled from operation because it conflicts with some aspect of a federal legislative
scheme. Thus, federal statutes and administrative regulations constitute the potentially preemptive law in
this strict sense. Other types of federal law, including federal constitutional law and federal common law
principles, may also disable and displace state and local law, but those inquiries proceed under legal
principles that diverge from legislative preemption .... ").
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preemption allows the federal government to displace state law with respect to
matters within the federal government's constitutional powers, 178 it allows
state regulation to supplement federal initiatives so long as the state does not
interfere with or otherwise obstruct the federal law's purposes. 179
The preemption doctrine has evolved into what Professor Schroeder calls
"a multipart universe consisting of express and implied preemption, the latter
encompassing both field and conflict preemption, which is further divided into
physical impossibility and obstacle preemption." 180 If the language of the
federal law is explicit as to its preemptive effect, that is called express
preemption; 181 otherwise, preemption is implied. 182 Implied preemption has

177. See Susann J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the
Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. I, 10 (1995); see also Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 41 ("Supremacy means
that in the case of a conflict between federal and state law, federal law trumps or displaces the
conflicting state law."); id. at 46 ("[S]upremacy is all about conflict. Conflict between federal and state
laws is the only reason that state laws are displaced under the principle of supremacy. By contrast,
preemption is not all about conflict between federal and state laws, but is primarily about a
congressional power and its exercise. It is the exercise of this power that is the major reason state law is
displaced-because Congress has said so-and not the existence of the resulting conflict."); Bradford R.
Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICES: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION, 167, 192-93 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press
2009) ("The negative implication of the [Supremacy] Clause, however, is that state law continues to
govern in the absence of 'the supreme Law of the Land."'). Gardbaum refers to supremacy as a "lesser
principle" compared to Congress's preemptive power. Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 48 ("[T]he
Supremacy Clause is the only source of the (lesser) principle of supremacy and not the (greater) power
of preemption.").
178. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 4.
179. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 687. But see Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court
Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S
CORE QUESTION 127 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press 2009) ("When Congress has
taken the particular subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is
not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go." (quoting
Charleston & W. Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) (Holmes, J.))).
Hoke makes the point that the Supremacy Clause is only one of the constitutional provisions that
addresses the relationship between the federal and state governments. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 756
n.337 ("[T]he supremacy clause is only one feature of the particular federalism which structures the
national government and its interrelation with the states," with the ninth, tenth, and fourteenth
amendments and the guarantee clause as other "specific texts upon which our federalism is structured.").
180. Schroeder, supra note 179, at 143. But see id. at 125 n.23 ("Once we recognize that all
preemption cases are about contradiction between state and federal law, we should begin to question the
usefulness of dividing them into the separate analytical categories of 'express' preemption, 'field'
preemption, and 'conflict' preemption." (quoting Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226
(2000))); Karen V. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretative Issues, 51
VAND. L. REv. 1149, 1175 (1998) ("The slippery path between the frustration prong of conflict
preemption and field preemption reinforces the view that the three categories of implied preemption are
not 'rigidly distinct."'); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal
Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 69, 74 (2005) ("[T]here should be only two situations when there is
preemption of state law. One is express preemption. The other is when federal law and state law are
mutually exclusive so it is not possible for somebody to comply with both. This would then eliminate
preemption based on states interfering with the achievement of the federal objective. It would eliminate
implied preemption based on the intent of Congress.").
181. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 586 ("As the name suggests, express preemption
arises as a result of the explicit language of a federal statute."); see also Borchers & Dauer, supra note
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the same preemptive effect as express preemption. 183
One type of implied preemption, field or occupation preemption, requires
a court to determine not only that the federal government has occupied a
regulatory field, but also that a state has impermissibly intruded into it. 184
Although field preemption can be implied from the pervasiveness of federal
regulation, based on a "reasonable inference" that Congress intended not to
allow state activity in the area, 185 courts today find pervasiveness less helpful
than they once did. 186 For example, the mere fact that a federal agency has
promulgated many complex regulations in a given field does not mean that a
court will infer from this a congressional intent to preempt that field

123, at I 02 n.99 (describing the proposition that Congress may preempt state law in express tenns
(citing Jones v. Roth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525 (1977))).
182. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 590 ("Congress has the authority to expressly
preempt state law, and its failure to do so is significant. Reading a statute to displace state regulatory
authority in the absence of a textual provision based on general statutory purposes is precisely the sort of
interpretive methodology that textualists criticize. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that there should be no
such thing as implied preemption in the sense of displacing state authority."). But see Stabile, supra note
177, at 86 ("The flexibility of an implied preemption analysis allows courts to consider whether their
preemption decision is appropriate not only in terms of the statute in question but in the context of the
regulation of that field as a whole."); id. ("[C]ourts engaging in implied preemption analysis can analyze
and balance the competing federal and state interests with appropriate regard for the existing social,
political and legal landscape, as well as for the regulation of the relevant field as a whole.").
183. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 587 ("Field preemption is a form of implied
preemption under which federal law completely displaces any state law in a given area-even if there is
no apparent inconsistency between federal and state law."); see also Wiggins, supra note 83, at 30
("Preemption by occupation forecloses state authority even though Congress has not enacted legislation
dealing with the precise subject under scrutiny.").
184. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1169.
185. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 31 (The factors used by courts to determine field preemption
specifically include: "The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal
law and the character of the obligation imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230-31 (1947))); see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 689 ("[Federal
occupation of a field] may be evinced by the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme, by the
overriding dominance of the federal interest, or by the nature of the federal purpose and the character of
the obligations imposed by the federal law."); Schroeder, supra note 179, at 128 ("Field preemption in
such areas of primary federal authority similarly amounts to the inverse of the 'presumption against
preemption' that operates in areas where state regulation has historically been dominant. Here, the Court
is using the criterion of dominant federal interest much as it has used the criterion of regulatory
pervasiveness, as an indicator of whether or not the Congress intended to occupy the field."); Borchers
& Dauer, supra note 123, at 103 n.IOO (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982)).
186. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 31 ("It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has
precluded state action or by the choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the
States undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide." (quoting Santa Fe, 331 U.S. at
231)); id. at 33 ("A finding that the California Nuclear law invades a field exclusively occupied by
federal regulatory authority must thus be based on a sounder footing than the mere fact of abundant
federal legislative activity.").
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entirely. 187 Findings of no field preemption also include instances where there
is a federal licensing scheme. 188 According to Professor Wiggins, even where
Congress has "enacted 'pervasive' legislation on a subject, its regulatory
interest will not automatically be converted into preemption of state legislation
in the same field."l89
Additionally, field preemption will not automatically be found where there
is an "important federal interest" in the subject area being regulated. 190
However, the "national character" of the area being regulated, such as foreign
affairs, as opposed to the importance of the federal interest, may still be key to
a judicial decision. 191 Finally, unless there is an actual conflict between the
federal and state law, the congressional purpose underlying the federal statute is
also of limited importance in determining field or occupation preemption. 192

187. See Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 47I U.S. 707, 718 (1985) ("[I]f an
agency does not speak to the question of pre-emption, we will pause before saying that the mere volume
and complexity of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact intend to pre-empt. Given the
presumption that state and local regulation related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist
with federal regulations, we will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations,
an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety.").
188. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 689 n.48 (Huron Portland Cement Co. "demonstrates that the
existence of a federal licensing scheme does not always imply preemption."); see also Ray v. At!.
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 168--69 (1978) ("Of course, that a tanker is certified under federal law as a
safe vessel insofar as its design and construction characteristics are concerned does not mean that it is
free to ignore otherwise valid state or federal rules or regulations that do not constitute design or
construction specifications.").
189. Wiggins, supra note 83, at 33,40 ("The comprehensiveness of a federal legislative scheme no
longer is held to indicate Congressional intent to occupy the field."); see also New York State Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973) ("We reject, to begin with, the contention that preemption is to be inferred merely from the comprehensive character of the federal work incentive
provisions . . . . The subjects of modem social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature
require intricate and complex responses from the Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending
its enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the problem."); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 239 (1984) ("[P]re-emption should not be judged on the basis that the Federal Government has
so completely occupied the field of safety that state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the imposition of a state
standard in a damage action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law.").
190. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1166 ("[B]ecause every subject that merits federal legislation is
a subject of national concern, [field preemption] analysis requires a finding of some 'special features'
warranting preemption.").
191. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 34 (discussing "national character of the subject matter,"
adding labor regulation "to this list of preempted subjects," and noting that "[f]oreign affairs policy is a
classic early example of a subject which should be regulated only at the federal level" (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941))); id. at 41 ("The remaining Rice factor, the characterization of the
subject matter regulated as either national or local, is the key to occupation analysis. The Court is
familiar with the federalism balancing function involved in employing this standard because it has been
used in dormant commerce clause cases since Cooley. It is also a sufficiently standardless guidepost to
permit the value preferences of the Justices regarding appropriate federal-state authority over a
particular subject matter to predominate.").
I 92. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 40 ("The Court has also deemphasized the importance of the
purpose for which Congress legislates ...."); id. at 40-41 ("In the less obvious cases which normally
arise, however, the Court now seeks to compare the objectives of state and federal legislation to uphold
both actions if possible. Thus, the purpose factor of Rice has been transplanted from occupation to
conflict analysis."); see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 692 (Ray "demonstrates that where the federal and
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How a court defines the federal regulatory field is critical: 193 the narrower
the scope of a preemptive federal field, the less likely a state law will intrude
into it. 194 Narrowing the scope of the field thus lessens the likelihood that
preemption will create an undesirable regulatory gap that may not be filled
until, and if, Congress acts. 195
Another type of implied preemption is conflict preemption. Conflict
preemption may occur in two situations: when compliance with both federal
and state law is impossible or when a state law presents an obstacle to meeting
the objective and purpose of a federal law. 196 Impossibility preemption is
rare, 197 and courts do not generally look for conflicts between federal and state
laws. 198 For example, the mere existence of state standards that are different
state means do not conflict, similarity of purpose will not necessarily result in a finding of
preemption.").
193. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 126 ("When the Federal Government completely occupies a
given field or an identifiable portion of it ... the test of pre-emption is whether 'the matter on which the
State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act' and not whether the state
regulation conflicts with a specific federal requirement. In these cases, a critical question can often be
how the 'field' that has been preempted is to be defined." (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 260)).
194. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1167 ("[C]ase law also shows that the Court will seek to narrow
the scope of the preemptive field to mitigate against the impact of field preemption." (citing Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983))); see also Robert L.
Glicksman, Federal Preemption by Inaction, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY
OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 167, 181 n.33 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press
2009); Schroeder, supra note 179, at 123 ("The presumption against preemption instructs the courts to
give federal statutes a 'narrow reading' in order to avoid interpretations that would override state law
and to look for a 'clear' statement that Congress means to preempt state law."); Chemerinsky, supra
note 180, at 75 ("Even as to express preemption, provisions of federal law that expressly preempt state
law should be narrowly construed unless Congress has indicated otherwise."); Hoke, supra note 172, at
763; Tribe, supra note 19, at 689; Baum, supra note 77, at 667 ("Even if some amount of federal
preemption is found, the states' police power is not considered totally preempted, but is invalidated only
'to the extent that it clearly has been preempted."' (quoting Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp., 677
F.2d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 1982))).
195. But see Jordan, supra note 180, at 1167 (1998) ("Field preemption creates a regulatory
vacuum that courts must honor because, in theory, Congress deliberately created the vacuum."); see also
discussion of regulatory gaps supra notes 60--61.
196. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 588 ("[C]onflict preemption arises in two ways. The
first is when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law .... The second type of conflict
preemption occurs when state law is an obstacle to the object and purpose of federal law."). Professor
Schroeder notes that the Court's reluctance to find field preemption has led it to decide these cases on
conflict grounds. Schroeder, supra note 179, at 131 ("The Supreme Court in recent years has shown
reluctance to find additional federal statutes to have engaged in field preemption. In contrast, the
Supreme Court continues to decide in numerous cases that 'conflict' preemption exists.").
197. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 588 ("Impossibility of compliance is relatively
rare, but when it is present, preemption is clear."); see also Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 103
(citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), for the proposition
that "state law is preempted when compliance with both state and federal standards 'is a physical
impossibility'" and quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), for the proposition that state
law is preempted when it "is 'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress"').
198. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 689 ("The Court upheld a Detroit ordinance regulating smoke
emitted while a ship's boilers were being cleaned, despite extensive federal licensing of such ships in
interstate and foreign commerce. The Court, refusing to 'seek[] out conflicts between state and federal
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from their federal counterparts does not create an impossibility situation if the
regulated party can comply with both sets of standards simultaneously. 199
The second type of conflict preemption-obstacle preemption-requires a
reviewing court to determine whether state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of Congress." 200 Thus, a
reviewing court must examine how the state and federal laws are interpreted
and applied. 201 This requires courts to look beyond the federal statute's text
and structure and to inquire about the relevant section's purpose. 202 This
includes examining whether, given the broader legal context into which the

regulation where none clearly exists,' found 'no overlap between the scope of the federal ship inspection
laws' that set safety standards for federal licensing of sea-going vessels and the municipal control
ordinance." (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,446 (1960))); id. at 720 ("In
determining whether the state's nuclear provisions are preempted, a court must be cognizant of the
'sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the separate, yet coordinate, federal and state
sovereignties' and 'the proper approach is to reconcile the operation of both statutory schemes with one
another rather than holding one completely ousted."' (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 123 (1971))).
199. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 588 ("It is important to note that the existence of
state standards that differ from federal standards does not always implicate impossibility of compliance,
if the regulated party can physically comply with both standards."). See also Tribe, supra note 19, at 688
n.44 ( "The Court noted that it 'must be careful to distinguish between those situations in which the
concurrent exercise of a power ... may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations where conflicts
will necessarily arise.'" (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973) (sustaining
California law "in the face of federal copyright laws"))); Wiggins, supra note 83, at 49 ("[T]he Court
might have opted to find a conflict between the ordinance and federal law, because it was impossible to
comply with the Detroit regulation using the boilers and fuel authorized by the Coast Guard. Instead, the
Court held there was 'no overlap' between the two regulations because they were aimed at different
purposes. . . . This difference in purpose prevented preemption, even though it left Huron with the
unattractive option of making substantial modifications to its vessels' Coast Guard-approved boilers or
avoiding the Port of Detroit." (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440
(1960))); id. at 84 ("At the policy level, then, there is reason for arguing that since the current Court will
not find that a conflict between state and federal law 'will necessarily,' arise, a different result [from
First Iowa preempting a state law requiring a hydroelectric facility to get a state permit as a condition
precedent to securing a federal permit under the Federal Power Act] would be reached in the merits."
(citing First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 164 (1946))).
200. Wiggins, supra note 83, at 43 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941)).
201. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1171 ("Whether a state 'law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress ... requires [an analysis
of] the relationship between the state and federal law as they are interpreted and applied."' (quoting
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977))); see also Stabile, supra note 177, at 10 ("Federal
legislative goals and purposes cannot be viewed as standing in a vacuum; instead they must be weighed
against the interests the state has in enacting its legislation.").
202. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1225 ("Under a purposive approach to the question, a court
would then look beyond the statute's language and structure in order to determine what purpose or
policy or underlying principle ought to be attributed to the provisions at issue."); id. at 1203-04
(discussing how courts "should consider relevant sources of information in addition to the statute's text,
such as the law's legislative history and the circumstances surrounding the law's enactment" when
trying to identify a law's purpose); id. at 1204 (Hart and Sacks posit "that in construing a statute to carry
out its purpose, courts should take into account relevant overarching principles and policies and should
ensure that the interpretation is in accord with any relevant 'policy of clear statement,' such as the
premise underlying preemption that state laws should not be found preempted absent 'clear evidence' of
congressional intent.").
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federal law was enacted, Congress reasonably would have enacted such a
provision. 2°3 Courts are increasingly willing to find obstacle preemption,
perhaps because legislative purpose is often subject to interpretation and the
analysis required to find obstacle preemption is becoming less rigorous. 204
Scholars differ as to what must or should be shown to establish obstacle
preemption. For Professor Wiggins, determining the existence of obstacle
preemption is relatively simple-when a state law has the same purpose as a
federal law, state law will more likely present an obstacle to the fulfillment of
that federal law and, therefore, be preempted. 205 Professor Jordan argues,
however, that the state and federal methods designed to achieve a shared goal
must actually conflict. 206 Additionally, Professors Levy and Glicksman argue
that since laws have many purposes, 207 less important purposes should not be
used to support federal preemption of protective state laws 208 unless Congress
provides an indisputable and clear signal of preemptive intent. 209 Regardless of
203. See id. at 1225 ("While a court could not attribute to the statute a meaning that the words
would not bear, the court would treat the statute as not only having an immediate purpose, but also a
larger and subtler purpose in its relation to the legal system as a whole. Thus, a court would consider the
context of the statute's enactment and inquire why, given the state of the law, a reasonable legislator
would have enacted the provision.").
204. See William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change
Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, I SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 23, 47 (2009)
[hereinafter Buzbee, Preemption Sword] (describing "a growing 'obstacle preemption' jurisprudence
where a direct conflict need not be shown for preemptive outcomes; rather, challenges must merely
demonstrate that a state or local law strikes a different balance than federal law"). But see Li, supra note
44, at 1204 ( "[T]he Court has not read the Constitution as an absolute bar to any state action that affects
foreign affairs" and "the Court's preemption doctrine has increasingly favored state interests.").
205. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 55 (saying "when state and national regulation are aimed at the
same purpose the Court seems more willing to find the state statute obstructs federal law and is therefore
unconstitutional"); id. ("The majority opinion in Area [Ray] demonstrates again that the characterization
of the state purpose remains very important in conflict preemption decisionmaking."). But see Gade v.
Nat'! Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992) ("In determining whether state law 'stands as
an obstacle' to the full implementation of a federal law, 'it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of
both federal and state law' is the same ... 'A state law also is pre-empted if interferes with the methods
by which the federal statute was designed to reach th[at] goal."').
206. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1174 (State law can be preempted if it "hinders either the
primary substantive purpose underlying the federal law or the secondary purpose of avoiding duplicative
regulation." (quoting Gade, 505 U.S. at 103)).
207. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Access to Courts and Preemption of State
Remedies in Collective Action Perspective, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 919, 929 (2009) ("[M)ost federal
laws have multiple purposes of varying degrees of centrality ... [and] it is important to distinguish
between the primary or principal purposes of a statute-those justifications that were central to a
statute's adoption-and secondary purposes that might have been articulated during the legislative
process.").
208. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 610 ("[G]eneral references to minimizing
regulatory burdens, protecting businesses, or balancing environmental protection and economic growth
should not, standing alone, justify the conclusion that federal law precludes states from adopting a
different balance that is more protective of the environment than the federal standard is.").
209. See id. at 642 ( "The analysis in the [Ninth Circuit's] fuel additive case does not preclude
Congress from preempting state regulation that would frustrate the secondary purposes associated with
environmental legislation. It simply cautions courts not to find preemption based on conflicts with those
purposes absent clear indication of congressional intent, preferably on the face of the statute."); see also
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what scholars believe the showing must be to establish obstacle preemption,
those who are more protective of state laws oppose preemption's increasing use
to strike down state laws. 210
There is little question that Congress has the power to preempt state law
when acting within its constitutional limits. 211 When preemption occurs,
however, it "strikes at the distribution of federal and state power in a federal
system" 212 and, therefore, according to Professor Tribe, should not be taken
lightly. 213 By preempting state law, Congress transforms a mixed federal-state
regulatory area into one that is exclusively federal, either totally or partially
depriving states of their pre-existing legislative authority. 214 When federal law

Goxem, supra note I 0, at 450 ("Pursuant to the decisions in Pacific Gas and Silkwood, all state and local
regulation of implementation of an offsite plan should not be preempted. Rather a determination of
whether a particulate state action is preempted is dependent upon an examination of the particular
purpose behind each individual legislative action. In the alternative, when state and local governments
are acting pursuant to their traditional police powers, courts should focus on whether there is a clear
congressional intent to displace such action. This is true even though the action may constitute
regulation of nuclear power safety.").
210. See Glicksman, supra note 194, at 183 ("If the only reason that a state reaches a different
decision on the desirability of regulation is that the two levels of government assess comparative risks
differently-because, for example, the state places a higher priority than the federal government does in
addressing a particular form of market failure, as compared to alternative uses of government
resources-{;onflict or obstacle preemption is not justified on the ground that state regulation would
interfere with the achievement of federal objectives."); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200
(2009) ("If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have
enacted an express pre-emption provision."); William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review,
Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and lntergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1521, 1572 n. 237 ("[A] grant of authority to an agency to set standards 'did not include the
authority to decide the pre-emptive scope of the federal statute because no such delegation regarding the
statute's enforcement provisions is evident in the statute."' (quoting Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494
u.s. 638,649-50 (1990)).
211. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 124 ("It is well established that within constitutional limits
Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms.").
212. Tribe, supra note 19, at 686 ("Preemption by the federal government of the states' power to
regulate an activity strikes at the distribution of federal and state power in a federal system."); see also
Hoke, supra note 172, at 752 ("As a nonnative matter, existing preemption jurisprudence warrants
revision because it has eroded meaningful constitutional federalism as well as the political space
available for civic republican activities."); id at 714 ("Civic republicanism constructs a normative lens
through which to measure the social and political costs of current preemption adjudication, and counsels
an interpretive approach that promotes maximum preservation of state and local regulatory power.");
Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 41 ("[B]y exercising its power of preemption, Congress can displace state
law even where the latter is not in conflict with federal law" and "by exercising its preemption power,
Congress may ... [also] redistribute general legislative competence between itself and the states").
213. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 143 ("Because the ultimate issue in preemption cases is so
fundamental and important, the doctrines the Supreme Court has developed to resolve preemption
controversies have been and will continue to be the subject of controversy."); see also Kenneth W. Starr,
Reflections on Hines v. Davidowitz: The Future of Obstacle Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. I (2005)
("For decades, the doctrine of preemption has been a fecund source of confusion and division.");
Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 41 ("Congress's power of preemption, when exercised to the full, has a
far more radical impact on state law than the automatic characteristic of federal supremacy.").
214. Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 41; see also Stabile, supra note 177, at 9 ("There are at least
three identifiable principles that should underlie preemption analysis: (I) appropriate regard for
federalism, which involves consideration of both the federal interest in Congress' substantive regulation
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preempts state law it "kills off ... an entire scheme of a particular community's
law," a result Professor Hoke calls "jurispathic." 215 She finds this result
troubling because it allows judges applying the preemption doctrine to overrule
a law enacted by state legislators who, arguably, better understand the needs
and desires of their constituents than unelected federal judges. 216 Thus,
according to some, although Congress has the power to preempt, courts should
rarely find preemption because it disrupts the delicate balance between federal
and state power in our federal structure by eliminating one of the contributors
to that balance.
In contrast, scholars who envision a cooperative federal-state regulatory
regime 217 find this "jurisdictional line drawing" between federal and state
governments pointless. 218 In the modem federal state, where law and reality

and the states' interest in enacting their legislation and in preserving their spheres of power; (2)
predictability; and (3) ease of administration.").
215. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 694 ("The shortcomings resulting from current preemption
practice have a broader impact than that of fortifYing the substantive injuries to the public that flow from
misguided or weak national regulation ... a ruling of federal preemption is inherently 'jurispathic,' it
kills off one line, perhaps even an entire scheme, of a particular community's law." (quoting Robert
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword-Nomos and Narrative, 87 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40
(1983))).
216. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 694 ("The law slayed by a preemption ruling arises from the
political and legal bodies that are both closest and most amenable to practical political efforts by average
citizen.").
217. See Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1659, 1669 (2009) ("A
dynamic, polyphonic view of federalism-a workable government where federal, state, tribal, and local
authorities are appropriately matched with geographic and socioeconomic issues-should encourage
stronger, more coherent and more cooperative forms of problem solving and leadership."); see also
Tribe, supra note 19, at 687 (The Merrill Lynch Court "noted that 'the proper approach is to reconcile
the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.'"
(quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973))); Edward J. Larson,
Building a Nation from Thirteen States: The Constitutional Convention and Preemption, 33 PEPP. L.
REv. 7, 14 (2005) (According to Madison's Convention notes in support of a proposal to have state
legislatures appoint Senators: "[W]hatever power may be necessary for the Nat[iona)l Gov[emmen]t a
certain portion must necessarily be left in the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the
extreme parts of the U.S. [sic] so as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought to
have some means of defending themselves ag[ain]st encroachments of the Nat[iona]l Gov[ernmen]t. In
every other department we have studiously endeavored to provide for its self-defense. Shall we leave the
States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than
the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Nat[iona]l
Establishment[?]).").
218. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature
of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. I, 17 (2007) ("The world is growing more complex, and
regulation is following suit. In particular-and perhaps most relevant for present purposes-the ensuing
articles paint a picture in which jurisdictional line-drawing is increasingly futile."); id. ("The emergence
of an array of new actors; heightened mobility; increasing external effects driven by new and varied
technologies, and a litany of related trends have collectively undermined the meaning-and perhaps the
singular utility--of boundaries."); see also David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive
Environmental Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 277, 296 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press 2009)
("As a general matter ... efforts to identity the optimal level of government for federal regulation are
misconceived.").
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are constantly changing in response to new social, political, and economic
conditions, 2 19 power is "flattening"; the hierarchy between different levels of
government is becoming less important as power is allocated and
reallocated. 22 Coordination, not conflict, is what is called for between and
among different levels of government, 221 with overlap the growing reality in
law and regulation. 222 These scholars therefore argue the critical question is
how to manage this jurisdictional overlap and federal-state interface
effectively. 223
The mismanagement of this fluid distribution of power between states and
the federal government could cause serious "negative consequences," such as
preventing a state from achieving its goals without justification. 224 To some,
this possibility means that courts should proceed cautiously when faced with
the potential of changing that power distribution. 225 It also means that, since

°

219. See Ahdieh, supra note 218, at 17.
220. /d. at 24-25 ("In important respects, the articles herein can be read to tell a story of the
flattening of power ... a softening of the sharp edges of hierarchy in law and regulation. If not quite
democratic, the allocations of power described herein are at least more dispersed."). To Ahdieh, this
phenomenon leads to new "operative strategies." !d. at 24 ("In a coordination game dynamic, the
operative strategic need is to align expectations, rather than alter incentives."); id. at 25 ("A flattening of
power, and resulting need for regulatory institutions to engage in persuasion to advance their aims,
follows quite naturally from the generalized sense of complexity . . . ."). Reflecting this flattening,
Resnik sees states interacting among themselves, "resulting in individual localities or states adopting
specific measures." Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and
Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light ofTranslocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 86 (2007).
221. See Ahdieh, supra note 218, at 5 (identifying "four facets of modern jurisdiction," what
Ahdieh calls "intersystemic governance," reflected in "regulatory design" as "complexity and overlap,"
"dynamic of coordination," "patterns of dependence among regulatory institutions," and "a growing role
of persuasion, rather than hierarchical mechanisms of control"); id. at 18 (discussing the need for
coordination given "the patterns of jurisdictional overlap" and how "bargains" or what Mark Tushnet
calls "political deals," "define federalism in the United States," and how these "bargains, at heart, are
coordination games"); see also Resnik, supra note 220, at 42 ("Despite the ideology of each state acting
alone as one of fifty within the United States, the practice is increasingly coordinated, in part in response
to translocal businesses and NGOs, lobbying across jurisdictions, and to a media similarly unleashed
from territorial constraints."); id. at 87-88 (discussing "the degree to which local and state actors work
in conjunction with their counterparts as they shape and are in tum affected by policies that transcend
the boundaries of their jurisdictions").
222. See Ahdieh, supra note 218, at 17; see also Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 277
(describing the "current system of environmental federalism" as "a dynamic one of overlapping federal
and state jurisdiction").
223. See Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a PostWestphalian World, EMORY L.J. 115, 120-21 (2007) [hereinafter Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic
Governance] ("Federalism is a system in which there are multiple nodes of political authority within a
country. Polyphonic federalism focuses on the creative overlap of these different legal regimes.").
224. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 10 ("When the preemption balance is struck incorrectly,
negative consequences result. In some cases, there will be an improper interference with a state sphere
of authority, preventing the state's attainment of its goals without appropriate justification."). For
additional arguments why preemption is a bad idea, see supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
225. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 763 ("Because a judgment of federal preemption implicates
federal structure and civic republican activities, it is appropriate to constrain and direct judicial
interpretation of allegedly preemptive federal statutes ... these vital capabilities must be channeled to
protect republican federalisin and participatory politics.").
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this is "a field of constitutional law in which policy and law are inextricably
intertwined," 226 any redistribution of that balance will cause friction. 227
Despite these scholarly arguments and Professor Buzbee's statement that
"the federal versus state choice is, in a sense, the wrong question because
interaction and mutual learning has been the norm in most areas of federal risk,
product, and environmental regulation," 228 it is still a choice that courts grapple
with when deciding whether federal law preempts a state law or course of
action. Determining whether state law supplements federal law, rather than
interferes or conflicts with it, can be very difficult. 229 Given the indeterminacy
of the answer to the factual question whether a federal law preempts a state
law, the arguments among legal scholars are shedding little light on the answer,
except possibly those scholars who suggest that the courts proceed with caution
because of the federalism consequences of their actions.
Concern about disabling otherwise legitimate state legislation and
disrupting the delicate balance between state and federal authority is
particularly sharp in the environmental law context. Environmental problems
are typically "multifaceted" and multi- or inter-jurisdictional 230 and harms can
226. Schroeder, supra note 179 at 143.
227. See Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 62 ("The existence of concurrent powers necessarily
presumes a certain amount of unavoidable inconvenience and friction when they are both exercised.
Supremacy is designed to do away with the most extreme form of such friction-namely,
irreconcilability-but not all forms."). Perhaps for this reason, Professor Chemerinisky recommends
looking at preemption through the lens of federalism, in which federalism is seen as empowering
different levels of government to deal effectively with society's ills. See Chemerinsky, supra note 180,
at 74 (proposing "an alternative thesis with regards to preemption and federalism . . . [namely]
federalism as empowerment"); id. at 75 ("In this way, I think, we achieve the optimal level of
federalism, empowering government at all levels to deal with society's serious social problems.").
228. William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for
Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1544 (2009) [hereinafter
Buzbee, Hard Look]. But see Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION
CHOICES: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 33 (William W. Buzbee
ed., Cambridge University Press 2009) [hereinafter Schapiro, Polyphony] ("[P)reemption is
fundamentally a question of institutional choice" about whether the federal government should be "the
sole regulator in a particular area or should state and federal laws operate concurrently," which level can
"promise the best regulatory design," which design (unilateral or cooperative) should Congress or
federal agencies select, "and how should courts discern this regulatory choice in specific situations.").
229. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1661 ("One can hardly dispute that preemption issues are
complex and highly nuanced, involving both federalism and separation of powers-congressional
prerogatives, agency competence, and judicial deference-as well as efficiency, equity, victim
compensation, and cost-shifting objectives."); see also Stabile, supra note 177, at 80 n.313 ("Less
charitably, it might be countered that judicial determination of when federal law preempts state law
means that preemption analysis will be subject to the Supreme Court's 'vacillating perspective on
federalism."' (quoting William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on
Federalism and the Burger Court, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 623,626 (1975))).
230. Professor Robert Shapiro describes contemporary federalism in this country as "layered
governance." Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 115 (describing
"contemporary federalism" in the United States as "layered governance"). But see Schapiro, Polyphony,
supra note 228, at 42 ("Political scientists have debated whether a 'layer cake' or a 'marble cake' best
reflects federalism. However, either of these spatial/gastronomic metaphors envisions state and federal
regulation as inhabiting separate regions. It is difficult to imagine two things occupying the same space
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be caused by a variety of market and regulatory failures, which "arise along
numerous dimensions and at different scales." 231 As a result, the wherewithal
to attend to environmental problems generally occurs at more than one level of
government, depending on the mix of political, economic, and environmental
factors involved. 232 Therefore, the consequences of preempting a state
environmental law are particularly severe as it removes a critical layer of
government implementation and enforcement of environmental norms.

B. Judicial Presumptions and Congressional Intent
This section examines two predominate features of the preemption
doctrine: the judicial presumption disfavoring preemption and the importance
of congressional intent. 233 The application of each involves wide swathes of
judicial discretion, making any particular outcome of a preemption case highly
unpredictable.

1. A Judicial Presumption Against Preemption
The presumption against preemption of state law is a "consistent
overarching" doctrinal principle in preemption cases, amounting to a
"substantive canon disfavoring the result of preemption." 234 The underlying
premise for the presumption is that Congress does not intend to preempt state
law. 235 As the Supreme Court said in Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, "because States
without combining into a new undifferentiated whole. The choice is layer cake, marble cake, or stew.").
He calls the concurrent exercise of authority "polyphonic federalism." See Schapiro, Federalism as
Intersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 120 ("Polyphonic federalism emphasizes that, as a
descriptive matter, states and the federal government in fact exercise concurrent authority.").
231. Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 278 (explaining that the authors' approach "rejects the
static matching principle for an adaptive model" because environmental problems are "multifaceted;
[s]ources of environmental harm may be the manifestation of numerous failures, market as well as
regulatory, that arise along numerous dimensions and at different scales"). The authors are particularly
interested in what adaptive models can teach about "the benefits of a more dynamic federalism, as well
as the appropriateness of an adaptive approach to federalism in managing a highly complex and
changing system such as the natural environment and the human impacts upon it." !d. at 279 (explaining
the authors' interest in determining "whether the strategy embodied in adaptive systems adds additional
support for arguments for over-lapping federal and state jurisdictions and against static attempts to carve
out separate state and federal regulatory roles").
232. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 278.
233. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 585 (calling these two features "foundational
premises" of traditional preemption doctrine).
234. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1563; id. at 1570--71 ("As a matter of Supreme
Court doctrine, however, the decided weight of preemption and administrative law precedents favors the
presumption in favor of preserving 'state-created rights."'); see also Schroeder, supra note 179, at 122
("In dealing with [express preemption cases], the Supreme Court frequently articulates one particular
principle or canon of statutory interpretation. This is the 'presumption against preemption,' which is
designed to implement respect for federalism values."); Buzbee, Preemption Sword, supra note 204, at
48.
235. See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) ("In all pre-emption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied, we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
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are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that
Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." 236 The
presumption thus originates in federalism concems 237 about preserving state
"sovereign authority to regulate for the well-being of their people, even if the
Constitution contemplates that state power will be restricted in some ways and
that federal law will be supreme in case of a conflict." 238 In this view, federal
laws like the AEA are merely "interstitial," acting against a "backdrop" of state
law and policies. 239 Accordingly, courts use the presumption against
preemption because they should not infer congressional intent to displace state
authority without serious consideration. 240
The presumption against preemption is particularly strong when
"Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the states have traditionally
occupied." 241 Thus, the presumption against preemption is robust when the
basis for state action is its traditional police powers. 242 However, courts will
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purposes of Congress."'); see also
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650-51 (1990) ("[F]ederal rights should be regarded as
supplementing state-created rights unless otherwise indicated."); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at
589-90.
236. Medtronic Inc., 518 U.S. at 485.
237. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 589 ("The presumption against preemption is based
principally on federalism concerns, but we [the authors] think that those federalism principles are
reinforced by principles oftextualism in statutory construction."); id. at 590 ("[Textualism] ensures that
Congress makes a conscious choice to displace state regulatory authority, a choice that has been
approved through the constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment. This ensures in tum that
the political safeguards of federalism are operative.").
238. !d. at 589 (calling this concern "(a]n essential principle of (American] federalism"); see also
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) ("Although the Constitution grants broad powers to
Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status
as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."); Rice v. Sante Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Suffice it to say that due regard
for our federalism, in its practical operation, favors survival of the reserved authority of a State over
matters that are the intimate concern of the State unless Congress has clearly swept the boards of all
State authority, or the State's claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has ordered.").
239. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 752 ("Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature ....
Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish
limited objectives. It builds upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplanting
them only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the background of
the total corpus juris ofthe states in much the way that a state legislature acts against the background of
the common law...."); see also Wiggins, supra note 83, at 28 n.lOl (saying that state-supportive
presumption "also 'comports with the basic conception of federal law as interstitial in nature"' (quoting
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 384 n.l (1978))); Schapiro, Federalism as lntersystemic
Governance, supra note 223, at 122 (quoting Justice Kennedy as saying "in creating federalism, the
framers 'split the atom of sovereignty'"); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
240. Glicksman & Levy, supra note I 75, at 589.
241. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485; see also Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1564.
242. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 123 ("Sometimes the Supreme Court also notes that the
presumption is especially strong when the state law at issue amounts to an exercise of the states'
traditional powers to protect the public health, safety, and morals."); see also Zellmer, supra note 217, at
1666; Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1572 (citing Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook Cnty v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001), as an example of the Court rejecting a federal
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not apply the presumption to sustain state law in the face of conflicting federal
law where doing so would be contrary to the goals of national uniformity or
would disrupt a "careful regulatory scheme established by federal law." 243
Thus, even in areas of traditional state regulation, if the state law conflicts with
some other federalism norm, like the achievement of national uniformity, the
presumption will not protect it from preemption.
Because of the importance of states in our federal structure, the
presumption against preemption can only be overcome by clear evidence of
contrary congressional intent. 244 For example, contrary intent can be found in a
assertion of power to protect isolated wetlands because "federal Jaw was impinging on state land-use
regulation, an area of traditional state authority"); Hirsh, supra note 175, at 551 ("[T]he countervailing
factors [in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers] were a tradition of local regulation of foodstuffs for
market, and the absence of a finding of an important national interest (such as the freedom of interstate
commerce from unjustifiable state discrimination) which would require the preemption of the state
regulation."); id. at 552 (One reason the Parker Court did not preempt state regulation was that the
"federal Act authorized the Secretary to cooperate with state programs. This authority indicated that
Congress contemplated the existence of state programs consistent with the federal Act" (citing Parker v.
Brown, 271 U.S. 341 (1943))). But see Hirsh, supra note 175, at 551 (discussing Cloverleaf Butter Co.
v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1952), and saying the Court rejected state arguments that state cooperation
with federal officials was not impeding federal efforts, state inspectors filled inspection gap created by
too few inspectors and therefore supplemented incomplete federal inspections, and state seizure of
product only effective way to protect butter's purity where visual inspections more effective than
infrequent federal lab tests).
243. Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1707-08 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2002), and
arguing that giving broad effect to a savings clause in the Ports and WateiWays Safety Act would
"disrupt national uniformity" and finding "the presumption against preemption inapplicable when the
state regulates activities marked by a his;ory of substantial federal presence, such as maritime law"); see
also Michael S. Greve, Federal Preemption: James Madison, Call Your Office, Symposium, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 77, 88 (2005) ("The logical extension of that basic insight ... is to afford federal statutes broad
preemptive force where such statutes are demonstrably targeted to curtail the federalism risks that
alarmed the Framers-in particular, the risk of interstate exploitation and interferences with interstate
commerce."). But see Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that California regulations requiring oceangoing vessels near the coast to switch to low-sulfur fuels were
not preempted by the federal Submerged Lands Act and rejecting an argument that presumption against
preemption should not apply where there is a long history of federal regulation). The Pacific Merchant
court was persuaded by Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), where the Supreme Court rejected such a
claim despite a long history of federal regulation given the "historic presence of state Jaw" in the field.
Pac. Merch., 639 F.3d at 1166-67. The court also noted states "have long sought to protect their own
residents from the undisputedly harmful effects of air pollution and other firms of environmental
harms." !d. at 1167. However, the shipping association filed a petition for certiorari filed June 23, 20 II
on grounds that the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses bar California's extraterritorial exercise of its
police powers and the federal Submerged Lands Act preempts state regulation and limits the state's
seaward boundary to three geographical miles from coastline. See U.S. Supreme Court Asked to Review
State's Maritime Fuel Use Regulations, Env't. Rep. Online (BNA) No. 42 at 1544 (2011).
244. See Jordan, supra note 180, at 1227 ("Effectuating a presumption against preemption means
that the analysis must be approached from the perspective that the assumption must be overcome by
clear evidence of congressional intent: a 'silent implication' simply would not suffice."). In
environmental preemption cases, courts look at the strength of the federal law's purpose. See Glicksman
& Levy, supra note 175, at 585 (The "critical question" for the court's preemption analysis in an
environmental case "is whether, in a particular case, the congressionally declared purposes of federal
environmental Jaw provide a sufficiently strong justification to overcome the presumption."); see also
Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1563-64 ("[S]tart with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
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clear congressional statement of preemptive intent or a clear delegation of
preemptive power to an agency. 245 Professor Buzbee likens this clear statement
requirement to "hard look review" of agency decision making, since it serves a
similar "analytical function of requiring heightened political burdens of clarity
and justification." 246 In the case of overcoming the presumption against
preemption, the burden is placed on Congress to legislate its intent clearly and
courts will look closely to see if that burden has been met.
How a court uses the presumption is dependent on how it construes "the
proper balance of federal and state regulatory power over a given subject
matter." 247 According to Professor Wiggins, a court should give heavy weight
to the presumption unless there is a "persuasive reason[]" to do otherwise, such
as when the subject area being regulated "permits no other conclusion" than to
favor federal regulation or Congress has explicitly "ordained" federal
regulation. 248 Professor Resnik would agree but for a different reason. The
purpose of Congress." (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). The
presumption against preemption also plays a role in interpreting statutory purpose by, providing a reason
to distinguish between primary and secondary statutory purposes. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note
207, at 929 (noting that characterizing statutory purposes as primary or secondary "may be disputed,"
but the distinction has been drawn "to underscore the basic point that the sovereign interests of the states
are entitled to respect and one way in which that respect is manifested is in the consistent application of
a strong presumption against preemption"). On the topic of what to do when a statute's purpose is
unclear, see id. at 929 (discussing the importance of maintaining state remedies in the face of federal
preemption). See also Jordan, supra note 180, at 1226 ("Under the purposive approach as conceived by
Hart and Sacks, when doubt still remains as to the [statute's] purpose ... a court may resort to an
appropriate presumption drawn from some general policy oflaw.").
245. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1564 ("Cases embracing the presumption against
preemption look for a clear statement of preemptive legislative intent or a clear delegation to an agency
of power to preempt, but they do not instruct agencies how, procedurally, they must assert preemptive
effect."); see also Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 55 ("(W]hether Congress has the enumerated power to
abrogate state immunity under the Commerce Clause as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment's
enforcement power, its rule of express textual abrogation has been continuously affirmed under both
powers."); Greve, supra note 243, at 88-89 ("Nothing in federalism's constitutional architecture
warrants a judicial presumption in favor of the federal government. In fact, in these sorts of contexts, a
'presumption against preemption' and a 'clear statement rule' look like sensible ways of approximating
the logic of the constitutional, enumerated powers architecture.").
246. Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1563; see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at
589 ("The presumption against preemption should be understood as a drafting principle or as a quasiconstitutional clear statement requirement."); Hoke, supra note 172, at 760-61. (discussing the
"presumption disfavoring preemption" and saying that the Court's justifications for the presumption
"include the desire for 'assurance that the federal-state balance will not be disturbed unintentionally by
Congress or the courts' and the need to 'prevent[] Congress from using ambiguous statutory intent to
conceal its failure to accommodate competing interests bearing on the federal-state balance of power"').
But see id. at 761 (criticizing the "clear statement rule" because the Court has failed to "elaborate[] in
conventional evidentiary terms the burden for demonstrating a clear congressional statement of
preemptive intent"). Hoke also criticizes the clear statement rule because it is not "defensible from the
standpoint of larger jurisprudential theory, and should not be embraced merely because of its
instrumental value in achieving even vital substantive outcomes." Jd. at 762.
247. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 30.
248. See id. ("The state-supportive presumption should figure heavily in deciding occupation
preemption cases, since 'federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of
state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons - either that the nature of the subject matter
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problem, according to Resnik, is that "the law of federalism" has not changed
to "correspond to the transformation in the landscape of federalism"; 249 a
landscape that is increasingly "penneable" due to "seepage. " 250 In this
changing federalism landscape, states and local communities "engage in robust
multi-faceted discourse" with each other and with foreign nations that
"compete[s] with and lessen[s] the hegemony of the national government." 251
Because Resnik sees jurisdictional boundaries as "fragile," 252 she urges courts
to proceed with caution when they are inclined to invalidate a state or local
initiative and to require exacting proof of specific and immediate harm before
doing so. 253 The congressional presumption against preemption should play a
more definitive role, but perhaps because of the difficult federalism questions
that are implicated in any preemption decision, 254 courts have used the
presumption erratically, lessening its use as a bright line interpretative. rule. 255

2. Determining Congressional Intent
Congressional intent is the "'touchstone' in every preemption case." 2 56
Courts discern evidence of intent from traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, as well as from the circumstances in which the statute was
enacted, and its legislative history. 257 Regardless of whether the type of
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained."' (quoting Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963))).
249. Resnik, supra note 220, at 42-43.
250. !d. at 60.
251. !d. at 64.
252. !d. at 91.
253. !d. at 87.
254. See id. at 65 ("[U]ndergirding" this interpretative process are difficult "questions of separation
of powers and judicial role as well as questions about the degree to which states ought to be centers of
robust authority and potential sites of experimentation and variation.").
255. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1563 ("[A]Ithough erratically used, it remains the
most consistently stated interpretive guide for how courts should review claims of preemptive effect");
see also Buzbee, Preemption Sword, supra note 204, at 49 ("The bottom line is that the 'presumption
against preemption' no longer is applied predictably or consistently."); Glicksman & Levy, supra note
175, at 589 ("The Court has often stated that there is a presumption against preemption, but its scope and
force are not entirely clear."); Greve, supra note 243, at 83 ("[T]here is a real limit to the extent to which
one can squeeze a coherent 'preemption law' out of the presumption lemon.").
256. Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 479,485 (1996); see also Schroeder, supra note 179, at 120
("So the crucial question is now to interpret the content of the federal law and that depends on
congressional intent."). But see Stabile, supra note I 77, at 89 ("Just as many modem theories of
statutory interpretation reject the notion that what courts should be doing in interpreting statutes
generally is striving to follow legislative intent, legislative intent should not be determinative of the
issue of whether federal law should preempt state law.").
257. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at I667 ("[E]vidence of congressional intent would be gleaned
from canons of statutory interpretation, the historic context of the statute in question, and legislative
history."); see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 587 ("The scope of the preemption provision
presents an interpretative question that may be resolved using the traditional tools of statutory
construction."); Tribe, supra note 19, at 688 (contending preemption is a matter of statutory
construction). But see Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1668 (attributing to Professor Roderick Hills the
thought that "preemption cases exhibit a type of 'faux textualism in which the Court invokes the alleged
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preemption is express or implied, a court is saddled with trying to divine the
intent of Congress. 258 According to Professor Schroeder, this can make the
outcome of the court's review "far from certain." 259 Other factors, such as the
circumstances giving rise to a case, could also make judicial attempts to
ad hoc and nuanced. 260 To some scholars, this

determine congressional intent

type of inquiry is misplaced.26l
Courts generally hold that for express preemption, congressional intent to
preempt state law must be specific and a "statement of general purpose" is not
sufficient to preempt state action that might interfere with the achievement of
that purpose. 262 This is especially true when the state law being preempted is

plain meaning of two wholly ambiguous words' in a statutory clause to reach antiregulatory results").
For Professor Hoke, this inquiry into legislative purpose should include an identification of the problems
that Congress wanted to address by enacting the law. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 763.
258. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 589 ("In sum, the purposes offederal regulation are
implicated in all three categories of preemption. In express preemption, purposes are relevant to the
congressional determination of whether and to what extent state authority should be preempted and to
the judicial construction of the scope of ambiguous express preemption provisions. For field preemption,
the purposes of federal regulation are relevant to determining whether the field has been occupied and
defining the scope of that field. Finally, the displacement of state authority in cases of conflict
preemption depends upon a determination that state regulation stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of federal purposes.").
259. Schroeder, supra note 179, at 119; see also Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 439 ("[T]he
difficulty of deriving any fixed standards of preemption is compounded by the fact that the Court has
used a broad range of terms, often imprecisely and inconsistently, to announce its determination that
state law is superseded. At the same time, while the Court's general views of the appropriate bounds of
federal and state authority have undergone significant changes, it has purported to apply the same 'tests'
of preemption."); Stabile, supra note 177, at 86 n.328 ("Even if one accepts the notion that preemption
should be an exercise in determining congressional intent, that would not compel the conclusion that
preemption must be dealt with expressly. That argument assumes that the final version of the statute
reflects some coherent notion of the intent of the body of Congress. Some commentators would argue
that it does not, suggesting that legislation is a product of public choice theory.").
260. See Hirsh, supr.a note 175, at 520 ("The need for focusing on these specifics [relevant
statutory provisions, the matters they regulate, and the circumstances giving rise to the case] means that
the Court's preemption decisions are largely based on ad hoc considerations, especially on the exact
statutes in question."); see also Wiggins, supra note 83, at 24 ("Our prior cases on pre-emption are not
precise guidelines in the present controversy, for each case turns on the particularities and special
features of the federal regulatory scheme in question." (quoting City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (I 973))); Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 59 n.90 (What Congress says
when it "speak[s] to the issue of preemption in the statutory text" may "not be 'clear' or 'plain,"' in
which case courts have the duty of interpreting the ambiguity.").
261. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 89 n.335 ("It is submitted that the Supreme Court abdicates its
duty as arbiter of the federal system when it makes the test of preemption the intent of Congress ....
First, it is questionable whether the action of Congress should be allowed to conclusively preclude state
action in any given area .... It is equally doubtful whether Congress should have the sole power ....
The framers intended the Supreme Court, not the Congress, to determine where the demands of
federalism should require the line to be drawn." (quoting Harrop A. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and
the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 630, 638 (1972))).
262. See Baum, supra note 77, at 679 ("A statement of general purpose does not demonstrate a
congressional intent to preempt any state action that might hamper the achievement of that purpose."
(citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 633 (1981) (finding that the Power-Plant
and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978's congressional objective to "encourage and foster great use of
coal" not reflective of intent to preempt all state action having adverse impact on coal use))); see also
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within a state's traditional regulatory power. 263 However, even when Congress
appears to specifically preempt state action, problems arise due to Congress's
difficulties in drafting precise and enduring preemption provisions. 2 64 When
Congress writes an express preemption provision, it does so with "the thenexisting social and legal landscape in mind. " 265 A carefully drafted preemption
provision may not work well, however, when the circumstances that provoked
it have changed, 266 such as changes in views about the appropriate federalism

Shattuck, supra note 17, at 265 ("The pressure on legislatures to discharge their responsibility with care,
understanding and imagination should be stiffened, not relaxed. Above all, they must not be encouraged
in irresponsible or undisciplined use of language. In the keeping of legislatures perhaps more than any
other group is the wellbeing of fellow men. Their responsibility is discharged by words. They are under
a special duty therefore to observe that 'Exactness in the use of words is the basis of all serious thinking.
You will get nowhere without it."' (quoting Justice Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 246 (1947))); Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. ISA
Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501 (1988) ("Without a text that can ... plausibly be interpreted as
prescribing federal pre-emption it is impossible to find that a free market was mandated by federal
law."); Glicksman, supra note 194, at 186 (discussing how Congress can specifically delegate
preemptive power to a federal agency, but "the courts should not find preemption unless the agency has
clearly exercised that power"); Jordan, supra note 180, at 1227 ("[A] court would approach the analysis
from the perspective that, ' [s]o long as full scope can be given to the amendatory legislation without
undermining non-conflicting State laws, nothing but the clearest expression should persuade [the court]
that the federal Act wiped out ... State requirements deeply rooted in their laws."' (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 245 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))); Nishimura-Paige,
supra note 81, at 1032 ("The Court [in Commonwealth Edison] refused to equate general policy
statements encouraging the use of coal with an intent to preempt all potentially adverse state
legislation.").
263. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 691 ("(W]here the subject is traditionally 'local' and the states'
interest in retaining significant authority to regulate is thus greater, total federal preemption will not be
inferred in the absence of especially plain congressional intent to bar state authority over the same
subject matter.").
264. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 2 (It is difficult for Congress to draft "satisfactory preemption
provisions ... [and] [o]ften, Congress' desire to achieve quite legitimate goals may result in preemption
language that is overinclusive, operating to prevent the attainment of important state interests even when
no federal goal is advanced by preemption."); see also Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal
Preemption: Reformulating the Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 25, 28-29 (2005) ("(T]here are fifty
sovereign States that might potentially infringe the policies of Congress or the Executive Branch,"
increasing exponentially the complexity for a Congress attempting to frame "meta laws restricting state
lawmaking."). But see Glicksman, supra note 194, at 178 ("Congress is fully capable of making such
intent explicit.").
265. Stabile, supra note 177, at 2; see also id. at 89-90 ("Even assuming Congress' intent about the
general contours of a preemption provision can be accurately and reliably ascertained, it is clear that
Congress did not and could not have anticipated the circumstances in which preemption claims have
arisen under many of the statutes containing express preemption provisions."); id. at 89 ("[F]ocusing on
intent fixes the point of reference at the time Congress was enacting legislation, thus limiting the inquiry
to the problems Congress was then addressing and the times in which it was acting").
266. See id. at 2 ("(A]ny express preemption provision is drafted with a particular set of problems .
. . in mind. The problems and landscape change dramatically over time, yet the express preemption
provision remains largely fixed."); id. at 30 ("Congress cannot make a comprehensive and accurate
determination at the time it enacts legislation regarding the appropriate breadth of that statute's
preemptive reach."); see also Schroeder, supra note 179, at 135 ("One particularly vexing problem
arises when an older federal statute containing an express preemption clause confronts regulatory issues
that were unanticipated at the time of the federal enactment."); Gasaway, supra note 264, at 30 ("No
legislature can envision the full effects of ordinary laws; it is especially impossible for a legislature to
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balance. 267 Thus, even when Congress has expressly stated its intent on
preemption of state law, the clear statement rule may not help when the context
in which that statement was made changes.
Despite the clear statement rule, some courts have implied preemption
when Congress has only considered the idea of preemption. 268 However, many
scholars oppose the idea of implied preemption in cases of congressional
inaction. 269 They contend implied preemption creates excess regulatory
uncertainty 270 and results in adverse consequences, such as giving too much
power to private entities and courts. 271
pre-envision the need for preemptive laws; and it is even more unrealistic to expect a legislature to preinterdict state action that occurs simultaneously on fifty fronts, and that, as a matter of hydraulic politic
pressure, will center in those States most opposed to federal policies. Likewise, a divided federal
legislature cannot possibly negate, after-the-fact, all of the intrusions one expects from fifty quasiindependent and potentially hostile sovereigns.").
267. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 80 ("An express preemption provision written with one set of
conditions in mind may not work well when the conditions to which it is being applied change."); id.
("Static statutory language can not [sic] easily adapt to such a change.").
268. See id. at 6; see also Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 384
(1983) ("A federal decision to forego regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative
determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much preemptive
force as a decision to regulate"). But see Gardbaum, supra note 172, at 59 ("Congress has no power to
impliedly preempt the states."); Glicksman, supra note 194, at 186 (Some courts "have appropriately
recognized a distinction between an agency's 'mere failure' to act and its affirmative decision that
regulation at any level of government would be inappropriate."); id. ("Inaction alone thus represents
only 'the absence of a real regulatory decision,' which should be afforded no preemptive effect."
(quoting Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Oberly, 837 F.2d 108, 116 (3d Cir. 1988))); Ark. Elec., 461 U.S. at
387 n.ll ('The relevant inquiry is not whether Congress authorized or expected [state] regulation, but
whether it indicated by its own actions to forbid it.").
269. See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 194, at 178 ("A court should not assume that Congress
wanted to preempt to avoid the adverse spillover effects of state regulation, prevent interference with
federal goals such as uniformity, or prohibit the states from seeking a cleaner environment or less risk
that the market would produce on its own.").
270. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 439 ("[T]he scope of the doctrine of implied
preemption is uncertain. The Court must construe the state statute and its operation as well as the federal
statute, and the interrelation of any two statutes may assume myriad forms ranging from direct conflict
through to tangential interference to complementary coincidence.").
271. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 716 ("Private parties independently determine what aspects of
state law hinder their interests and, under the weak standards for determining implied preemption, are
permitted to achieve through litigation the preemptive impact that the political institution did not, and
perhaps because of internal disagreement could not, reach. This substitution of judicial policyrnaking for
political decision undermines democratic accountability and public decisionmaking at the national level,
as well as the democratic process and regulatory space of states and localities."). The same problem
arises in the administrative context, where an agency's inaction is construed by courts as foreclosing
comparable regulation at the state level. See Glicksman, supra note 194, at 186 ("[A]n agency's failure
to regulate has preemptive effect only where that failure 'takes on the character of a ruling that no such
regulation [by any level of government] is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of the
statute."' (quoting Ray v. At!. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 (1978))); id. at 187 ("[T]he courts
should lend greater credence to an agency's determination that its inaction preempts state law if that
determination is made during the course of a rulemaking proceeding, in which the agency invited and
considered public comments than if it first asserts that its inaction preempts state law in the course of
litigation." (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 535 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001))). Professor Glicksman
proposes applying the same clear statement rule that the courts apply to Congress to agency declarations
so that only courts should only find agency preemption where there is a clear declarations of preemptive
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One can hardly think of a clearer statement of congressional intent not to
preempt than the inclusion of a saving clause in a statute. For example, the
savings clause in the AEA 272 explicitly preserves a state's ability to use a
variety of legislative, regulatory, and common law tools to protect the public
health and wellbeing of its citizens. 273 Congress may include a savings clause
to reflect its view of the comparative institutional competence and efficiency of
the states and the federal government. On the other hand, a savings clause may
indicate Congress's desire to achieve comprehensive regulation by allowing
overlap. 274 Despite their apparent clarity, however, savings clauses embroil
courts in the same task of divining legislative intent. 275
Under traditional rules of statutory interpretation, Congress's act of saving
state law should be indicative of congressional intent not to displace it 276 and
should cause courts to be reluctant to disrupt the careful federalism balance
Congress struck. 277 But, how courts treat statutory savings clauses is not cut
and dry and, according to some scholars, can depend on whether the interest
being regulated by the state constrains business interests. 278 For example,

intent. See id. at 186 ("Unless the agency explicitly declares that its own decision not to regulate also
bars states from doing so, the courts should not find conflict preemption based on interference with
federal purposes.").
272. See Atomic Energy Act§ 271, 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (2006) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State, or local agency with respect to the
generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed
by the Commission."); § 274(k), 42 U.S.C. §202l(k) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to
affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards."). See also Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1704 (arguing that the savings clauses
found in sections 271 and 274(k) "played a role in the resolution of' Pacific Gas).
273. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1732 ("Savings clauses preserve the states' ability to use a
variety of regulatory and common law tools to provide increased protection for their citizens and the
environment over and above the federal regulatory floor.").
274. See id. at 1731.
275. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 85 n.328 ("[L]egislation simply reflects the conflicting
interactions of interest groups; the resulting law sometimes reflects their private, selfish interest, and
sometimes serves no purpose at all." (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 49-56 (2006))).
276. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1733 ("Where Congress has included a savings clause,
straightforward rules of statutory construction dictate that state laws and remedies related to the subject
matter of the clause should not be displaced. If the clause does not strictly apply to the state law or
activity in question, implied preemption arguments may still be raised to defeat the state law, but the
savings clause should be seen as evidencing congressional intent not to occupy the field. Moreover, the
savings clause should weigh against a blanket determination that state law poses an obstacle to the
accomplishment of federal purposes."). See also id. at 1732 ("Statutory savings clauses have been
included in many federal regulatory statutes in order to temper Congress's 'extraordinary power' to
displace state laws." (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991))).
277. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1732 ("Ignoring explicit savings clauses or construing them
unduly narrowly undermines congressional policy in the highly sensitive, politically charged area of
federal-state relations. Conversely, giving savings clauses appropriate weight honors congressional
choices, avoids regulatory gaps, fosters innovative measures to protect human health and the
environment, and enhances institutional competency by empowering government at all levels to protect
the public at appropriate scales.").
278. See, e.g., id. at 1731.
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Professor Zellmer finds that if state regulations impose a burden on economic
interests, then pro-business courts will be inclined to ignore a savings clause; if
they do not, then those courts will likely give a savings clause full effect. 279
Therefore, local regulation of business interests is particularly vulnerable to
preemption in recent years. 280 Given this trend, Vermont's law, which burdens
an economic interest, may be vulnerable to preemption despite the savings
clauses in the AEA.

IV. POLICY REASONS FAVORING AND DISFAVORING PREEMPTION
This Part examines policy arguments supporting and opposing preemption
and, thus, provides the last piece of background information necessary to
analyze whether the AEA preempts Vermont Act 160.
A. Why Preemption May Be a Good Idea

Avoiding collective action problems is one of the strongest rationales
supporting federal preemption. 281 Additional rationales favoring preemption
include the creation of economies of scale, the prevention of burdens on
interstate commerce, the coordination of the management of interstate
resources, and the creation of uniform national standards.
Collective action problems arise when states are motivated to act in
furtherance of their individual interests to the detriment of the interests of other
279. Jd. ("With the exception of certain agricultural practices, where states have imposed
constraints on economic interests, statutory savings clauses have been given short shrift or even ignored.
Conversely, in cases where state laws are less onerous on economic pursuits than federal regulation
would be, prodevelopment interests have been upheld under the guise of saving state law. Despite the
presence of savings clauses, progressive state regulatory programs have been even more vulnerable to
judicial preemption than have state common law claims, particularly where the state, for whatever
reason, was not a party to the litigation.").
280. See id. at 1703 ("In the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, progressive state and local regulatory
programs have been exceptionally vulnerable to judicial preemption despite the presence of statutory
savings clauses. During the past decade in particular, such regulations have been struck down almost
without exception whenever they would impose greater economic burdens on industry than those
established by the federal regulatory floor. The recent trend, which began in the mid-1990s, has
prompted some scholars to equate the modern day preemption doctrine with the Lochner Era of the early
1900s, where the Court employed an array of tools to strike down progressive state and local economic
and social regulation."); see also Hoke, supra note 172, at 718 n.l47 ("The judicial veto of legislative
acts highlights preemption's threat to usher in a new Lochner era, supplying a doctrinal cover for
judicial meddling with the policy decisions of elected representatives at all levels of government."). But
see Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1700 (In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-608
(1991), "the Rehnquist Court gave weight to the savings clause to afford room for local governments ...
to restrict or even prohibit aerial spraying in order to protect the health of their citizens.").
281. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 929 ("[F]ederalism is a structural response to
collective action problems among states," which "arise when individual states have incentives to act in a
manner that is contrary to the interests of states as a collective, and transaction and enforcement costs
would prevent an effective agreement among states to act collectively."); see also Glicksman & Levy,
supra note 175, at 593 ("Under McCulloch's analysis, federal environmental regulation is most justified
when collective action problems create incentives for states acting individually to regulate in ways that
are contrary to the interests of the states as a collective.").
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states or the nation, 282 such as transferring its regulatory burdens to other
states. 283 When a state acts in its own self-interest, it might enact laws or
regulations that protect its citizens, but potentially harm everyone else. 284 An
example is the "Not-In-My-Backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome, where a state
blocks the siting of facilities that benefit the public-at-large, but create
environmental harms for that state. 285 Other collective action problems include
transboundary pollution caused by a facility in one state that creates negative
externalities in other states. Resource pooling, 286 where states share resources
282. See Victor Flatt, The History of State Action in the Environmental Realm: A Presumption
against Preemption in Climate Change Law?, I SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 63, 67 (2009)
("[P]reemption in the environmental arena would, thus, be justified if and when 'collective action
problems create incentives for states to act individually to regulate in ways that are contrary to the
interests of the states as a collective."'); see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 592 ("Federal
power is most appropriate when the cost-benefit analysis of state policymakers is distorted by collective
action problems."); Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaption: A Collective Action Perspective on
Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1175 (2010) ("The exercise of federal authority is most
justified in response to collective action problems that provide incentives for states to act in a manner
that is inconsistent with the interest of the nation as a whole .... In other words, the federal action is
necessary or justified when state regulation is unlikely to produce the optimal result, viewed from the
perspective of the United States as a whole, because the incentives of individual states and the interest of
the states as a collective run in different directions.").
283. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 935-36 ("[C]eiling preemption is not ordinarily
justified if the purpose of federal regulation is to prevent the export of health and safety risks to other
states, because that kind of externality would tend to cause underregulation," but it "may be justified in
one of two circumstances: (I) when states have incentives to export regulatory burdens, or (2) when
states have incentives to overregulate an activity that exports benefits to other states."); see also
Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 125 ("Scholars argue that states
may seek to apply their laws to those not represented in their political systems. States might attempt to
impose costly regulations on out-of-state entities that happen to do business in the states. States might
also adopt regulatory schemes that have the practical effect of dictating standards to other jurisdictions .
. . . Either situation presents the potential for political-process failures. Jurisdictions would be imposing
regulatory costs on those not democratically represented in the polity.").
284. See Flatt, supra note 282, at 79 ("States will rarely use their power to create unique regulatory
schemes, and when they do, they only do so when it is necessary to protect the health and well-being of
their citizens-a state's most important role."). Flatt describes this as creating a commons problem. See
id. at 67 ("Unfettered, such behavior would result in a state economic competition in which all states
would create policies that initially might benefit their own citizens but, in the aggregate, hurt
everyone-a 'commons' problem.").
285. See id. (This justification "also validates preemption of some state Not-In-My-Back-Yard
(NIMBY) policies, which would restrict locations of environmental negatives when the benefits are
important to everyone"); see also Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 593-94 ("Thus, it is not
surprising that the traditional justifications for federal environmental regulation reflect commonly
understood collective action problems, including negative environmental externalities, resource pooling,
the 'race to the bottom,' uniform standards, and the 'NIMBY' []phenomenon."); id. at 608 ("[C]eiling
preemption makes sense when federal environmental regulation responds to a NIMBY problem because
stringent state regulation may have the purpose and effect of forcing environmentally damaging
activities to locate somewhere else," as demonstrated by the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 (Pub. L. No. 99-240,99 Stat. 1842 (1986)), the purpose of which is to prevent
the forty-seven states without low level radioactive waste storage capacity "from unfairly burdening" the
three states that have it "with the risks and costs created by the disposal of the entire nation's low level
wastes.").
286. See Glicksman, supra note 282, at 1178 ("In the environmental context, resource pooling has
the capacity to generate efficiencies in the collection and distribution of scientific and technical
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like data collection systems, is another type of collective action problem, which
may create an incentive for individual states to "free ride on the efforts of
others. " 287
Thus, states' self-dealing and the unpopularity of certain types of
activities, such as nuclear or hazardous waste storage facilities, may lead to
states blocking such facilities, even though their siting creates positive spillover
effects for other states. The loss of these positive spillover effects can
negatively affect those states as well as the entire country's social welfare. 288
To Professor Pierce, the likelihood of a state's regulations creating positive and
negative spillover effects is the defining issue for determining at what level of
government regulations should take effect. 289 Following the logic of Professor
Pierce's thinking would mean that state laws that eliminate significant positive
spillover effects for other states, as well as those laws which would create
negative spillover effects for other states, should be preempted. 290
For example, the federal government may need to prevent states from
lowering their environmental standards to encourage the siting of new
industries. 291 When powerful economic interests benefit from low standards or
information."); see also Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICES: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE
QUESTION 13, 18 (William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge University Press, 2009) ("A federal rather than a
state-focused approach is more likely to effectively address problems that cross state lines.").
287. See Glicksman, supra note 282, at 1176-81 (listing collective action situations justifying a
federal role, including: transboundary negative externalities, resource pooling race-to-the-bottom
potential, uniformity of standards, the "NIMBY syndrome," and the "threat of under and overregulation
by the states"). Resource pooling achieves economies of scale and synergistic effects create a '"public
good,' which in collective action terms creates an incentive for each state to free ride on the efforts of
others". !d. at 1177; see Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 931 (listing collective bargaining,
national defense, and scientific research as examples of resource pooling where "states individually lack
the resources or incentives to act effectively").
288. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency
Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REv. 607,651-52 (1985).
289. !d. at 610 ("Thus, the issue of whether regulation should be imposed on a national level or on
a state level should be resolved primarily by determining whether, and to what extent, state regulation
would create interstate spillovers."). According to Pierce, making this determination when there is a
federalism dispute involving "'incomparables,' like safety and economics," involves a two-step analysis,
the first of which is empirical research of predictable in- and out-of-state impacts and the second of
which calls for "a decisionmaking process [that] balance[s] benefits of one type of regulation (e.g.
environmental) with the costs of another (e.g. economics)." !d. at 662.
290. See id. at 651, 652 ("States should not be permitted to make regulatory decisions when those
decisions have the potential to create or to eliminate large positive spillover to other states.").
291. See Glicksman, supra note 282, at 1165 (listing among the benefits of "federal participation
and leadership" that states may not have necessary resources and "are likely to have incentives to put
their citizens at an advantage vis-a-vis those of other jurisdictions fighting for the scarce resources such
as water, the actions of one jurisdiction may have spillover effects in other places, and coordination of
the policies of multiple jurisdictions may be needed to ensure effectiveness"); see also Verchick &
Mendelson, supra note 286, at 18 ("A uniform federal approach will minimize the risk that states will
'race to the bottom,' competing with each other to loosen their environmental or other standards so as to
attract new business."). But see id. at 18 (noting the difference of opinion among scholars on this point,
but saying "at a minimum, this scholarship raises important questions about whether state regulation
may sometimes be affected by pathologies causing state regulators to choose less-than-optimal levels of
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when the adoption of a tougher standard would impose significant costs on
those interests, the state in which they operate may not have an incentive to
make its standards equivalent to states with higher standards. 292 Professors
Glicksman and Levy find little support for the conjecture that some states might
become overenthusiastic regulators and "race to the top." 293 Professor Schapiro
agrees, finding that the dormant commerce clause, the constitutional
protections of free speech, the power of out-of-state money to block
unfavorable laws, and the interlocking nature of the country's economy check
such behavior. 294 Also, interstate competition and the costs of regulating laws
make it unlikely that states will become enthusiastic over-regulators. 295 Underregulation, however, is much more likely.
But reliance on the federal government to take care of collective action
problems may be misplaced. Congress does not act as an effective check on
state tendencies to enact laws where the in-state benefits exceed in-state
costs, 296 even in circumstances where the national costs of those laws exceed

environmental protection"); Resnik, supra note 220, at 88 ('The literature's focus on the 'race to the
bottom' presumes interstate effects but singular state incentive structures. Yet, the evidence of
cooperative action among state actors suggests their increasing awareness of spillover effects that
require coordinated action.").
292. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 606 ("It is conceivable that some states or localities
might engage in a 'race to the top,' competing to be the most environmentally friendly so as to attract
some preferred group of citizens or businesses (for example, wealthy taxpayers)."); see also Levy &
Glicksman, supra note 207, at 935 ("If ... an activity within a state produces economic benefits that are
exported to other states, but causes health and safety burdens within the state, then the state may have an
incentive to overregulate. This is, in essence, the NIMBY problem."); id. at 930 ("[D]isplacement of
state authority is justified when collective action principles would suggest that state courts have
incentives to 'overregulate' in ways that interfere with the interests of the nation as a whole.").
293. Glicksman and Levy also note that there is little evidence supporting the idea that the
Prisoner's Dilemma forces states to overregulate to improve their competitive posture vis-a-vis other
states or that a "race to the top" exists that might lead a state to overregulate. Glicksman & Levy, supra
note 175, at 606.
294. See Schapiro, Federalism as !ntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 131-32 (Checks on
states "targeting their regulations to have only out-of-state effects" include the fact that "federal and
state laws all occur within a democratic field"; that states operate within a constitutional framework
which "imposes norms of procedural and substantive fairness on state regulations"; and that "principles
of free speech allow out-of-state entities to participate in the political debates within a given state, even
if votes are limited to citizens of the state"; the "interconnectedness of the national economy," which
prevents "cost shifting; and that states would bear at least part of the costs for any inefficient regulatory
scheme that is promulgated.").
295. See Greve, supra note 243, at 88 ("The regulating state will at all events have to live with the
costs as well as the benefits of their laws, and state competition acts as a potent disciplining
mechanism.").
296. See Lori A. Martin, The Legality of Nuclear Free Zones, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 965, 996 (1988)
("Congress does not have a mechanism for learning about state and local rules that intrude upon either
regulated or unregulated matters of federal interest."). But see Tribe, supra note 19, at 721 ("Should a
state exercise its power to reject this nuclear option notwithstanding a federal policy to make the option
as attractive as possible, a court faced with a preemption challenge must remember that Congress
remains free to decide that vital national interests require overriding the state's choice and then to use
unambiguous statutory language to that effect.").
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national benefits. 297 There are too many other matters on Congress's agenda
for its focus to be as a watchdog over potential state interference with national
policies 298 and playing that role puts Congress in conflict with another level of
government, the courts. 299 Congress is also ill-suited to act sufficiently quickly
to prevent a state from enforcing a local law that interferes with some national
objective. 300
Beyond avoiding collective action problems, federal regulation may also
prevent burdens on interstate commerce and be politically easier to adopt at the
national level. 301 Many environmental problems present difficult dynamics that
limit the effectiveness of state regulation. For example, managing water
resources calls for coordination among various jurisdictions, which states have
difficulty implementing. The federal government is also better at dealing with
inter-jurisdictional problems because states lack the technical and informationgathering resources necessary for effective regulation and because states cannot
provide forward-looking and uniform solutions to problems that lack a
geographic boundary. 302 Additionally, states may be competing with each

297. See Martin, supra note 296, at 994.
298. See id. at 995 (discussing the reasons Congress can cabin negative tendencies in the states and
saying "under the pressure of the usual business of Congress, evaluation of state intrusions on foreign
affairs policy may not receive high priority"); id. at 996 ("Judicial review of state encroachment on
federal power does not deny Congress the power to amend the court's decision through statute. But if
Congress is overcome by legislative inertia, the advantage of judicial review is that a federal body,
subject to national checks, will have passed on the state statute.").
299. See id. ("Many of the matters that command the attention of Congress are positive measures
that set the policy and programs of the country. Evaluating state actions places Congress in the position
of reacting defensively to the goals set by another political body."). When Congress fails to act, the
responsibility to decide which level of government should regulate a given activity is foisted onto the
courts. See id. at 997 ("Congress is a more representative body than the courts to pass on state actions
that encroach on national foreign policy. But representative government is not attained if Congress fails
to act, not out of a positive assessment of the impact of state legislation on national foreign policy, but
due to a failure to deliberate at all."); id. ("If the courts sit uneasily as arbiters of federalism challenges
to local [nuclear free zones], they do so because the political branches have evaded their responsibility
to define better the role ofthe states in the regulation of nuclear weapons.").
300. See id. at 996 ("Lobbyists are able to present their grievances to Congress, but if a party seeks
immediate redress, such as an injunction against enforcement of the local measure, only courts provide
timely relief."); id. ("Congress is not suited to the task of determining whether local ordinances are
incompatible, on an 'ad hoc basis,' with the federal system.... [To do so] Congress would have to study
the effects and legislative history of each local rule, a task better handled in an adjudicative fashion.").
30 I. See Pierce, supra note 288, at 646 (Boyden Gray "recognized ... that federal regulation
sometimes can provide benefits that more than offset the advantages of permitting regulatory power to
be exercised primarily at the state and local level .... [H]e argued that federal regulation sometimes is
superior to state regulation for one of four reasons: (I) federal regulation can prevent burdens on
interstate commerce; (2) some socially beneficial programs are easier to adopt as a political matter on
the federal level; (3) states may compete on the stringency of regulation to the detriment of the nation;
and (4) the federal government usually has greater access to sources of relatively scarce expertise
essential to some types of regulatory programs."); see also Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 292
("In modem environmental law, federal regulation is premised on several standard grounds, including
the need for uniform regulations for interstate commerce, the economies of scale that come with federallevel regulation, and the distorting effects of externalities on state laws.").
302. Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1665.
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other for scarce resources, requiring the presence of a federal regulatory
scheme. 303
The goals of uniformity and the elimination of transaction costs that
burden interstate commerce also support federal regulation. 304 States may
"undervalue" these benefits because they are realized in other states. 305 "The
transaction costs of nonuniform regulations are particularly high for goods
produced in large numbers that move from state to state, like cars and
trucks." 306 The federal government can more easily equalize the balance of
regulatory benefits and costs and achieve economies of scale by eliminating
divergent state laws. 307
However, for a stationary source, like a power plant, transaction costs are
significantly lower than the costs for transitory goods like cars that are mass
produced and sold nationally. 308 For non-transitory goods, such as power
plants, it makes sense to regulate conditions of sale, like the cost of power, at
the state level because the impacts of such regulations are entirely in-state. 309
303. Glicksman, supra note 282, at 1165; see also Ahdieh, supra note 218, at 18 ("Federalism, as
such, represents a regime of coordination."); Angela Durbin, Comment, Striking a Delicate Balance:
Developing a New Rationale for Preemption While Protecting the Public's Role in Siting Liquefied
Natural Gas Terminals, 56 EMORY L.J. 507, 539 (2006) (discussing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998), and
explaining Heller's thesis that "where too many parties are given the right to exclude others, a 'tragedy
of the anticommons' is created" that "lies in the 'underuse' of the resource at issue").
304. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 932 (noting that "[a] common justification for
federal regulation is the need for uniformity, particularly as a means of removing obstructions to
interstate commerce" and seeing "this federal purpose as the rationalization of regulatory standards so as
to reduce transaction costs associated with a national market"); see also Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note
228, at 45 ("State regulation of interstate business may have differential effects in different states. A
state's laws might impose burdens on out-of-state firms, while benefiting in-state consumers. Product
safety rules, for example, might protect consumers in one state, while imposing costs on manufacturing
processes that take place in other states. Depending on the structure of the market, firms might not be
able to customize their price structure so as to force a state to internalize the costs of regulation.").
305. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 932; see also id. at 930 (Collective action problems for
states typically "include negative externalities, resource pooling, the race to the bottom, uniformity and
rationalization of standards, and the 'NIMBY' phenomenon. In the broadest sense, the benefits of
collective action in these situations produce a public or collective good for all states.").
306. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 627.
307. See Buzbee, supra note 228, at 1571; see also Hoke, supra note 172, at 693 n.36 ("Even if a
firm's bargaining power is high in most states, it may still seek national regulation because the benefits
of uniformity may outweigh the costs resulting from higher average level of regulation. National
regulation may produce scale economies and thereby provide large national concerns an advantage over
their local or regional competitors. In short, large national firms may actively seek federal preemption
legislation to avoid the costs of diversity." (quoting Jerry L. Marshaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT 101, 134 (G.
Eads & M. Fix eds., 1984))); Pierce, supra note 288, at 658 (discussing Professor Foote's regulatory
classifications "for purposes of determining whether they should be imposed on a national or state
level"); Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 18 ("Notwithstanding the federalism-related benefits
of preserving state authority to regulate, there still may be reason to limit state control over a particular
regulatory issue or to supplement it with federal regulation.").
308. Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 635.
309. Pierce, supra note 288, at 659 (citing Elizabeth Foote, Beyond the Policies of Federalism: An
Alternative Model, 1 YALE J. REG. 217 (1984)); see also Greve, supra note 243, at 88 ("Conversely,
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Where an industry is evolving, as is the nuclear industry, 310 and the context in
which it functions is dynamic and uncertain because different problems can be
encountered at different locations, preemption of alternative regulatory
approaches is "risky." This is because preemption eliminates an additional
layer of protection and increases the risk that the industry will be unable to
adapt to changing circumstances. 311
There are benefits to uniform regulatory standards: such standards assure
citizens that their level of protection will be the same regardless of where they
live. 312 National standards also guarantee industry that regulations are certain
and consistent regardless of where their facilities are located. Having only
national standards avoids multiple layers of regulation, which can be expensive
to comply with and interpret. 313 A "unitary federal approach" saves

where Congress purports to regulate economic activities and preempts state legislation that has no
adverse effects on interstate commerce, a more restrictive interpretation seems warranted. Statutes
regulating workplace conditions or localized environmental events fit this description.").
310. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 129-35 (discussing the changes in reactor design and plant
licensing procedures after the accident at Three Mile Island); id. at 143 n.403 (referring to a new
generation of reactor designs); id. at 143 n.405 (describing more recent changes in the licensing
process).
311. William W. Buzbee, Interaction's Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 158 (2007) [hereinafter Buzbee, Interaction's Promise];
see also Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 290 ("[I]n many, if not most, areas of environmental
regulation, uniformity is as much a problem as it is a virtue .... Finality, which is often in opposition to
adaptability, is also a double-edged sword in constantly changing natural, technological, and commercial
environments that otherwise would create at least the possibility of new information and beneficial
policy experimentation."); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 648 ("[C]eiling preemption of state
restrictions on GHG emissions is not supported by most of the principal justifications for federal
environmental regulation, including interstate externalities, resource pooling, a race to the bottom, and
NIMBYism. The desire to achieve uniformity in regulation in order to avoid burdening regulated entities
with excessive transaction costs provides limited justification for ceiling preemption of programs to
control GHG emissions from motor vehicles, but not of stationary source controls."). Professor Flatt
distinguishes between product and production standards and health and safety standards, fmding cause
for federal preemption of the former where there is a national market for these standards. See Flatt,
supra note 282, at 65 (drawing a distinction between product and production standards and other health
and safety standards and suggesting "[e]ven proponents of a strong state role in environmental
policymaking advocate federal preemption for the regulation of products for which there is a national
market" (quoting Ann Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 63, 67 (2008)); id. ("This, of course, fits with the general breakdown of power between the
states and the federal government, in that the federal government is given exclusive jurisdiction over
interstate commerce (to the benefit of all), but state and local governments are generally seen as better
able to operate to protect health and safety interests through the exercise of localized police power.").
312. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 18 ("[A] national standard can give each
citizen an assurance-even something of an entitlement-to a minimum level of safety, health, or
environmental protection, no matter where he or she resides.").
313. See id. at 18-19 ("A single federal approach, without separate state standard-setting, also has
advantages for regulated entities. . . . [They] can face a regulatory regime that is more certain and
uniform and thereby avoid multiple layers of regulation, which not only may be costly to comply with
but also may be costly to figure out."). But see Buzbee, Interaction 's Promise, supra note 3 II, at 158
("A place surely exists for strongly preemptive federal standards that provide no latitude for deviation
and eliminate multiple regulators retaining roles with the associated possibility of divergent regulatory
approaches. However, such settings are few and the risks of such approaches are considerable.").
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government resources, as only one level of government has to invest in
developing regulatory standards. 314
But uniformity may be an exaggerated value 315 and, in this era of timid
federal regulation, states have taken an aggressive regulatory posture to
environmental problems. 316 Also, the localized nature of regulations limiting
land and water use strongly suggests they should be designed at the state
level. 317 States also are in a better position to protect the health, safety, and
economic interests of their constituents because local elected officials are more
directly accountable to their constituents and have greater knowledge of local
factors. 318 Because of the mixed benefits of uniformity and preemption's
intrusive effect, Professors Levy and Glicksman warn that before a court
preempts local standards because of a desire to achieve uniformity, the
preemptive federal law should clearly state achievement of uniformity as a
"primary purpose." 319

314. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 19 ("A unitary federal approach might also
save resources, as only one government, the federal government, would invest its resources in
developing regulatory standards. A fully encompassing federal regulation thus might benefit from
economies of scale.").
315. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 79 ("[U]niformity, insofar as it refers to the application of a
uniform national legal rule, is not universally desirable. Although there are certain circumstances in
which uniformity is valuable, there are often equally compelling reasons for allowing different law to
address local needs or individual circumstances."). Uniformity is problematic when it is used solely to
justify broad preemptive statutory language. See id. at 30 ("Uniformity may be a legitimate federal goal;
there assuredly will be situations where allowing differing state laws to operate will frustrate federal
interest. However, using uniformity to justify broad express preemptive language elevates uniformity to
an unjustified degree. There must be some advantage or value to uniformity before it can be used as a
basis to displace state law. Yet, the consequence of express language is to preempt state law even when
there is no such federal benefit."); Wiggins, supra note 83, at 34 ("In most other areas, on the other
hand, the balkanization of regulation that occurs when each state constructs a system of control is not a
sufficient problem to warrant the ouster of legitimate desires to maintain some local control. There is no
catalogue dividing the myriad subjects of regulatory action into these two categories, so an ad hoc
determination is necessary as each case arises."). The Court's jurisprudence reflects diminishing reliance
on uniformity as a preemption rationale. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 35 ("The Court's recent
preemption opinions are not totally consistent, but they do suggest an increasing reluctance to infer
preemption because the subject matter regulated by the state requires uniform national rules.").
316. This is especially true with global climate change regulation. See generally Buzbee,
Preemption Sword, supra note 204; Flatt, supra note 282.
317. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1712 ("'[T]he Government's expansive interpretation would
'result in a significant impingement of the States' tradition and primary power over land and water use.'
Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the development permits ... is a quintessential states
and local power. ... We ordinarily expect a 'clear and manifest' statement from Congress to authorize
an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority."' (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 737-38 (2006))); id. at 1714 ('"Changes in the river like these fall within a State's legitimate
legislative business, and the Clean Water Act provides for a system that respects the States' concerns."'
(quoting S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. ofEnvtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 386 (2006))).
318. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 592 ("Because state governments are more directly
accountable and more familiar with regional conditions, they are generally in a better position than the
federal government to make policy judgments for their constituencies.").
319. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 934 ("To avoid the intrusion on state autonomy that
would result from preemption of a broad swath of state regulation, the purpose of promoting uniformity
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In contrast, according to Professor Adelman, the federal government's
greater ability to widely disperse regulatory innovations, because of its status as
the "top regulator" and its "unique relationship" with every state in the union,
further supports preemption. 320 Another "virtue" of regulating at the national
level is that it avoids the myopia and tendency to be "overwhelmed" by the
high level of uncertainty that may accompany regulation by lower level
policymakers. 321 Increased stability can also result from looking at problems in
the aggregate level. 322 As with many of the perceived benefits of preemption
discussed in this part, except for the benefits that flow from preventing selfdealing among states, these regulatory benefits can be offset by the benefits of
localism. They are also dependent on the debatable views of states as illequipped to handle complex regulatory tasks and the need to achieve
uniformity in all regulatory matters.

B. Why Preemption May Be a Bad Idea
A principal reason why preemption is not preferable is the strong,
independent role states play in a "decentralized government." 323 In addition,
having states as concurrent centers of regulatory authority minimizes regulatory
risk of error, increases the opportunity for learning at both levels of
government, creates multiple entry points for citizens into the governing
process, and preserves states as laboratories for innovation.
Having states play an independent role in a decentralized government
enables them to respond to the "needs of a heterogeneous democratic society by
preventing 'capture' by industry, increasing opportumttes for public
involvement, and encouraging governmental creativity by making states
compete to satisfy a mobile citizenry." 324 By acting as "rival centers of
power," 325 states can limit the excesses of the national government or moderate
to rationalize standards and thereby reduce transaction costs for regulated entities should be a clear,
primary purpose of the federal law before it justifies preemption of state law.").
320. Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 293.
321. !d. at 294.
322. !d.
323. See Stabile, supra note 177, at 9 (Justice Black described federalism as representing "a system
in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in
which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the States" (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971))). Perhaps this is why the
Framers rejected various proposals to curtail the power of the states in favor of a strong central
government. See Larson, supra note 218, at 14 (According to Madison's Convention notes, "[o]n Friday,
June 8, the delegates debated whether the national legislature should have the power to veto state laws.
Madison strongly supported the proposal, but this effort to radically curtail the power of the states was
decisively rejected, just as his effort to prevent the state legislatures from electing senators was defeated
the day before.").
324. Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1663.
325. Greve, supra note 243, at 78 ("The point of endowing subordinate (state) sovereigns with
authority over the same citizens and territory-while limiting the central authority's sphere of authorityis to create rival centers of power, to make '[a]mbition ... counteract ambition,' and in that fashion to
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its policies. 326
Robust state governments with regulatory structures that overlap or
complement federal regulations offer clear benefits. 327 For example, having
more than one regulator making decisions reduces risk of error. 328
Furthermore, it puts less of a premium on an initial decision, as other regulatory
venues are available to question that approach and, by testing other approaches,
correct errors. 329 Preemption "eliminates the possibility of plurality, dialogue,

make government control and discipline itself." (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)));
see also Larson, supra note 217, at 13 (Madison's Convention notes reported that John Dickinson
argued, "The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce
that collision between the different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other.
To attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the Councils of our Country, would be
impracticable, would be ruinous. [Dickinson] compared the proposed National System to the Solar
System, in which the States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits");
Shattuck, supra note 17, at 252 ("[I]t has remained a fundamental premise of federalism doctrine that
'[t]he Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
states."' (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,725 (1869))).
326. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 16; see also Greve, supra note 243, at 78 n.6
("Madison noted that by dividing the powers 'between two distinct governments' America created a
'double security' as 'to the rights of the people.' . . . This design would cause '[t]he different
governments [to] control each other; at the same time that each [would] be controled [sic] by itself.'"
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)); Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1664 ("American
federalism is defined generally as the extent to which state autonomy limits the exercise of federal
power.... At its best, federalism safeguards the public from dangerous, tyrannical impulses at the
national level by allowing flexible, decentralized institutions to flourish.").
327. See Durbin, supra note 75, at 540-4\ {discussing William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory
Fragmentation Continuum, Westwcry and the Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323 (2005)
[hereinafter Buzbee, Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum], and attributing to Buzbee the ideas that
"the division of authority between different regulatory bodies is not always a bad thing" because
"[f]ragmentation can serve to slow down or even halt projects whose harms might otherwise be
overlooked in a more streamlined regulatory scheme" and that "regulatory fragmentation is especially
important at 'the intersection of environmental and land use laws,' where multiple layers of regulators at
the federal, state, and local levels have all played important roles during the past four decades").
328. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1577 ("More interactive, multi-actor regulatory
strategies, however, greatly reduce several pervasive sources of regulatory risk and also improve the
odds of superior regulatory outcomes."); see also Schapiro, Federalism as Jntersystemic Governance,
supra note 223, at 121 ("[T]he concurrence of state and federal power promotes several benefits,
including a plurality of regulatory perspectives, a dialogue among regulators, and a system of
redundancy to guard against errors by state or federal regulators.''); Durbin, supra note 75, at 542
("[F]inal review by a single federal agency ... rather than a multi-layered, multi-tiered review by
several state and federal agencies, has the potential to create a situation in which negative aspects of the
project might ... be overlooked.'' (quoting Buzbee, Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, supra note
327, at 324); id. (explaining why FERC should welcome the participation of states and localities in the
siting process for LNG terminals, especially with respect to "regional safety and security hazards ....
Otherwise, although the number of LNG terminals will increase at a faster rate due to centralized
regulation, the siting of those terminals may be insufficiently analysed, causing the public to be subject
to unwarranted safety and security risks.").
329. See Schapiro, Federalism as Jntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 126; see also
Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at \577 ("[I]f all regulatory power is handed to one actor, all is
dependent on the initial regulatory judgment being right. If it falls short, or is imprudent at the moment
of creation, the absence of other actors or regulatory venues to reconsider that judgment can freeze the
law. Not only will no better approach be tested or revealed, but incentives to critique the status quo will
exist only if that single actor is amenable to persuasion. When one factors in reluctance to engage in
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and redundancy"; where the only regulatory authority is federal, there is "no
backup system" should the federal approach not work. 330 Preemption also can
destroy the positive results of state and local political efforts. 331
Concurrent and overlapping regulatory actors also create mutual learning
opportunities and possibilities for adjusting a given regulatory approach. 332
They create multiple venues and means for citizens and stakeholders to
participate in government, 333 and represent a move away from centralized
power. 334 This, in tum, lessens the likelihood of federal error and regulatory
"stasis" and "fosters 'democratic experimentalism. "' 335 Federal regulators,
legislators, and courts are more removed from the average citizen and lack
inexpensive ways for citizens to submit direct communications. This removes
citizens from the democratic process. 336 Thus, preemption, which works within
self-criticism, giving sole regulatory turf to one actor is risky"); Buzbee, Interaction's Promise, supra
note 311, at 157 ("Handing all regulatory power to one actor is the antithesis of the diversity of actors
called for in experimentalist literature. With complete displacement, ... no actor or institution outside
the federal regulatory venue has any room or incentive to criticize and seek change.").
330. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 126; see also Adelman
& Engel, supra note 218, at 293 ("The hierarchy inherent in the federal system ... clearly has its place.
Yet, as the Framers understood from the outset, it poses many risks as well. From the standpoint of
adaptive systems and traditional theories of federalism, the most obvious one is the dramatic loss in
diversity that can result from preemptive federal regulation. This loss may be a direct result of a strict
standard or may arise more subtly from the highly aggregated level at which federal regulators view
environmental problems.").
331. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 721-22 ("Federal preemption edicts often eviscerate the
substantive achievements of these state and local political efforts.").
332. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1577-78 ("[A]llowing multiple actors to retain
roles reduces the risk of a single actor monopolizing the regulatory field without opportunities for
dynamic learning."); Buzbee, Interaction's Promise, supra note 311, at 164 ("[F]loor preemption's
retention of multiple institutions and the different modalities and incentives of common law litigation
mean that one need not rely on hyper-involved citizens and selfless bureaucrats to prompt regulatory
reexamination and adjustment.").
333. See Buzbee, Preemption Sword, supra note 204, at 53-55 (listing among the benefits of dual
regulation that states and local government "provide additional venues in which citizens and
stakeholders can participate and nudge governments"); see also Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286,
at 17 ("Greater state autonomy to regulate will mean more opportunities for citizens to participate in
governance and seek responsive government. That may result in greater 'civic virtue' in citizens by
encouraging them to become better informed and more actively engaged in all levels of government.").
334. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 688-89 (noting de Tocqueville would have been concerned by
"[t]he transmutation of political issues into not merely judicial questions but also federal preemption
issues" because "embedded in this metamorphosis is a move toward greater administrative centralization
of power, and a concomitant decline in the competing centers of political power which he had praised
for protecting our democratic republic").
335. Buzbee, Preemption Sword, supra note 204, at 55 (quoting Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287-88 ( 1998)).
336. Hoke, supra note 172, at 687, 695 ("Federal preemption decisions impede the ability of those
governmental bodies that are structured to be more responsive to citizens' public values and ideas-state
and local governments-and have concomitantly undermined citizens' rights to participate directly in
governing themselves."); Pierce, supra note 288, at 645 (noting that Boyden Gray identified as a major
disadvantage of federal regulation the fact that "it is implemented by a massive, inefficient bureaucracy
remote from the needs of the people in each locality"). Hoke calls this an "odd 'tragedy of the
commons."' Hoke, supra note 172, at 695 ("As each public issue and particular industry's regulatory
apparatus is nationalized, fewer and fewer issues of substance remain for the political activity of average
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"a bipolar model of federalism," shuts off "the political space within which
grass-roots citizens" work to change government or its policies. 337 Because of
these social costs, Professor Resnik is a "critic of the new preemption rules in
which judges shape quasi-constitutional doctrines limiting federalism's
iterative opportunities." 33 8
However, regulatory overlap has "potential pitfalls." 339 These include
undermining uniformity, finality, and accountability, and causing inefficiencies
if different or even contradictory regulations apply to the same activity or
product. 340 When there is regulatory overlap, "lines of responsibility" may
become blurred, and citizens who are dissatisfied with a particular government
initiative may not know which level of government to hold responsible. 341
Conversely, Professor Schapiro claims that polyphonic federalism, in which the
federal and state governments exercise concurrent authority, can effectively
manage jurisdictional overlap. 342 Concurrent authority may produce a more
innovative and resilient form of government that "advances the valuable
characteristics of plurality, dialogue, and redundancy," and "encourage policy

citizens on a local or state level."); id. at 696 ("[E]ach additional industry or other interest group's
success in nationalizing a regulatory issue divests from states, localities, and citizens the ability to create
meaningful change through democratic political activity, compressing the legislative and regulatory
space available for meaningful self-government").
337. Hoke, supra note 172, at 696; see also Resnik, supra note 220, at 41 ("These multiple sites for
conflicts about social norms are the opportunities provided by democratic federalism to permit problems
to be argued in more than one forum and more than once .... I do not suggest that the outcomes of such
contestation are either optimal or to my personal liking, nor that problems of aggrandizement, capture,
cartels, and overreaching are absent. But the reiterated conflicts are desirable because they enable us to
watch and to participate in struggles over the content of the law of the United States.").
338. Resnik, supra note 220, at 41; see also Hoke, supra note 172, at 696 ("Most theories of
federalism ... fail to recognize that federalism is not properly understood as bipolar or dichotomous, but
is three-dimensional, with the availability of citizen participation and citizen power supplying the third
plane of analysis."); Schapiro, Federalism as lntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 126
("Preemption prevents the interplay of state and federal law that constitutes one of the chief benefits of
federalism.").
339. Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 228, at 44.
340. See also Adelman & Engelet al., supra note 218, at 290 ("The multilevel approach of adaptive
(and dynamic) federalism is not costless. Uniformity, accountability, and finality are all sacrificed to
some degree by allowing multiple jurisdictions to address environmental problems simultaneously."); id.
at 295 ("Clearly, where a proliferating polyglot of state-level regulations becomes enormously
disruptive to the economy, federal preemption may be warranted.").
341. Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 228, at 45.
342. Schapiro, Federalism as Jntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 120-21; see also id. at
121 ("Federalism is a system in which there are multiple nodes of political authority within a country.
Polyphonic federalism focuses on the creative overlap of these different legal regimes."); Resnik, supra
note 220, at 42 (The question is "how to weave the fact of such joint action into legal theories that aspire
to celebrate the diversity, the potential for redundancy, the distribution of power entailed in the potential
singularity of each state, and the differences among states."); id. at 86 ("Non-uniformity is a predicate of
federalist systems, which can impose a national norm but which ought to be dedicated to local
divergence wherever tolerable.").
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experimentation." 343 Professor Schapiro sees preemption under circumstances
of "broad participation and shared interest" as "an unduly blunt and generally
unnecessary mechanism to protect an abstract principle of democratic
control." 344
When not preempted, state regulations can fill regulatory gaps left by
federal inaction and overcome the "status quo bias" of federal regulatory
decisions. 345 States may offer a more finely tuned layer of regulation, which
can be adjusted quickly in response to changes in perceived local needs or
conditions. 346 Businesses use the preemption doctrine to block state health and
safety laws that are more aggressive than their federal counterparts or civil
rights laws that require broader protection. 347 When businesses are successful
and state law is preempted, states and local communities cannot move to fill a

343. Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 228, at 43; see also Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at
1544 (indicating his preference for the phrase "polyphonic federalism" because it reflects current
practice and "serves numerous salutary ends").
344. Schapiro, Federalism as lntersystemic Governance, supra note 223, at 132; see also Adelman
& Engel, supra note 218, at 296 (The "findings suggest further that federal preemption should be used
sparingly, and that exclusive federal control of environmental regulation should be reserved for
exceptional circumstances.").
345. See Buzbee, Interaction's Promise, supra note 311, at 155-56 ("Any regulatory design choice
needs to take into account and adjust for numerous regulatory failure risks. Among those common risks
are regulatory inertia, capture, poor initial choice or error, outdated choices, and inadequate funding of
administrative agencies. Creation of effective regulatory schemes must further anticipate status quo bias,
which can make any initial choice sticky, and risk-averse regulators.").
346. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 16 ("[I]f states possess robust authority to
regulate, the policies chosen within a state will tend to be tailored to local concerns and to citizen
preferences."); see also Pierce, supra note 288, at 645-46 (saying that Boyden Gray identifies as
advantages of state and local regulation that "(I) it produces programs tailored to local needs with
correspondingly greater ability to respond promptly to changes in local needs; (2) it permits
experimentation with a variety of approaches to regulation; and (3) it provides for greater political
accountability and legitimacy"); Mark Tushnet, Judicial Enforcement of Federalist-Based Constitutional
Limitations: Some Skeptical Comparative Observations, 57 EMORY L.J. 135, 138 (2007) ("Consider
finally the best general statement of federalism's normative basis, the principle of subsidiarity,
according to which governmental activities should be conducted on the lowest level at which they can
effectively be carried out.").
347. Hoke, supra note 172, at 721 ("Whether it is greater concern for the dangers posed by nuclear
power plants and toxic wastes, or by the loss of privacy rights and reproductive freedoms, some states
have enacted regulation that is far more public-regarding than has the national government."); see also
Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 286, at 19 (discussing the virtues of "a hybrid, power-sharing
arrangement between the federal government and the states" and saying "[e]ven with federal
environmental standards in place, some citizens may still face acute localized risks, called 'hot spots' by
environmentalists; preserving state authority to go beyond federal standards can allow an effective
response to these local problems"); Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1570-71 ("Of course,
preemption advocates prefer preemptive outcomes precisely to reduce regulatory and legal burdens.").
Professor Zellmer finds disturbing the pro-development, anti-regulatory tilt of the current Supreme
Court. See Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1662 ("Although an empirical study of the full range of
preemption cases issued by the Rehnquist Court indicated that preemption may be less likely when a
state is a party to the dispute, in the cases surveyed in this Article, judicial outcomes reflect an
antiregulatory sentiment, whether or not a state played a role in the litigation."); id. at 1731 ("Since the
mid-1990s, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have consistently shielded industry from progressive state
regulations in areas of traditional state concern ranging from pollution prevention to workplace safety.").
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regulatory void, leaving their citizens exposed to harm 348 and reducing states
to little more than administrative arms of the federal government. 349 It is not
easy for states to get Congress to restore their legislative power. 350 The result
is that the level of protection of citizens is less complete than it otherwise might
have been had state law not been preempted.
In addition, when state regulations are preempted, short-term economic
benefits may be created for indust:ry, 351 which generally prefers more lax
federal regulation to more aggressive state regulation. 352 Professor Hoke
argues that federal preemption benefits larger corporations because they can
bear the higher costs of complying with federal laws and have the resources to
influence the content of federal laws. 353 But one level of regulation leaves
federal agencies vulnerable to capture by industries 354 and removes states as a
potential "stabilizing device." 355 Citizens lack the resources and wherewithal
to offer a counterbalance to industry's preferences. 356 Since preemptive
federalism undermines "the dynamism of a healthy system of overlapping
jurisdiction," powerful feedback loops may emerge, one of which, according to
Professor Adelman, is a shift in industry's lobbying efforts to the federal
level. 357 As industry representatives are "substantially fitter" players at this

348. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 718.
349. See id.
350. See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11 HAMLINE L. REV.
183, 214 (1988) (noting that many of Justice Blackmun's critics accused him of overestimating "the
states' ability to protect their interest through their representatives in Congress").
351. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 692-93 ("In an era when federal regulations are frequently
outdated, substantively lax, or ineffectually enforced by an underfunded agency, compliance with only
the federal regulations may provide distinct short-term economic benefits to regulated industry."); id. at
693 ("With a 'friendly' regulatory apparatus on the national capital, elimination of the increasingly
active, and arguably more public-oriented, state regulatory power appears to be sound business
strategy.").
352. See id. at 721 ("While evaluating the social costs of eliminating dual regulation via federal
preemption, we should recognize the substantive import of many of the laws challenged as
preempted."); see also Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1703 ("As the states become more aggressive in
filling gaps left by lax federal regulatory schemes and federal enforcement failures, for-profit
corporations, developers, and other antiregulatory forces have become equally aggressive-and quite
effective-in wielding preemption as an obstacle to the implementation of protective state
regulations.").
353. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 719.
354. See id. at 693 ("When an industry has achieved a federal regulatory regime that is conducive
to its self-determined interests, known in the literature as 'agency capture,' a parallel system of state
regulatory law may threaten to dilute or to vitiate the advantages amassed on the federal level.")
355. !d. at 719.
356. See Buzbee, Interaction's Promise, supra note 311, at 161 ("Industry will not want such
change, nor will regulators. Citizens will be outgunned, and even issue-based not-for-profits will often
lack the resources to stick with the ongoing process of adjustment."); see also Adelman & Engel, supra
note 218, at 294 ("[P]ublic-choice theory predicts which interest groups are likely to prevail.
Concentrated industry interest groups negatively impacted by environmental regulation will have a
competitive advantage over the diffuse, poorly organized public threatened by regulatory inaction.").
357. Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 295. For a discussion of complex, dynamic adaptive
system and feedback loops, see Hope M. Babcock, Democracy's Discontent in a Complex World: Can
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"game," they will disproportionately gain from these feedback loops, 358
reaping the benefits from preemption.
Refraining from preempting state regulation preserves states as
laboratories; 359 while investing sole regulatory authority in the national
government eliminates the effects of local conditions providing support for
strong regulation. 36 Federal regulators learn from state experimentation and
states often improve on federal laws, 361 creating "room for pragmatic
adjustment." 362 States are more likely to innovate and experiment than the
federal government, which is reluctant to change regulatory standards because
of the time-consuming, resource-intensive nature of the rulemaking process,
followed by the uncertainty of hard-look judicial review. 363 Moreover,
regulators may better assess regulatory choices when states go beyond the
federal government or are willing to step into a regulatory gap. 364 Taking
authority away from the states limits their capacity to innovate and thwarts
possible state "solutions to social problems that may later be adopted at a

°

Avalanches, Sandpiles. and Finches Optimize Michael Sandel's Civic Republican Community?, 85 GEO.
L.J 2085 (1997).
358. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 295.
359. See Pierce, supra note 288, at 609 ('"Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."' (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).; Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 293 ("The value of
innovation is one of the oldest justifications for a federalist system, encouraging, as it does, the role of
states as 'laboratories of democracy."').
360. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 218, at 294-95 ("The benefits of greater predictive stability
and full cost internalization that come with elevating an issue to the federal level sacrifices other factors
as well," such as attenuating the feedback loop "between the benefits and costs of individual variation,"
which are "strong and swift ... at a small scale ... [because] individual species are inherently more
vulnerable than ecosystems collectively. These tight feedbacks are essential to adaptive change, as
buffering mechanisms, by their very nature, diminish sensitivity to exogenous pressures. Accordingly,
although aggregation promotes stability and resiliency, it increases the inertia of a system and its ability
to respond to changing environmental conditions.").
361. See Pierce, supra note 288, at 656 ("Federal regulation is not inconsistent with regulatory
experimentation; it is inconsistent only with regulatory experimentation initiated on a decentralized basis
by states. Still, decentralized regulatory experimentation probably does have advantages, simply because
regulatory wisdom does not reside exclusively in federal agencies.").
362. See Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 228, at 1544 ("Federal actors have learned from state
innovations. At other times, states have modeled law on federal law, but then improved on it. Most areas
of social and environmental policy reveal federal leadership but then ongoing interaction and
improvement that is fostered by the latitude left for political and legal contributions of state and local
governments and courts. This reality of regulatory interaction has been critical to regulatory progress.").
363. See id. at 1569-70.
364. See Glicksman, supra note 194, at 183 (arguing that when a state "takes a more precautionary
approach to a health and environmental risk than the federal government, and is willing to regulate
despite uncertainties," not only will this not thwart federal purposes, but "[s]uch state experimentation
may help all levels of government, as well as targets of regulation and those seeking its protections, by
allowing more informed assessment of regulatory options").
0
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nationallevel." 365
States are also in a better position to respond to and care for the needs of
their citizens than the national government. 366 Indeed, states are often in the
forefront in terms of enacting protective laws and regulations 367 and state
regulators may be more protective than their federal counterparts. 368
Concentrating too much power in the hands of federal regulators can also have
"perverse" consequences, such as preventing states from regulating an area that
the federal government avoids addressing, like climate change, 369 perpetuating
a regulatory gap. 370 Since it is the states and not the federal government that
regulate the intra-state generation, sale, and transmission of electrical power, 371

365. Stabile, supra note 177, at I 0 ("[l]mproper preemption decisions give insufficient regard to
the purposes and goals of Congress in passing federal legislation."). Professor Adelman claims that
limiting environmental regulation to the federal government undermines the competition dynamic that is
essential to the survival of complex adaptive systems, like our federal system. See Adelman & Engel,
supra note 218, at 294 ("A defining characteristic of adaptive systems and ecosystems, in particular, is
the variation in competition for resources that occurs over time and space. Without this variability, much
of the diversity in an ecosystem would be lost to natural selection-the fittest species would win out in
the absence of localized disturbances and ecological niches. Limiting environmental policy making to
the federal government through the doctrine of preemption undermines this essential dynamic.").
366. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 296, at 994 ("Three principal arguments favor a strong,
independent state power ... states can better respond to the diverse interests and preferences of their
citizens . . . [they] can compete against one another for citizens and economic growth through
innovation in government ... [and] states are often thought to be better protectors of private rights than
either the larger national Congress of the President."); see also Schapiro, Polyphony, supra note 228, at
43 ("People in different states can experiment with different legal solutions to common problems ....
Federalism allows different states to try out different possibilities. The states and federal government
can operate as 'laboratories,' experimenting with divergent regulatory regimes . . . . No single best
solution will dominate. In other areas, the states and the national government will converge on a single,
preferred outcome.").
367. See Hoke, supra note 172, at 721.
368. See id. at 694-95 ("[T]he power transferred or confirmed to exist only in national political
institutions may remain unexercised, thus creating a regulatory vacuum if the question has not yet been
addressed by national legislation or agency regulations and is not on the current national political
agenda.").
3 69. See Schroeder, supra note 179, at 141 ("The most perverse consequences of allocating too
much authority to the federal government through doctrines governing congressional and agency
preemption creates a similar problem of 'states who can't and federal authorities who won't."'
(discussing Judge Henry Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963))); id. at 142 ("lfattacks grounded in preemption are successful in
stifling the initiatives states are taking with respect to [greenhouse gases] and global warming, while
Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) remain stalemated and silent, global
warming will become a poster child for the perverse effects of states who can't and federal authorities
who won't.").
370. See id. at 142-43 (identifYing as one of "four problem areas" that arise when state law is
preempted "the 'regulatory vacuum' that can result from concentrating too much authority at the federal
level"); see also Glicksman, supra note 194, at 178 ("[P]reemption in the face of federal inaction leaves
the state whose law is preempted at the mercy of the market failure that prompted it to regulate in the
first place because no substitute federal regulatory regime exists."). On the topic of regulatory gaps
generally, see William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. I (2003).
371. Tribe, supra note 19, at 702 ("It is therefore clear that the states retain the right to regulate
nuclear energy activities at least for non-radiation purposes that relate to the generation, sale, or
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preempting state authority in this area is an example of how a "regulatory gap"
might arise and not be filled. 372 The result of this particular} regulatory gap
would then be fewer checks against "utility discretion" to choose nuclear
power, even though Vermont might consider the nuclear option to be imprudent
and harmful to its citizens. 373
Additionally, federal bureaucracies can be less efficient than local ones,
requiring more time and resources to make decisions. 374 This inefficiency can
increase the social cost of regulation 375 and discourage the resolution of
federalism controversies through national regulations. 376 In contrast, state
agencies must make decisions quickly because they lack the resources and
expertise to conduct a thorough regulatory analysis; however, quick decisions
can have their own social cost if states make mistakes. 377 As in the case of
preemption's benefits, which are often offset by negative consequences, there
are negative consequences from placing regulatory burdens on states when their
laws are not preempted.
Thus, there are several persuasive reasons to oppose preemption, such as
the importance of promoting democratic experimentalism by preserving states
as robust centers of alternative regulation and experimentation. States may also
act as regulatory gap fillers when federal regulators hesitate to act, and prevent
errors and bureaucratic stasis.

transmiSSion of electric power generally."); see also Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 104
("Congress 'underscored the distinction drawn in 1954' between regulation of nuclear power plants for
safety reasons, and elemental decisions of state governments as to whether nuclear power plants are
desirable from other perspectives."); Wiggins, supra note 83, at 72 ("Section 274 was concerned solely
with allocating responsibility for protecting against radiation hazards between the federal and state
governments. Such matters as zoning, land use, and arguably, the required authorization to commence a
nuclear power project-'matters on the fringe of the preempted area'-were left to state authority.").
372. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 208,
225 (1983) ("While the NRC does evaluate the dangers of generating nuclear power, it does not balance
those dangers against the risks, costs, and benefits of other choices available to the State .... It is almost
inconceivable that Congress would have left a regulatory vacuum; the only reasonable inference is that
Congress intended the States to continue to make these judgments.").
373. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 64 (Unless state utility commissions are allowed to make "a
general evaluation of feasibility, on broad grounds of social, economic and ideological policy, then the
decision whether to build a nuclear facility in a state will ultimately be made only by the public utility
seeking its construction. So long as a reactor's design specifications meet NRC requirements, there
could be no public check whatsoever on utility discretion.").
374. , See Pierce, supra note 288, at 655 ("[M]ost observers of the regulatory process would accept
Boyden Gray's assertion that federal agencies tend to require more time to make regulatory decisions
than state agencies. This phenomenon is probably attributable to some combination of bureaucratic
diseconomies of scale, crowded agendas, and the increased number and nature of parties affected when a
regulatory decision is made on a national level.").
375. /d. at 655-56.
376. /d. at 655.
377. !d. at 656.
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V. APPLYING THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND ITS UNDERLYING
POLICY CONCERNS TO VERMONT ACT 160

Two principal legal arguments demonstrate why the AEA does not
preempt Vermont Act 160: (1) the absence of an express or implied preemption
of laws like Act 160 in the AEA; and, (2) the call for the application of a
presumption against preemption to protect the exercise of traditional state
police powers and maintain states as strong alternative centers of governance.
Although the NRC's jurisdiction over nuclear power plants is broad, it is not
all-encompassing. A combination of statutory language, other environmental
laws, and Supreme Court opinions, as well as the development that commercial
nuclear power is no longer a national imperative, have cabined the NRC's
authority, leaving room for states to act within increasingly wide jurisdictional
borders. 378 Lastly, a finding that the AEA does not preempt Vermont Act 160
is consistent with recognized federalism principles.

A. Vermont Act 160 Neither Expressly nor Impliedly Conflicts with the
AEA
Because the AEA contains only a limited express preemption of state
regulation of nuclear power plants and specifically preserves traditional state
authority over the generation, transmission, and sale of power, as well as
nonradiological matters at the plants, there is no express or field preemption of
Vermont Act 160. While there may be tension between the two levels of
regulation because their application may lead to different results, as applied
here, there is no conflict between them. Thus, there is also no implied
preemption of Vermont Act 160.

1. There Is No Express or Implied Field Preemption of Vermont Act 160
The AEA does not expressly give the federal government exclusive power
over nuclear reactors. 379 In fact, Congress carved out a sphere of state
378. See Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 103 (The Pacific Gas Court noted that "although the
AEA is broad in its regulation of nuclear power plants, it is not all-encompassing, and substantial room
exists for state regulation of nuclear power," since section 271 "provides that '[n]othing in this chapter
shall be construed to affect the authority ... of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the
generation, sale of transmission of electrical power produced through the use of nuclear facilities .... "'
(quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 208)).
379. See Baum, supra note 77, at 669 (noting despite the 1959 AEA amendment adding Section
271, "the AEA still fails to state expressly that the federal government has sole and exclusive authority
to regulate radiation hazards" (citing N. States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir.
1971), ajf'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972))). But see Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 446-47
("[T]he congressional declaration in the Atomic Energy Act that federal regulation was to be exclusive
was made in the context of total, existing federal control and regulation. Thus, the determination by
Congress that exclusive federal regulation was to be continued gives to the preemption provision a
degree of precision absent in other cases. In this context, the determination that exclusive federal
regulation was to be continued constitutes an explicit statement of broad supersession of all state
regulation of the construction and operation of nuclear power plants for purposes of controlling radiation
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regulation of nuclear reactors in the AEA. 380 By assuring states that nothing in
the AEA circumscribed their traditional authority over power generation and
transmission within a state,3 81 and by allowing states to regulate certain types
of nuclear materials and nonradiological hazards, 382 Congress made clear that
states had a defined space in the nuclear regulatory orbit 383 ; it certainly did not
expressly preempt that authority. Therefore, the AEA does not expressly
preempt Vermont Act

160 and, in fact, the Act functions in an area expressly

reserved to the states.

hazards."). Having failed to find express preemption in the AEA, Professors Murphy and La Pierre find
implied or obstacle preemption. See id. at 447-48 ("Even if courts do not find in section 274 an
unambiguous declaration of express preemption, the conclusion that state bills imposing a prohibition or
moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants are impliedly inescapable .... They are in
irreconcilable conflict with the federal law in a number of respects .... [for example] the conflict
between these bills and the federal policy of developing nuclear energy for the production of electric
power.").
380. Atomic Energy Act§ 271,42 U.S.C. § 2018 (2006).
381. /d.; see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 701 n.ll2 (quoting section 271 and explaining that
Congress added the proviso clause "to prevent the section being construed to achieve" an '"intolerable'
result," namely that local ordinances and regulations having to do with the generation, sale, or
transmission of electric energy might place "an unacceptable burden" on the Commission); Murphy &
La Pierre, supra note 44, at 453 ("Unlike other possible state regulation for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards, state public utility regulation is expressly contemplated by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In providing in section 271 for the preservation of state public utility
regulation, Congress considered that the states would retain the authority to regulate the rates and
services of electric power produced in nuclear power plants. When Congress amended this section in
1965, it did so precisely to confirm that state regulation is to be confined to rates and services.").
382. 42 U.S.C. § 2021. See Cavers, supra note 19, at 31 ("In adopting section 274, the Congress
has opened the door part way to compatible state regulation; perhaps it should go further."); id. at 35 n. 7
("' [T]he Commission has exclusive authority to regulate for protection against radiation hazards until
such time as the State enters into an agreement with the Commission to assume such responsibility."'
(quoting S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., lst Sess., at 12 (1959))); Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at
103-04 (discussing the Court's reliance in Pacific Gas on section 274(k) and concluding this section
was "not an affirmative grant of power to the states; rather, Congress added section 274(k) to make clear
that the 1959 amendments had not drawn any more authority from the states than the original act passed
in 1946, as amended in 1954"); Tribe, supra note 19, at 701 ("[S]ubsection K is intended to make it
clear that the bill does not impair the State[s'] authority to regulate activities of AEC licensees for the
manifold health, safety, and economic purposes other than radiation protection." (quoting S. REP. No.
870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 12 (1959))); Zellmer, supra note 217, at 1704 (While section 274(k) was
"narrowly circumscribed to apply only to the particular topic addressed in that section ... certain
federal-state agreements," the Court recognized that "Congress, by permitting regulation for 'purposes
other than protection against radiation hazards' underscored the distinction ... between the spheres of
activity left respectively to the Federal Government and the States." (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 210 (1983))); Baum, supra note 77, at
674 ("Section 2021(g) [requiring NRC 'to cooperate with the states to be sure that "State and
Commission programs for protection against hazards of radiation will be coordinated and compatible'],
therefore, must contemplate some cooperation between the NRC and the state before the state enters
such an agreement. ... Yet, if some cooperation is anticipated before the state enters into an agreement
with the NRC, arguably the AEA contemplates some state regulatory authority." (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2021(g) (1976))). Anticipating the enactment of section 274, some states prior to 1959 had begun to
promulgate nuclear safety regulations. See id. at 676.
383. Interestingly, in 1957, the AEC proposed legislation that would have allowed states to
establish concurrent state radiation standards so long as they those standards did not conflict with federal
ones; the proposal never got out of committee. Wiggins, supra note 83, at 69.
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That the AEA contemplates some form of state regulation of nuclear
power plants also means that the federal government has not exclusively
occupied the field of regulating nuclear power plants. While the AEA makes
clear that the federal government has occupied the field of how nuclear power
plants should be constructed and operated, it "has not even entered the field" of
determining whether such plants should be constructed at all. 384 Determining
whether a nuclear plant should be built, or in this case continue to operate,
involves the state in a wide array of non-radiological matters, 385 such as the
need for the plant, its relative costs and benefits, its environmental and
economic impacts, and an assessment of alternatives. In contrast, the NRC is
concerned with a single factor-protecting the public from radiation harm. It
does not consider, let alone attempt to regulate, other factors relevant to the
selection of a particular source of power for a community. 386
But, drawing a line between nuclear reactor safety and a state's interest in
protecting the welfare of its citizens is not easy. 387 Nor is it simple to
determine what qualifies as a radiation hazard. 388 The line between an
economic and radiological safety effect of a nuclear reactor's operation may

384. ld. at 61.
385. ld. But see Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 215,299 ("Finding that the
Utah statutes were intended to regulate nuclear safety, the court held that 'in the matter of nuclear safety,
Congress has determined that it is the federal government, and not the states, that must address the
problem.'" (citing Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1254 (lOth Cir.
2004))).
386. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 61-62 ("This 'whether' decision involves a broad range of
economic, social, safety, environmental, and ideological factors. By contrast, the NRC concerns itself
almost exclusively with only one such factor-protection against 'radiation hazards'-and does not
attempt to deal with all the other influences bearing on the selection of a type of power source to meet
the energy needs of a particular community."); id. at 7D-71 (citing New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d
170 (I st Cir. 1969) (upholding the AEC's position that its jurisdiction did not include thermal pollution
because its jurisdiction was limited to radiation hazards)).
387. See Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 100 (Northern States held "that the AEA preempted
a Minnesota law regulating radioactive emissions of nuclear power plants more strictly than federal
laws" and noted that the "AEA is a complex and pervasive scheme." (citing N. States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), ajf'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972})); see also Recent
Developments in Utah Law, supra note 385, at 292-99 (2005) (discussing Nielson, which preempted
various state laws, including "laws requiring counties to pass ordinances rejecting all spent nuclear fuel
repositories" or, alternatively, to create "detailed plans" allowing for their regulation and requiring
compensation for unfunded potential liabilities created by those storage facilities).
388. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 680 ("Defining the state and federal roles-both unraveling that
design and subjecting it to constitutional review-is a delicate task inasmuch as both sovereignties have
important interests in exercising authority over the activity in question. With respect to nuclear power
plants, Congress has declared that national regulation is necessary to provide for the common defense
and to assure the safe operation of such facilities. Yet the states also have an interest in the safety of
nuclear power plants as well as an important interest in the economic, environmental, and social
implications of using nuclear fuel to generate electricity for their citizens."); see also Baum, supra note
77, at 680 n.ll3 (citing Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 581 (7th Cir. 1982), as an
example of a federal court recognizing "the difficulty in distinguishing what is or is not a regulation of a
radiation hazard").
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also be blurry. 389 In fact, there is no way that a state can regulate a nuclear
power plant's rates and services without at least some consideration of the
"radiation safety aspects" of the plant's operation. 390 Utility rates reflect the
safety of the plant's operation to some degree. 391 For example, if a plant is
shutdown or its power output is reduced to correct a safety problem "the level
of services and rates charged to consumers will be affected." 392 Indeed, a
public utility commission could decide to block construction of a new nuclear
plant because safety problems may cause it to shut down frequently, resulting
in an expensive, unpredictable supply of power. 393 Alternatively, a public
utility commission may decide to prevent a nuclear power plant's construction
because the commission decides it is unwise to rely on nuclear power when
alternative, more reliable, or cheaper forms of power are available. 394 Thus,
389. See Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 673 ("The Pacific Gas Court drew an ambiguous distinction
between safety and economic concerns. In adhering to the distinction, the Court significantly affected
nuclear energy policymaking by allowing the states to enter a regulatory sphere earlier reserved for the
federal government. The Court failed to recognize, however, that safety and economics are not separate
questions."); see also Murphy, supra note 96, at 885 ("[T]he line between environmental protection and
safety issues is often blurry both legally and physically." (citing Brown v. Kerr-McGee Chern. Corp.,
767 F.2d 1234, 1241 (7th Cir. 1985) (authorizing private parties to sue chemical companies under state
laws governing pollution standards, building codes, and public nuisance, as long as radiological matters
were not involved))).
390. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 453. The authors find various state laws that would
impose conditions on authorizing the construction of new nuclear power plants susceptible to
preemption by section 274 because they reflect the states' concern about radiological safety and would
result in delaying or prohibition of the construction of nuclear plants. See id. at 447 (commenting on
pending bills in California, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, and Wisconsin). But see TOMAIN, supra note
21, at 15 ("Safety and finances are not discrete topics. Waste disposal is a radiological hazard as much
as it is an accounting entry on the utility's books.").
391. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 691-93 (discussing the NRC's Individual Plant Examinations
policy and how, under the Pacific Gas decision, state agencies can "disallow the utility from recovering
the implementation costs by increasing rates to energy consumers," calling these disallowances
"prudence disallowances," revir.wing how these disallowances can prevent utilities from "recouping
safety maintenance costs," and saying how courts will only prevent states from using prudent
disallowances "if the end results are not just and reasonable" (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488
US. 299 (1989))).
392. Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 453.
393. /d. at 454.
394. See id. ("Even if nuclear power reactors and conventional power plants were determined to
have comparable records of service, a state agency might still decide to prohibit the construction of an
additional nuclear facility on the ground that it was unwise for the state 'to put all its eggs in one basket'
and that there should be an equal development of a variety of power sources within the state.").
According to Professor Reilly, a state might even be able to override federal authority over nuclear
safety "simply by claiming that some aspect of nuclear power generation is too costly." Reilly, supra
note 43, at 685. See also Goxem, supra note 10, at 443 ("Such nonparticipation by state or local
governments has the potential effect of delaying or even halting the licensing of a nuclear power plant.
Even though nonparticipation conflicts with the concept that the federal government has exclusive
control over safety regulation, the court allowed this result."). But see Murphy & La Pierre, supra note
44, at 454 ("There is no easy answer to ... whether such state public utility regulation would be
preempted. The command of section 274 of the 1954 Act that the NRC have exclusive control over the
construction and operation of nuclear power plants cannot be reconciled in all cases with the authority of
state and local governments under the Act to regulate the rates and services of electric power."); id. at
448-49 (First Iowa "strongly indicates that the states cannot bar a federal licensee from constructing and
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safety concerns can infuse a public utility commission's economic decisions
about a nuclear power plant's rates and services.
Vermont Act 160 did not stray into a field exclusively occupied by the
federal government-the radiological safety of nuclear power plants. Quite the
contrary, the Vermont Act focused on the socio-economic impacts on Vermont
citizens from the plant's continued operation. For example, the Act required the
PSB to identify and analyze the continuing need for Vermont Yankee; the
costs, benefits, and risks of its continued operation; alternatives that might
better promote the welfare of Vermont citizens; long-term accountability and
financial responsibility issues; and long-term environmental, economic, and
public health issues. 395 None of these topics relates to radiological safety, let
alone the design or operation of the plant-the focus of federal legislation. The
legitimacy of Vermont Act 160' s considerations and the difficulty of separating
safety from economic concerns lessen the likelihood that Vermont's law is a
"subterfuge" to block the continuing operation of a nuclear plant. 396 Even if
Vermont Act 160 is an outgrowth of legislative concern about the safe
operation of Vermont Yankee, it is "unrealistic" to assume that a state that
looks at the economics of a nuclear power plant's operation can at the same
time ignore its operational risks, given the economic consequences of those
risks. 397 To suggest that a state must ignore the risks that attend the selection of
the nuclear option is to blindfold the state to nuclear power's very real
economic risks. 398 Thus, there is no implied field preemption of Vermont Act
operating a nuclear power plant producing electric power for interstate commerce" and state bills
imposing prohibitions on constructing nuclear power plants or other conflicting requirements "would
seriously disrupt the national plan and policy of Congress for the development of nuclear energy to
produce electric power for interstate commerce." (citing First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946))).
395. See 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 160; see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 718 ("The placement
of California's nuclear provisions within a comprehensive administrative scheme to achieve such
purposes as ensuring a reliable supply of electrical energy, conserving energy resources, and assuring
attainment of statewide environmental, public safety, and land use goals, is a further indication of
California's pursuit of legitimate interests in enacting these provisions.") The California Act established
siting procedures and criteria for non-nuclear plants. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 718.
396. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 454 ("In the final analysis, the validity of state
public utility regulation will rest on a determination whether its actual purpose is one other than a
concern about radiation hazards and the degree of conflict which the state restriction imposes on the
national plan for the development of nuclear energy."); id. at 455 ("Although the proposed [state
moratoria] bills are sometimes justified as state regulation, in most cases the claim of regulation is
patently a subterfuge for the real objective-prohibition. Although the bills are phrased in terms of
'conditions' to be met before further construction, the conditions are, as a practical matter, incapable of
fulfillment").
397. Reilly, supra note 43, at 70 I ("[I]t is unrealistic to assume that states consider nuclear energy
solely in terms of 'economics' and ignore the fact that nuclear energy presents safety risks. Such
restraint would require an inordinate amount of willpower. Instead, states almost certainly evaluate the
advantages of nuclear power based on their own estimation of nuclear safety.").
398. !d. at 70 I n.I26 ('"In making its traditional policy choices about what kinds of power are best
suited to its needs, a State would be forced to ignore the undeniable fact that nuclear power entails
certain risks."' (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 225 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring))).
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160.
Moreover, as long as Vermont Act 160 is directed at a different problem
than the AEA, a federal court is unlikely to find it field preempted because any
overlap is "incidental" to the field of nuclear regulation rather than essential to
it. 399 Here, the purposes of the federal and state law are quite different and
there is no overlap. 400 Vermont's law is directed at protecting the citizens of
Vermont from unnecessary expenditures, from potential environmental harm,
and from anxiety caused by an aging nuclear power plant; the AEA is directed
at improving the safety of plant operations and preventing the release of
radiological substances. Vermont has not entered the field of radiological safety
standards-nothing about the reactor's design would need to be changed for the
plant to comply with Vermont Act 160. Nor has the state entered the field of
regulating the reactor's routine operation. Therefore, any impermissible overlap
between Vermont Act 160 and the AEA is incidental and not fatal to the state
law.
Vermont's law empowering the PSB to deny a certificate ofpublic good to
Vermont Yankee is an exercise of its reserved authority under the AEA to
protect its ratepayers from unwarranted and unwanted economic costs and
anxiety. 401 As such, it has not intruded into an exclusive field of federal
regulation. Therefore, Vermont Act 160 is safe from express or implied field
preemption.
2. There Is No Implied Conflict or Obstacle Preemption of Vermont Act
160

Although there may be tension between the two levels of regulatory
authority, 402 no actual conflict between state and federal law exists here that
399. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 56 (When "state and national power is utilized to solve
different problems, the state's actions should be encouraged if the degree of overlap between the two
provisions is found to be incidental to the operation of both.").
400. See id. ("The state-supportive presumption will require those advocating preemption to
establish that a conflict with some federal enactment 'will necessarily arise' because California has
postponed granting land use to proposed nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the Huron principle will
militate against preemption if the objective [of] the California Nuclear Law is found to differ
significantly from the purposes of applicable federal law.").
401. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 712 ("A state's rejection of an electric power source that
reasonably appears to create a source of indefinitely growing back-charges to ratepayers no more than
exercises the authority recognized by section 271."); see also supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text
(discussing the costs of building and operating a nuclear power plant).
402. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 881 (The Supreme Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238 (1984), "emphasized the point that Congress expected tension between state and federal
law .... Accordingly, this tension implies coexistence."); see also Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 675
("The Silkwood Court also recognized that punitive damage awards could force utilities to conform to
safety standards determined at the state level. ... [T]he Court admitted that allowing state law punitive
damage awards, which have the effect of regulating safety standards, was inconsistent with the notion of
exclusive federal jurisdiction over radiological safety. Nevertheless, the majority found that Congress
intended to recognize both concepts-the NRC's exclusive authority to set safety standards and the
ability of states to award punitive damages if a jury decided that a plant's safety standards were not
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makes it impossible for a regulated entity to comply with applicable federal and
state laws. 403 Vermont has not enacted a law that conflicts with any NRC
regulation. Since the NRC's decision to authorize Vermont Yankee's continued
operation was safety-based, Vermont's decision to deny the plant a certificate
for non-safety reasons did not conflict with the federal agency's safety rationale
for its decision. Nor was the state's impact on the basis for the NRC's decision
direct or substantiai. 404 Vermont's law authorized the PSB to deny Entergy a
certificate of public good to continue to operate Vermont Yankee based on an
assessment of the plant's economic and social risks, while the AEA authorizes
the NRC to extend the operating life of the plant based solely on safety
considerations. 405 There is also no impossibility problem; Entergy could take
steps to lessen the risk of economic surprises from the plant's operation and
demonstrate that the concerns raised in association with Act 160 are
groundless.
Moreover, Vermont Act 160 does not create an obstacle to the fulfillment
of any legislative purposes of the AEA. There is no mandate in the AEA that
nuclear power be the preferred future source of energy. 406 Nor is there any
indication that Congress intended to prevent state public service commissions
from choosing to not certify nuclear power plants. 407 There is nothing in the
statute or its legislative history directing states to choose the nuclear option;
instead, Professor Wiggins finds a clear statement of legislative intent to make
nuclear power an option a state might choose. 408
reasonable. The Court paused over the potential conflict between these two policies, yet ultimately
concluded that Congress intended to 'tolerate whatever tension there was between them."' (quoting
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256)).
403. See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text (discussing implied conflict and obstacle
preemption).
404. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990) ("[F]for a state law to fall within the
pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who
build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels," and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim "may have some effect" on safety concerns, but that the effect was "neither
direct nor substantial." (emphasis added)). But see Scott S. Smith, Federal Preemption and the AEA:
How Federal Preemption Law "Nukes" State Law that Affects Nuclear Waste, 9 MO. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. Ill, 119-20 (2002) (discussing Brown v. Kerr-McGee, 767 F.2d 1134, 1240-41 (7th Cir.
1985), and saying that even though radioactive and nonradioactive materials were '"inextricably
mixed,'" Congress did not intend to preempt applicable state laws, and the state law "did not fall within
a specific field occupied by the federal government," the district court injunction ordering Kerr-McGee
to remove byproduct material from the site "would substitute the judgment of the district court for that
of the NRC as to the best method of storing the waste material" and, therefore, the state law was
preempted).
405. See Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 529 ("[G]iven the danger associated with fission reactions
and the radioactive waste generated by the process as well as the potential national security threat it
poses, nuclear energy is regulated under a strict legal regime that gives the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission exclusive jurisdiction over the safety of nuclear power plants.").
406. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 65.
407. See id. at 78 ("[T]here is simply no room for the conclusion that Congress 'unmistakably'
intended to prohibit states from disfavoring nuclear plants when certifying public utility applications.").
408. See id. (The AEA "inaugurated the very beginning of the private nonmilitary use of nuclear
energy.... In this setting, it would be surprising indeed to find Congress intending to eliminate states'
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Regardless of whether the AEA's initial primary purpose was the safe
development of commercial nuclear power, the passage of time has made any
such legislative directive less clear as alternative forms of energy have become
available and, in some cases, more appealing. 409 Indeed, the Court in Pacific
Gas specifically stated that the pro-development bias of the AEA did not
require that nuclear power plants should be built regardless of their costs. 41 0
Absent a manifest directive in the AEA to construct nuclear power plants, 411
states like Vermont, that choose to conserve energy or develop alternative
energy production technologies like wind or solar power, should not be bound
by what Professor Wiggins calls a "nationally standardized selection of nuclear

discretion to utilize nonnuclear energy facilities. Far more likely, what was to be 'promoted' was not
nuclear power at the expense of alternatives but the development of the technology that would permit
nuclear power plants to be one of the alternatives"). But see Baum, supra note 77, at 668 ("The primary
purpose of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) is to foster the safe development of nuclear energy as
a power source." (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
u.s. 190,221 (1983))).
409. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 721 ("Since [California's] nuclear provisions may result in an
indefinite exclusion of nuclear power plants from California, it may be argued that the state is interfering
with activity that Congress set out to promote through the Atomic Energy Act. Congress, however, has
neither made a judgment nor enacted any requirement that the nation as a whole must 'go nuclear.' On
the contrary, by separating promotional from regulatory activities in the nuclear field, and by recently
permitting states to subject nuclear power plants to state health regulations no less stringent than those
applicable to other energy sources [in Clean Air Act § 122], Congress has clearly indicated its intent to
provide the states with a nuclear option, not a nuclear mandate."); see also Wiggins, supra note 83, at 80
(saying the enactment of the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act, "which completely restructured federal
regulation of atomic energy," indicated Congress's unwillingness "to give nuclear power a legislative
preference, and instead provided for a balanced system of meeting national energy demands").
410. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 221-23 (saying the AEA's primary purpose of developing
commercial use nuclear power did not imply congressional intent to do so "at all costs" and states
retained "sufficient authority . . . to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even
stopped for economic reasons"); see also Borchers & Dauer, supra note 123, at 104 ("The Court noted
that while a basic purpose of the AEA is to promote nuclear power, the objective of promoting nuclear
power is to be achieved economically" and, thus, the California law, which the Court "construed as a
guarantor of economically viable nuclear development, was not at cross-purposes with the AEA .... ");
Li, supra note 44, at 1203-04 (Local nuclear free zones "do not conflict with federal statutes or obstruct
federal purposes. Because the AEA does not require the manufacture of nuclear weapons 'at all costs,'
and because nuclear free zones do not impose unacceptable costs on the production of nuclear weapons,
their impact on federal defense policy does not require invalidation."). But see Martin, supra note 296, at
996 ("[l]f Congress does not act, and the courts are precluded from reviewing local enactments, 'the
effective final decision weighing state and federal interests would ... rest with ... state and local
lawmaking bodies' likely to emphasize local concerns and discount the federal interest in an
unobstructed foreign policy."); Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 674 ("This result in Pacific Gas undercuts
Congress's promotional objectives for nuclear power as set forth in the AEA and gave individual states a
means to exercise leverage over the safer development and use of nuclear power.").
411. Even the granting of a construction permit is not a mandate to build and operate a plant. See
Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 672 ("NRC licensing permits the construction of a nuclear power plant
without compelling it ... .");see also Tribe, supra note 19, at 703 ('"[T]he license granted by the AEC
is merely a permit to construct a power plant, not a Federal order to do so.' Therefore, if legitimate state
interests lead a state to delay, relocate, or even reject a proposed nuclear power plant, the 1954 Act as
amended cannot be treated as mandating a contrary choice." (quoting Marshall v. Consumers Power Co.,
237 N.W.2d 266,280 (1975))).
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energy." 412 Thus, Vermont Act 160 presents no threat of obstacle
preemption. 413

B. Vermont Act 160 Is Protected by the Presumption Against Preemption
The presumption against preemption is particularly strong when the basis
for state action is its traditional police powers, as is the case with Vermont Act
160, and where there is no expression of contrary intent in the federal law, as
with the AEA. 414 One sacrosanct area of state regulation is determining electric
utility rates, 41 5 including electricity from nuclear power plants; 41 6 another is
determining whether a particular power plant is necessary. 417 "[T]o require that
commercial electric power shall not be generated until it is clear that the
economic burden of using such power can be fully discharged in a finite time[]
is only to impose a rational economic constraint on the generation and sale of
electricity."418 This authority to require a utility to demonstrate the need for the
power a plant will generate fits squarely within a state's traditional power to
regulate utilities that operate within its borders 419 and to protect its ratepayers
from unsound investments, even if the exercise of that authority enables the
public utility commission to exclude an investment in a nuclear plant from the

412. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 66-67 (highlighting "California's unique position" as a reason
why "states should be free to establish their own priorities and guidelines for meeting energy needs,"
listing among these features California's leadership in environmental consciousness resulting in a public
"debate over the desirability of nuclear power" and that it is "geographically and geologically well
situated" to use nonnuclear energy, mentioning "solar, wind, geothermal and tidal sources," and stating
that the argument that "California cannot choose to develop alternative energy technologies, but that it
must be bound by some nationally standardized selection of nuclear power, makes very little sense in the
absence of an unambiguous showing of congressional intent"); see also supra notes 2~5 and
accompanying text (discussing the clear statement rule).
413. Cf Nishimura-Paige, supra note 81, at 1032 ("In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, [453
U.S. 609 (1981),] the Court rejected a claim that congressional policy favoring the use of coal as a fuel
source preempted state legislation that may have had an adverse effect on the use of coal.").
414. See supra notes 234-55 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial presumption against
preemption).
415. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 67.
416. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 686 {The nuclear provisions of the California Public Resources
Code "are not preempted by federal law. On the contrary, they properly serve the vital interests of the
people of California in providing California citizens with a plan of maximal accountability for the
development of a responsible and economical state energy program within the framework of national
energy policy and federal law."); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 208 {1983) (holding that the statutory language and history of section 271
"confirm[ed] that while the safety of nuclear technology was the exclusive business of the federal
government, state power over the production of electricity was not otherwise displaced" (citing 100
CONG. REc. 12015, 12196-202 (remarks of Sen. Hickenlooper)). For a general discussion of the ratesetting process, see Tomain, supra note 16.
417. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978) ("There is little
doubt that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar bodies are
empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for power.").
418. Tribe, supra note 19, at 712.
419. See id. ("(S]uch an economic preference would fall within the traditional state function of
regulating public utilities-insuring that they provide adequate services at reasonable rates.").

2012]

NUCLEAR GENIE

765

rate base, making the nuclear plant a financially unattractive investment for the
utility. 420 Thus, to the extent that Vermont Act 160 represented a determination
by the state that the safety problems at the plant created untenable economic
uncertainties for the company's ratepayers and citizens of Vermont, then the
state's decision not to extend its operating lifetime until a complete cost-benefit
evaluation had been done for the plant should be protected by the presumption
against preemption.
It is hard to imagine a more "frontal assault" on state authority than a
federal directive dictating to states what form of energy source they must invest
in. 421 If a court construed the AEA to preempt Act 160, it would be telling
Vermont that the state must continue to rely on nuclear power as its preferred
energy source and dedicate the plant site to that use. Surely, after forty years of
fraught experience with Vermont Yankee, Vermont should be able to change its
mind. Indeed, if Vermont were not allowed to protect its citizens from the risk
considerations of Act 160, there would be a regulatory vacuum leaving the state
exposed to those risks. 4 22
Another police power is a state's ability to determine land uses within its
borders, which has long been considered a matter of exclusive state control. 423
This power remains plenary even when it might be used to block construction

420. !d. at 712 n.l57 ("[A] state under its regulatory authority could inquire into the prudence of
investments by public utility companies into nuclear power reactors, and could exclude such investments
from the rate base if they were determined to be imprudent," even if that resulted in "prevent[ing] the
development of nuclear energy within the state .... [I]t is not clear that the federal government could
compel a state to invest its resources in a losing venture."); see also Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 673
("By employing economic considerations to justify state laws that block the operation of nuclear power
plants, even though safety is the genuine but undisclosed goal of such laws, state legislatures effectively
can prevent the further development of nuclear energy within their jurisdictions."); Guastella, supra note
I 0,. at 759 ("Two tests have traditionally been used by regulatory commissions for implementing this
allocation of risk policy [between investors and ratepayers]. The prudent investment test disallows the
use of plant costs in determining rates if the investment was imprudent in light of information that was
reasonably available to management at the time the investment decision was made.").
421. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 722 ("If, as the Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery, a
congressional command that the states pay their public health and recreation employees a minimum
wage must be struck down as a forbidden attempt to 'devour the essentials of state sovereignty,' then
what is one to say of a congressional command that states invest their resources in nuclear energy rather
than rely on a combination of fossil fuels, solar power, geothermal power and energy sources?" (quoting
Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976))); id. ("If Congress requires California to
open its gates to nuclear reactors, however, it is exercising a far more delicate power that, under
National League of Cities, appears to call for extraordinary justification, such as a showing of 'an
extremely serious problem which endanger[s] the well-being of all the component parts of our federal
system and which only collective action by the National Government might forestall."' (quoting Nat'/
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852-53)).
422. See id. at 714 ("[S]tate requirements not directed at radiation safety would not be duplicative
of federal efforts, and a holding of preemption in such a case would create a legal vacuum."); see also
supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text for an example of a regulatory gap.
423. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing a state's traditional authority to regulate
land use).
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of a nuclear power p1ant. 424 Additionally, a state has a legitimate interest in
shielding its environment from hann and protecting its citizens from anxiety
caused by the operation of a nuclear power plant. 425 To the extent it may be
difficult to tease apart radiological impacts from other forms or causes of
environmental harm and public anxiety, courts should give deference to a
state's determination of where the dividing line should fall. 426 Therefore, the
determination by Vermont in Act 160 that the continuing use of land within the
state's borders for the use of Vennont Yankee is unwarranted because of
potential harm to its citizens is an exercise of the state's traditional police
powers.
However, since a contrary federal interest can overcome the exercise of a
state's police power authority, 427 an argument might be made that Vermont
Act 160 should be preempted because it could start a landslide of similar
attempts by states to block the extension of their nuclear power plants'
operating licenses. 428 This might undermine important national goals like
achieving energy independence, maintaining a strong electric power grid, and
avoiding the short-term need to build new coal-fired power plants. 429 But even
in the wake of Fukushima Daichii, several states have reiterated their
424. See Baum, supra note 77, at 679 (noting many ways states can "prevent the development of
nuclear power plants by means of stringent land use requirements, or by using the authority granted the
states under the Clean Air Act Amendments of I 977").
425. See Tribe, supra note I 9, at 703...{)4 ("In order to meet its responsibilities towards its citizens
for regulating public utilities, managing public resources, and maintaining public tranquility, and also its
responsibilities towards future generations, a state has a duty and a right to: (I) require economy and
efficiency in the generation of electricity, (2) minimize the economic and social burdens of nuclear
reactor failure or catastrophe, (3) guarantee its citizens maximum peace of mind concerning nuclear
energy activity, and (4) avoid irreconcilable conflict with sound principles of ecological management.");
id. at 708 ("Other problems flow from the public anxiety inevitably associated with the manifest
difficulties of this [nuclear waste] containment, and from the many tangible and troubling symptoms of
social unrest to which such unrelieved anxiety can contribute."); see also Cavers, supra note 19, at 5 I
(arguing that a state law banning construction of nuclear reactors near major population centers because
of the anxiety this might cause city residents, regardless of the objective safety of a reactor "seems ... a
purpose distinct from 'protection against radiation hazards,' ... [and] would be sheltered by subsection
k against attack based on a theory of pre-emption").
426. See Murphy, supra note 96, at 877 (arguing that the court in Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v.
Bonsey, 107 F. Supp. 2d 47, 55-56 (D. Me. 2000), held "deference must be given to the state assertions
that the state did not intend to regulate radiological areas, and, therefore, federal law did not preempt the
state investigation").
427. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 55-56 ("Of course the asserted purpose must first be found an
appropriate use of the state's police power .... Next, this state interest must be balanced against the
equally justifiable federal interest in regulating the same subject.").
428. See Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 44, at 450.
429. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 679 ('The extent to which the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(AEA) allows the states to regulate the siting, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants is a
question of great significance to the entire nation at a time when the rising costs of traditional fuels have
caused suppliers and consumers alike to search for safe, economical, and reliable alternative sources of
energy."); see also Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 665 (Pacific Gas and Silkwood allow "all the states to
circumvent federal policy favoring continued development of nuclear energy by clearing the way for the
enactment of stringent safety regulations, which can be used to block the operation of privately owned
nuclear power plants.").
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continuing commitment to nuclear power, 430 in part because of the difficulty of
building new coal-fired plants given Clean Air Act restrictions. Moreover,
taking existing power plants offline has a cost: replacement power must be
purchased, power failures may increase, and electricity prices will likely
rise. 431 In the short term, only Vermont will bear the costs of its action, as it
will need to find replacement power to assure uninterrupted service to Vermont
Yankee's customers and will have to shoulder the cost of lost jobs and
revenue. 432 These costs make it doubtful that many states will rush to follow
Vermont's lead. Therefore, little disruption to the national grid would occur if
only one state, Vermont, prevails in its attempt to close its nuclear plant.
In the absence of a conflicting national policy requiring Vermont
Yankee's continued operation, the presumption against preemption protects
Vermont's decision to abandon what is becoming an unreliable and risky
source of power. This presumption protects state laws enacted under a state's
traditional police powers and can only be overcome by clear evidence of
contrary congressional intent. 433 A reliable supply of electric energy for its
citizens falls within a state's traditional police power and is a matter of state,
not federal, concern. 434 Vermont Act 160, which authorizes the state to
exercise that power to assure its citizens of a reliable source of electric energy
and, thus, protect their general welfare, is a legitimate use of the state's police
power and, therefore, should not be preempted.
Strong policy reasons underlying the presumption against preemption also
support this conclusion, particularly the importance of maintaining states as
robust centers of independent authority in our federal structures. Vermont's law
reflects the state's interest in being an active player in the fate of its only
nuclear reactor, and as the state's recent denial of a Clean Water Act section
401 certification for plant discharges illustrates, 435 Vermont offers its citizens
the prospect of greater environmental protection than the national
government. 436 Given Vermont Yankee's accident record, the history of lax

430. See Christa Marshall, Nuclear Revival Plans Continue in Some States, CLIMATEWIRE (March
21, 20 II), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/20 11103/21/archive/4 (citing Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Iowa, Utah, and Missouri as states considering the nuclear option).
431. See generally Matthew L. Wald, If Indian Point Closes, Plenty of Challenges, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 20 II, at A21; see also Patrick McGeehan, Dirtier Air and Higher Costs Possible if Indian Point
Closes, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at Al9.
432. See RICHARD W. HEAPS, NORTHERN ECONOMIC CONSULTING, INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF THE VY STATION (2010), available at http://www.vtep.org%2Fstudies%2F!BEW%2520Heaps%
2520VY%2520Economic%2520Report.pdf (discussing the economic benefits of Vermont Yankee,
which presumably would be lost if the plant ceases operation).
433. See supra notes 234-46 and accompanying text (describing the basic elements of the judicial
presumption against preemption).
434. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text (discussing the division of authority over
nuclear power plants between the federal and state governments).
435. See supra note 161.
436. Cavers objects to a Minnesota law authorizing the state Board of Health to reject nuclear
reactors that endanger public health because:
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NRC oversight of its operation, and Entergy's dissembling information about
the plant's problems, additional oversight by the state provides an overlapping
layer of regulation and the chance to avoid re-experiencing the NRC's
errors. 437 Indeed, the state's denial of the section 401 certification corrected an
error that the NRC made when it authorized the license extension without
complying with section 401. 438 Therefore, protecting Vermont Act 160 from
federal preemption assures Vermont citizens a higher level of protection from
potential environmental harm.
Vermont Act 160 also promotes deliberative democracy. 439 The law
requires a "public engagement process," including at least three public
meetings to discuss the issues raised by the public review of the plant. 440 This
kind of public engagement in a governmental decision-making process can
happen more easily and effectively at the state or local level, where access for
citizens is more direct and immediate, and there is less likelihood of agency
capture by large economic interests than at the federallevel. 441 Preempting the
state law would foreclose such participation with the attendant risks of federal
agency capture and the loss of public input into the decision-making process.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has largely settled the question of
whether states should be robust centers of nuclear power plant regulation. 442 In
Pacific Gas and Silkwood, the Court effectively decentralized nuclear
regulation. 443 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions affirmed that result despite
unless Minnesota were prepared to rubber-stamp the AEC's decisions, its exercise of
concurrent licensing power might actually result in the imposition of stricter controls than
those imposed by the Federal agency" and would require a "parallel process be conducted
before a state agency [that] would add to the already serious costs of the licensing process
in terms of the applicant's time and man-power and might readily lead to expensive
delays in getting the reactor built and into operation.
Cavers, supra note 19, at 33-34.
437. See supra notes 327-44 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of, and problems with,
regulatory overlap).
438. See supra note 161 (citing a GREENWIRE article discussing the state's lawsuit against the NRC
for extending the plant's operating license without a water quality certificate or a waiver of the statutory
requirement).
439. See supra notes 351-58 and accompanying text (discussing how preemption squashes citizen
participation in the process of governing).
440. 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 160 § 4(b).
441. See supra notes 345-57 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of public
participation at the local level); supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text (noting the role of public
participation in avoiding agency capture).
442. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 684 ("The Court agreed that the Federal Government 'has
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns' .... Consequently, state regulation of nuclear
power plant construction based on public health and safety concerns 'would ... be in the teeth of the
Atomic Energy Act's objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread
development and use-and would be pre-empted for that reason."' (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,212-13 (1983))).
443. See Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 673-74 ("[B]ecause the Supreme Court sanctioned direct state
regulation of all 'non-safety' matters, it effectively decentralized government decisionmaking over the
nuclear power industry."); id. at 677 ("In Pacific Gas and Silkwood, the Court reassessed the extent of
federal preemption under the AEA and interpreted the Act to permit greater state authority over the

2012]

NUCLEAR GENIE

769

the strong federal interest in assuring nuclear reactor safety, achieving national
energy independence and an uninterrupted supply of power for the country, and
reducing the country's carbon footprint. 444 The Court may have done this in
response to increasing public concern about nuclear safety 445 or, perhaps,
because it realized that concentrating nuclear regulation in the federal
government might increase the likelihood of error and stifle regulatory
creativity at the state level.
Because of the desirability of having states as robust centers of
governance and the strong tradition of preserving a state's traditional governing
authority, absent a clear statement of preemptive intent in the AEA and
conditions favoring preemption, Vermont should be free to choose the source
of energy for its citizens. 446
C. Overcoming Collective Action Problems Created by Vermont Act 160

Since Vermont Act 160 affects a single nuclear power plant, and not state
regulatory standards or other plants, many of the arguments set forth in Part IV
supporting preemption of state laws are inapplicable to the argument in this
Article, such as the need for uniformity, the ability to achieve economies of
scale at the national level, the avoidance of burdens on interstate commerce,
and the need to facilitate interstate markets and resource management.
nuclear power industry. The Court thus cleared the way for joint regulation of nuclear power plants by
both the states and the NRC, notwithstanding the potential future impact of this policy upon the
congressional desire to promote nuclear energy."). But see Cavers, supra note 19, at 31 n.7 ("Licensing
and regulation of more dangerous activities-such as nuclear reactors-will remain the exclusive
responsibility of the Commission. It is not intended to leave room for the exercise of dual or concurrent
jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by regulating by-product, source, or special nuclear
materials. The intent is to have the material regulated and licensed by the Commission, or by the State
and local governments, but not by both."' (quoting S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 8-9
(1959))).
444. See Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 665 ("Despite its emphasis on the indirect effect of the
regulations at issue, the Goodyear Atomic Court again provided specific precedent that allowed states to
participate more significantly in the safety regulation of nuclear plants-an area inherently bound to
national security and over which the states previously had been denied authority." (citing Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988))); see also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90
(1990) (holding the state law action for intentional infliction of emotional distress did not "fall within
the pre-empted field of nuclear safety as that field has been defined in prior cases").
445. See Izhakoff, supra note 122, at 689-90 ("The Court's somewhat inconsistent positions in
Pacific Gas, Silkwood, and Goodyear Atomic might best be interpreted when viewed in their historical
context. Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court has faced increasing public sensitivity to inadequate
regulation by the NRC and, after the Three Mile Island accident, growing doubts about the safety of
nuclear power. Aware of this public sentiment and under mounting pressure from state legislatures
seeking to involve themselves in regulating nuclear safety, the Court in Silkwood and Goodyear Atomic
may have decided to adopt an analytical interpretation of the AEA which broadens the permissible scope
of state control over the nuclear industry.").
446. See Wiggins, supra note 83, at 82 ("[I]n keeping with the state-supportive presumption in
preemption cases generally, the states themselves may determine priorities for types of power plants to
be constructed within their borders. Until Congress 'unmistakably' declares a preference for a specific
fuel source, which it has not yet done, the states should retain responsibility to monitor choices made
initially by a public utility. In this way their traditional police power authority can best be maintained.").
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However, Vermont's enactment of Act 160 was clearly motivated by its selfinterest. In all likelihood, the state based its assessment of its sole nuclear
plant's costs, benefits, and risks on parochial concerns, 447 ignoring benefits and
harms beyond its borders. 448 This motivation provides a strong justification for
federal preemption. 449 Following Professors Glicksman and Levy's suggestion
that a court should only find preemption when collective action problems could
not be overcome, this Part examines whether Vermont Act 160 creates
collective action problems and, if it does, whether those problems could be
surmounted without the law's preemption. 450
Collective action problems may arise if Act 160 vested negative
externalities on adjacent states or on the states as a whole. Since Vermont is not
closing its borders to an unwanted land use, which another state or the federal
government wants to locate there, its law is not forcing that unwanted land use
and its harms onto another state; 451 Vermont Yankee is not going to be
relocated because the plant's only purpose is to provide power to local
customers. Vermont's law will not have a direct impact on any other state's
treatment of nuclear power plants. Nor will national regulations that might
affect some regulatory threshold result from Vermont Act 160. Thus, allowing
Vermont Act 160 to stay in effect will not create a barrier to the location of
nuclear plants in other states or the location of non-nuclear plants in Vermont.
So, no other state will suffer lost positive externalities and Vermont Act 160
44 7. See Reilly, supra note 43, at 70 I ("States, observing nuclear power from a localized point of
view, inevitably base their safety estimations on parochial concerns. They may very well overemphasize
the risk of a severe nuclear accident, since this would profoundly affect the population within their
borders.").
448. See id. ("While states overemphasize the likelihood of a nuclear disaster, they simultaneously
de-emphasize the significant environmental benefits of nuclear energy. Many of these benefits would be
external to state borders and thus apparent only from a national or global perspective."); id. at 702
(California's nuclear moratorium law "may have forced California to import electricity from states in the
Northwest. Production of this electricity may severely pollute the Northwest, but leave the Californian
environment untouched."); id. ("In Northern States Power, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals
anticipated state overregulation of nuclear power," and "enforced federal preemption of state nuclear
regulation because '[states] might conceivably be so overprotective in the area of health and safety as to
unnecessarily stultifY the industrial development and use of atomic energy for the production of electric
power."' (quoting N. States Power Co. v. Minn., 447 F.2d 1143, 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd per curiam,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972))).
449. See Levy & Glicksman, supra note 207, at 930 ("[F]ederal action is necessary or justified
when state regulation is unlikely to produce the optimal result, viewed from the perspective of the
United States as a whole, because the incentives of individual states and the interests of the states as a
collective run in different directions."); Cavers, supra note 19, at 51 ("If the reactor were simply a part
of an electric power system, ministering to no special federal objectives in its particular location, I
should not be surprised if the authority of the state were held to prevail."). But see Tribe, supra note 19,
at 723 ("[E]ven if California's nuclear provisions were to result in the exclusion of nuclear reactors-a
wholly speculative possibility-they should not, solely for that reason, be deemed preempted by federal
law.").
450. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 175, at 647-48.
451. Conceivably, as a seller of wholesale power to customers in other states, the loss of that power
or any increase in its costs could hurt those out-of-state consumers. But it is assumed that Vermont
would be able to produce or purchase replacement power, thus eliminating any such harm.
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will not create any transboundary pollution. Indeed, shuttering Vermont
Yankee eliminates that likelihood. 452 This is also not a situation involving
resource pooling--creating incentives for other states to free ride on the efforts
of Vermont-or resource harding-giving Vermont an unfair advantage.
Therefore, Vermont Act 160 does not create any collective action problems for
other states or the country as a whole.
While Vermont's citizens may benefit from the shutdown of Vermont
Yankee to the extent that they are protected from unwanted future costs or
health risks, the state will also suffer costs, such as the need to buy or develop
replacement power, the loss of plant-related jobs, and the loss of state revenue
from plant operation. 453 Vermont might even find itself subject to a takings
claim should it deny a certificate of public good for the plant. 454
Therefore, any collective action problems attributable to Vermont's law,
on closer examination, disappear. Vermont alone will bear the costs and
benefits of its action. There is no reason to expect other states to follow
Vermont's lead by also blocking the extension of their nuclear plants' operating
licenses. Even if they do, this dynamic may be a valuable communication tool
causing the NRC to rethink its policy of automatically granting license
extensions-a reason why Congress, in the AEA, preserved a sphere of state
regulation of nuclear power plants when their operation directly affects a state's
traditional police power concerns.
CONCLUSION

The AEA should not preempt Vermont Act 160. Vermont's law falls

452. The plant would be decommissioned and dismantled in accordance with NRC rules and the
remaining fuel would be sent to a licensed waste repository or stored onsite.
453. See generally HEAPS, supra note 432. Vermont may also not be able to recoup these costs in
the rate base. See Guastella, supra note 10, at 759 ("The second test is the used and useful test, which
excludes from the rate base the costs of a plant that is not providing service. In reality, it is not a test at
all. The principle strips the regulatory body of any discretion and denies recovery regardless of whether
the investment was prudent, without regard to the potentially devastating effect such a decision might
have on a utility.").
454. See Guastella, supra note 10, at 763 (discussing Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 454 A.2d
435 (1982), which found a decision by the state public utility commission prohibiting the expenditure of
capital received in "a routine stock issuance, on construction of Unit II of the Seabrook nuclear facility"
a regulatory taking because it "effectively precluded completion of the project"); id. at 760-61 (New
York's Used and Useful law when "combined with the state's new anti-Shoreham policies, appear[ed] to
unreasonably defeat the investment expectations of LILCO. LILCO shareholders would be injured by
receiving no return on their investment in an operational nuclear plant for which the state, through past
participation and support, was partly responsible. Management and investors relied on this government
cooperation and the prudent investment rule. It now appears they were misled by the state and county,
which have embarked on policies of active opposition to Shoreham."); see also Shattuck, supra note 17,
at 267 ("To saddle a utility with the costs of a political change of mind by a state or local government,
and to allow their consequent nonparticipation in emergency planning to become a de facto veto after
hundreds of millions of dollars have already been spent, makes no more sense than telling people with a
rector in their backyard that they must not think the unthinkable and must not worry over how to get
out.").
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squarely within the state's traditional police power preserved in the AEA and is
consistent with federalism principles. State participation in the regulation of
nuclear plants has not been expressly preempted by the AEA, nor has the NRC
totally occupied the field of nuclear power plant regulation. Absent a statutory
mandate supporting the national development of commercial nuclear power
plants, the AEA creates no obstacle to a state wishing to pursue alternative
forms of power. The conflation of economic and radiological safety concerns
that underlie the AEA underlie nuclear power itself-radiological safety cannot
easily be separated from a state's concerns about the economic wellbeing of its
citizens, nor should it be. Preserving Vermont's capacity to say no to the
continued operation of Vermont Yankee protects the state's exercise of its
traditional police power authorities and preserves it as a robust center of
governance-a useful check on federal excesses and errors and a source of new
ideas for solving regulatory problems. The only valid justification for
preemption of state authority in a circumstance such as this is to prevent
collective action problems, but there are none here that would harm other states
or the nation.
Vermont should be allowed to protect its citizens from what it perceives as
a potential economic and environmental harm. Vermont Yankee is no different
from any other type of plant a state public service commission determines is
imprudent. Indeed, in an era where there are many power generation choices, to
saddle Vermont with a plant that has been accident prone, poorly managed, and
costly, based upon decisions made nearly half a century ago, would be unwise
and unfortunate. This is certainly not what the Framers intended when
establishing the federalism balance that envisioned states as coequal partners
with the federal government in the business of governing.
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